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Who gets to participate in decision making and how, on what scale and with 
what processes and through what organizational forms, and toward what 
ends and with what means of evaluation and change are fundamental com-
ponents, indeed, and the focus of this book. They are fundamental questions 
of resource management, and they are the fundamental questions of politics. 
Politics is not only “who gets what, when, and how” as it has been famously 
described (Lasswell 1958). It is also who	decides who gets what, when, and 
how, and how	we	decide such things.
So much has been written about watersheds: their importance, their 
The modern “watershed movement” constitutes a broad and ambitious 
experiment in natural resource governance. Watershed initiatives are 
forcing a reexamination of several fundamental	components	of	resource	
management, including: who should be involved in making management 
decisions; at what geographic locations should the decisions (and deci-
sion-making processes) be based; and which evaluation criteria should be 
used to determine appropriate water uses and management philosophies?
frank GreGG, doUGlas kenney, kathryn MUtz, and teresa riCe  
(1998, eMPhasis added)
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complexity, their rediscovery as a focus of natural resource management 
and environmental protection. A fair amount has been written, too, about 
the management of watersheds and the kinds of institutional arrangements 
that would be best suited to the task. Much of that writing prescribes one or 
another organizational approach (such as an integrated watershed manage-
ment agency or basin commission) or decision-making style (collaborative, 
consensus based, etc.) as essential or at least desirable to that task. Most 
watersheds, though, at least in the United States, have not conformed to 
such prescriptions and are instead governed and managed through com-
plex, polycentric mixes of private and public bodies, of general-purpose and 
special district governments, of jurisdictions that lie within the watershed 
and jurisdictions that spill beyond it.
Our primary purpose in this book is not to criticize the institutional 
prescriptions that others have recommended but to try to explain the more 
complicated reality of the political watershed. Of course, we are not inter-
ested in providing merely a justification for existing institutions; we will 
have some prescriptions of our own along the way. We are, however, inter-
ested in combating a couple of viewpoints that surface from time to time 
in writing about watersheds—that one best way (meaning some form of 
comprehensive integrated management) exists for governing watersheds 
and that if we could just get rid of the politics we could manage the water-
shed so much better.
The one-best-way theme surfaces anew with each water era in the United 
States. Supporters of the National Resources Board and its river basin com-
mittees, created in 1934, argued that finally the United States would realize 
the value of integrated planning and comprehensive development of river 
basins, leaving behind the fragmented, haphazard approach practiced to 
that time (Derthick 1974). Two and a half decades later, river basin commis-
sions were heralded as the best way to accomplish river basin management, 
replacing the fragmented, uncoordinated practices of the previous water 
era. As a 1960 report of the Senate Select Committee on National Water 
Resources explained: “For this new type of approach the term ‘comprehen-
sive development’ is suggested. By it we mean the application of integrated 
multipurpose design, planning and management” (Senate Select Committee 
on National Water Resources 1960, Print #31:2). And, again, contemporary 
efforts at watershed planning and management through watershed partner-
ships claim that one of their prime advantages over earlier efforts is their 
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broad focus on managing all dimensions of a watershed (Sabatier et al. 
2005).
In addition, the tone of frustration with political considerations is clear 
in some of the reflections of commentators (especially from the physical 
sciences) who have contributed their thoughts on natural resource systems 
generally or watersheds in particular. Watershed management efforts “face 
numerous obstacles, more social than hydrologic” (Kraft et al. 1999, 10), 
and their success often depends on “the degree of political commitment to 
the objectives by those who have authority to act. Regrettably, science can 
offer no help in this problem” (Pereira 1989, 54). Particularly in the United 
States, the governmental structure exhibits problems of “overlapping areal 
jurisdiction, dispersed functional responsibilities, and ineffective coordina-
tion . . . heightened by traditional interunit and intergovernmental tensions” 
(Nakamura and Born 1993, 812), with agencies and programs sometimes 
operating at cross-purposes (Behrman 1993, 11; U.S. EPA 1995, iii; Duncan 
2001). Other water problems have remained unaddressed because they do 
not fit within established programs, so no agency or unit of government 
is charged with responding to them (Kraft et al. 1999). While they remain 
unaddressed, they grow worse.
These are important and valid criticisms by thoughtful and respected 
colleagues, and there is plenty of empirical support for them. The differ-
ences between political boundaries and watershed boundaries complicate 
many aspects of water resources management, and the existence of mul-
tiple governments and organizations with differing jurisdictions, powers, 
and portfolios creates opportunities for delayed and uncoordinated action. 
Left unanswered by this critique of the past and present, however, are three 
other questions that we think are important. First, how has watershed man-
agement (particularly in the United States) emerged despite this complex 
system, and what does it look like? Second, why do these polycentric and 
complicated arrangements exist—is there any logic to why people have 
constructed organizational and inter-organizational relationships in these 
ways, and if so what is it? Third, how can individuals working on water-
shed management under these circumstances better understand the institu-
tional environment that surrounds them, why it is the way it is, and what to 
do? (In particular, we imagine the situation of a person who has assumed a 
position of responsibility for managing a watershed, whose education and 
experience heretofore have been primarily in science or engineering, and 
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who is looking for some practical help as well as a broader understanding.) 
Addressing these questions is a way of taking watershed politics seriously, 
of rightly viewing those political issues as “fundamental components of 
resource management.”
In this book, we also discuss political considerations as they affect water-
shed governance. Our approach as political scientists is somewhat different, 
at least in style, but in substance too. Instead of being stymied by political 
issues, we concentrate on them and the challenges they present. We do so for 
a variety of reasons.
For people to govern watersheds well requires that they make collec-
tive choices. People, organizations, interest groups, and governments, all 
of whom represent different interests, values, dreams, and aspirations, 
must collectively decide how to govern the shared resources and uses of 
watersheds. Collective choices are ultimately political choices. Thus, gov-
erning watersheds well requires embracing politics. Fortunately, watershed 
politics does not have to be blindly embraced; rather political science and, 
more broadly, political economy provide explanations, analyses, and pre-
scriptions to assist watershed governors. The explanations and analyses, 
grounded in political theory, transaction costs, local public economies, and 
federalism, provide us with an understanding of why watershed governance 
is almost always going to involve many overlapping, sometimes coopera-
tive, sometimes competitive governments, organizations, and associations. 
Such organizational and institutional complexity is likely even if coopera-
tive and problem-solving orientations dominate among the participants in 
a watershed.
These literatures also provide prescriptions for good governance, which 
we will focus on and highlight. In our reading of the watershed literature we 
believe that political explanations and analyses are largely missing, and, con-
sequently, so too are the prescriptions arising from such analyses. Finally, in 
engaging in a political economy analysis of watershed governance we hope 
to begin to reorient the policy debates surrounding watersheds from the 
search for the one best way to govern to the exploration of what forms of 
governance are possible in what types of situations and how institutional 
and organizational complexity can be better managed.1
We begin in Chapter 1 by constructing the physical and institutional 
setting within which watershed governance occurs in the United States. 
Watersheds are complex adaptive systems, and as such they exhibit certain 
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characteristics and dynamics that present particular challenges for their 
governance and use. Institutional arrangements, such as those in use in a 
watershed, can also be thought of as complex adaptive systems. Viewing 
both watersheds and institutions as complex adaptive systems provides 
opportunities not only to compare and contrast them but also to consider 
their relation to one another in a context where neither is privileged concep-
tually over the other.
In Chapter 2, we examine three eras of water management in the United 
States. Each era represents efforts at a nationwide scale to realize compre-
hensive integrated watershed management. In examining these eras we 
focus on the conceptions of the physical and institutional settings of water-
sheds, governance problems emerging and existing in watersheds, and 
means of addressing those problems. The fundamental political issues were 
similar across eras; however, how they were addressed differed, except in two 
important respects. The preferred mode of decision making was consensus, 
and plan implementation was voluntary. Such organizations are relatively 
weak and unable to realize integrated management. In the end, we argue 
that searching for the best way to manage a watershed is not as productive as 
examining how watershed management unfolds in practice and why.
In Chapter 3 we consider issues that are fundamental to politics. Those 
issues involve determining whose interests count in decision making, the 
strengths and limitations of different forms of decision making, and differ-
ent institutional mechanisms for holding decision makers accountable. All 
of these issues require people to make choices that result in governing struc-
tures that are not always fair, that sometimes neglect important interests, 
and that are imperfectly accountable. These choices and their implications 
may sometimes be so difficult and divisive that people have trouble devising 
institutional arrangements that would allow them to better govern water-
sheds. We illustrate the difficult political choices that public officials and 
citizens must make in a case study of the Platte River watershed.
Beginning with Chapter 4, we construct a political economy analysis of 
watershed governance. In that chapter we assume that people are boundedly 
rational and make choices and take actions in a world of transaction costs. 
Bounded rationality and transaction costs place constraints on the types and 
structures of institutions and organizations that people can devise in order 
to achieve shared goals and desired outcomes. In order to cope with transac-
tion costs, boundedly rational individuals construct multiple, overlapping 
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organizations that separately address limited goals and problems that would 
otherwise be impossible to achieve in a single, watershed-scale, general-
 purpose government. We illustrate our theoretical argument by applying 
it to a case study of the Columbia River Basin and the Northwest Power 
Planning Council.
In Chapter 5, we refine and further flesh out the analysis from Chapter 
4 by focusing on values. In constructing governing arrangements, people 
must not only make trade-offs among transaction costs but also make trade-
offs among efficiency, fairness, and responsiveness. Organizations that may 
be responsive to their members’ needs may not be very efficient in produc-
ing desired goods and services, for instance. We use the local public econo-
mies literature to explain how devising a diverse set of organizations with 
different missions and at different scales in a watershed may allow people 
to realize differing and sometimes conflicting values. The San Gabriel River 
watershed in Southern California provides us with the empirical example to 
apply our argument.
In Chapter 6, we turn to issues of scale and the relationships among 
governments and organizations at different levels extending from those that 
are wholly within the watershed to those that extend beyond the watershed. 
One of the sustained critiques of polycentric governance is that it is frag-
mented and uncoordinated. We use the literature on federalism to explore 
cross-scale linkages and relationships among governments, and how those 
relationships can be structured to support coordinated and complementary 
efforts on the one hand, and how they can dampen and discourage destruc-
tive competition among governments on the other. We use the Delaware 
River Basin Compact to further explore these issues.
In the concluding chapter, we review lessons from the case studies that 
were used in the previous chapters. In the similarities and differences among 
the cases, we find examples of the broader themes raised in the other chap-
ters and in the book overall—the complex dynamics of water resources and 
human communities, the multiple scales and goals that are relevant to water 
resources management, the limited ability of people to address multiple 
scales and goals through integrated decision making and organizations, and 
the rationale underpinning the multi-organizational, polycentric, even fed-
eral style of governance seen in watersheds in the United States. Although 
it can seem a less congenial and rational place than the ideal integrated and 
scientifically managed watershed, the political watershed has the modest 
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virtues of being real and attainable. Embracing the political watershed is 
thus not so much a matter of ardor as of acceptance.
note
1. We illustrate our arguments using several case studies of watershed manage-
ment efforts. They include the Santa Ana and San Gabriel watersheds, the Platte 
River Basin, the Columbia River Basin, and the Delaware River Basin. We selected 
these case studies for a variety of reasons. First, although these watersheds are located 
across the United States from the northeast to the northwest and points in between, 
policy makers and citizens, no matter their location, were confronted with similar 
types of political challenges in governing watersheds. Second, the cases represent 
watersheds at a variety of scales, from those wholly within a state to those span-
ning numerous states. Third, the cases represent a variety of issues and challenges, 
from endangered species, to water quality, to drought management, to water supply, 
to habitat protection, and so on. Fourth, the cases represent a variety of institu-
tional arrangements. The Platte River Cooperative Agreement is an administrative 
agreement among Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, and the U.S. Department of the 
Interior to recover endangered species. The Northwest Power Planning Council was 
created by an act of Congress to integrate power planning and development and fish 
and wildlife protection on the Columbia River. The Delaware River Basin Compact 
was the first interstate river compact to include the federal government as an official 
member. And the two watersheds within California represent local entities assem-






Every watershed has a physical landscape—a complex terrain of landforms, 
water resources, vegetation, animals and their habitats, human beings and 
the structures they have built. Every watershed has an institutional landscape, 
too—a complex but largely invisible terrain of rules and organizations that 
govern and affect human choices about the making of decisions, the use of 
resources, and the relationships of people to nature and one another. This 
book considers the institutional landscapes of watersheds, not in isolation 
from the physical world but in connection to it, recognizing that watersheds 
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Institutions are political—not in the limited sense of Democratic or 
Republican, conservative or liberal, or labor and so forth, but in the larger 
sense of involving choices about who may participate in decision making 
and how, what actions can be taken and under what conditions, what issues 
fall into which jurisdictions, and how and by whom current actions and past 
decisions can be examined, critiqued, and modified. Political scientists are 
fond of saying that politics is about power, which is true. “Power,” however, 
is not necessarily employed in this book as the word is used in ordinary 
conversation, where it makes many people uncomfortable and suspicious. 
Politics is about power because politics is about who can do what and when 
and under what conditions and under what limitations. In that broad sense, 
politics is about all of us in all the landscapes of our lives. Politics is even part 
of how people relate to nature, and so it matters in watersheds.
Without question the institutional arrangements in most watersheds 
in the United States are complicated. There are nongovernmental compo-
nents (associations, councils, trusts, etc.) as well as governmental ones. The 
governmental components are themselves complex, being embedded in a 
political system that features the separation and sharing of powers as well as 
federalism and its web of intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, neither 
governmental nor nongovernmental elements of the institutional landscapes 
of watersheds remain fixed for long. Organizations and the rules governing 
them change. Like their physical counterparts, institutional landscapes shift, 
sometimes almost imperceptibly and at other times dramatically.
How, then, to understand the institutional as well as the physical land-
scapes of watersheds? Much has been gained recently in understanding the 
physical dimensions of watersheds and other ecosystems by viewing them as 
complex adaptive systems. That view can be applied also to understanding 
institutions relating to watersheds. First we will summarize briefly the view 
of watersheds as complex adaptive systems, and later in the chapter we will 
connect that view to the understanding of institutions and what these com-
plexities mean for organizing the management of watersheds.
CompLex adaptIve systems I: eCosystems and Watersheds
The idea and study of complex adaptive systems emerged in connection 
with rising interest in ecosystems. A significant literature on ecosystems as 
complex adaptive systems has developed (Holling 1978, 1986; Walters 1986; 
CompLex LandsCapes    
Lee 1993; Grumbine 1995; Gunderson, Holling, and Light 1995; Stanley 
1995; Carpenter 1996; Haueber 1996; Lackey 1998; Levin 1999; Low et al. 
2003). The concept of complex adaptive systems is encapsulated elegantly 
by Low and colleagues (2003, 103), who write that “complex adaptive sys-
tems are composed of a large number of active elements whose rich pattern 
of interactions produce emergent properties which are not easy to predict 
by analyzing the separate system components.” The connection between 
complex adaptive systems and ecosystems is that ecosystems also consist of 
multiple interacting elements, the conditions and behavior of which change 
over time in ways that can yield unpredictable shifts and outcomes.
ecosystems, Watersheds, and Complex adaptive systems
The literature on ecosystems has had many points of overlap with 
the literature on watersheds. Watersheds fit the conception of ecosystems 
noted above and are often employed as examples of ecosystems (but this is 
not a one-to-one match since a watershed may be home to multiple eco-
systems and a given ecosystem could contain more than one watershed). 
Although the ecosystem literature is not entirely about watersheds and not 
all contributions to the watershed literature include a discussion of ecosys-
tems, each concept has contributed to the development of thought about 
the other.
When analysts and policy advocates try to apply the ecosystem concept 
to actual settings, they often use watersheds as examples. Ecosystems can 
be difficult to identify in a way that finds agreement among many people. 
As Ruhl (1999, 519) stated provocatively, “The term ‘ecosystem’ is much 
like Darwinism and Marxism, in that everybody ‘knows’ what it means, 
but after not very much discussion of the subject it turns out everybody’s 
meaning differs to some degree.” Barham (2001, 183) connects this dif-
ficulty with ecosystems to the attention that watersheds receive: “Setting 
precise boundaries around an ‘ecosystem’ has proven difficult. . . . For 
planners and policymakers in the public arena, the result has often been 
the adoption of the watershed or catchment basin as an ecosystem proxy. 
Watersheds, defined by the ridgetops that separate drainage basins from 
one another, provide ecosystem boundaries that are not as open to dispute 
in terms of their physical location.” Ruhl too advocates watersheds as proxy 
ecosystems for exactly this reason: “It is imperative . . . that policy decision 
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makers undertake a concerted effort to agree upon a single predominant 
controlling factor for ecosystem delineation. Of the realistic candidates for 
that purpose, watersheds stand out as the most suitable [and] most viable 
planning unit available” (1999, 521–522). With some satisfaction, then, Ruhl 
observes that “the use of watershed based planning as a foundation for eco-
system protection has grown steadily throughout the 1990s to the point of 
predominance” (522).1
Watersheds thus are not merely examples of ecosystems; they are seen 
by advocates of ecosystem management as near-substitutes for ecosystems 
and as an appropriate physical landscape on which to put ecosystem man-
agement concepts into practice.2 Although we will have much more to say 
about the matter of watershed boundaries, it suffices here to note that 
the topographical manifestation of watersheds has pragmatically rein-
forced the conceptual link that already existed between watersheds and 
ecosystems.
Accordingly, the literature on complex adaptive systems may be seen as 
relating not only to the broad category of ecosystems but also to watersheds 
as ecosystems. Writing about watershed management projects in language 
compatible with the language of complex adaptive systems, Kerr and Chung 
(2001, 539) observe:
Spatial interlinkages related to the flow of water are inherent in water-
sheds. Water pollution upstream may harm downstream uses of land and 
water, while conservation measures upstream may benefit downstream 
use. Coordination or collective action is often required, which may be 
difficult because benefits and costs are distributed unevenly. . . . Since the 
extent of such complexity will vary by case, a project that works in one 
location may not work well in another. Subtleties in underlying differ-
ences can make it difficult for researchers to understand causal relation-
ships governing project success.
The closing sentences of that observation underscore the roles of uncer-
tainty and surprise that characterize complex adaptive systems, including 
ecosystems and watersheds. The difficulties of predicting watershed or eco-
system behavior are not merely a matter of intellectual curiosity: they are 
vitally connected with the challenges of management. We therefore turn to 
the topic of uncertainty and its relation to the understanding of complex 
adaptive systems such as watersheds and ecosystems.
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Complex adaptive systems and scientific uncertainty
“Uncertainty” is used in several contexts. Often it signifies a lack of 
complete information (insufficient data). Sometimes it means the presence 
of “noise” or risk due to the stochastic, or randomly varying, nature of some 
process. Underlying these standard or familiar definitions of “uncertainty” 
is an “assumption that we know or believe we know the basic cause-and-
effect relationships—the system structure—in . . . whatever we are studying” 
(Wilson 2002a, 333), we just lack enough data to be more precise and accu-
rate, or our predictions contain errors because of variability in the system. 
We might call these kinds of uncertainty “system uncertainty.”
By contrast, “scientific uncertainty” involves more than a lack of reli-
able data. Scientific uncertainty involves a lack of knowledge or absence of 
agreement among scientists about the nature of the resource system and its 
dynamic behavior, about what elements of the system are the best indicators 
of its overall condition, and about what changes in those indicators mean. 
By themselves, more or better data would not necessarily diminish or elimi-
nate this kind of uncertainty.
Because the problem of scientific uncertainty has been discussed in the 
context of complex adaptive systems, people may think uncertainty is the 
same as complexity. As Emery Roe has usefully and clearly articulated, how-
ever, uncertainty and complexity are distinct. “Issues are uncertain when 
causal processes are unclear or not easily understood. Issues are complex 
when they are more numerous, varied, and interrelated than before” (2001, 
111). Seeing this distinction helps avoid a misconception that underlies 
standard modern (often engineering-based) approaches to environmental 
management; namely, that the accumulation and integration of additional 
information will allow us to understand the complex processes better, which 
will reduce the uncertainty. Roe continues:
It is commonly said that, since ecosystems are complex, many of their 
causal processes are uncertain, which in turn requires learning more 
about these processes if the ecosystems are to be managed more opti-
mally. Hence, the implicit notion is that complexity leads to uncertainty, 
which, if reduced, would allow for more complete management. . . . As 
ecologists remind us, it is also true that a deal of uncertainty remains, 
even after scaling down from the ecosystem to the site, where presum-
ably the components are fewer if not less varied or interrelated. (2001, 
111–112)
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Uncertainty of this type is particularly troublesome for understanding 
or managing complex adaptive systems (Holling 1986; Lee 1993). Ecologists 
have struggled for some time with the challenge of being able to describe 
and predict ecosystem processes (Jordan and Miller 1996). With respect to 
the management of ecosystems in particular, Carpenter (1996, 118–119) 
observed that “a host of scientific uncertainties about the behavior of ecosys-
tems under anthropogenic and natural perturbations continue to frustrate 
statistically reliable biophysical measurements and ecologic understanding.”
Wilson (2002a) contrasts the Newtonian world of controllable non-
adaptive systems with the ecosystem world of complex adaptive systems. A 
problem with the latter is the pervasiveness of nonlinear relationships, mak-
ing it difficult to trace the particular course of movement of one object in the 
system and, from that information, predict the reactions of other objects. In 
Carpenter’s words, “Almost all real systems, and certainly all ecosystems, are 
nonlinear (small change in a parameter can lead to a sudden large change 
in behavior)” (1996: 134). Past approaches to managing ecosystems have 
typically assumed “relatively complete (if stochastic) biological knowledge 
operating in a Newtonian world” (Wilson 2002a, 342). Actual experiences 
(more bluntly, observed failures) in ecosystem management suggest that the 
Newtonian view does not apply readily to complex adaptive systems, and 
perhaps not at all.
Why is scientific uncertainty of this sort particularly associated with 
complex adaptive systems such as ecosystems? The literature on uncertainty 
in ecosystem management discusses at least three distinct but interrelated 
reasons: differential rates of change among system components, scale differ-
ences, and disturbance processes.
The factors that make up a complex adaptive system such as an ecosys-
tem typically change at different rates. Species populations within the system 
change at different rates. A host of ambient environmental conditions con-
nected with ecosystem conditions (e.g., temperatures, air or water quality, 
soil composition) change at different rates. Anthropogenic impacts on the 
system (e.g., harvesting behavior or technologies) change at different rates 
as well. In and of themselves, differential rates of change present a complex-
ity problem rather than an uncertainty problem. The uncertainty problem 
arises from the fact that in a complex adaptive system, elements respond to 
changes in other elements so the differential rates of change yield alterations 
that are not mere linear extensions of trends. Relationships and effects are 
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contingent. “State shifts” occur among system elements as the configuration 
of other elements changes. Thus, a one-degree temperature change in com-
bination with one configuration of ambient conditions produces little effect 
on a species population, but an additional degree of temperature change 
occurring in combination with a slightly different configuration of other 
ambient conditions produces a crash or a surge in that population, which 
triggers shifts in other populations, and so on.
Interactions and effects also occur across space and time scales in com-
plex adaptive systems. Problems are not always fixed to specific areas, nor 
can a change of condition in one portion of the system be automatically 
“scaled up” to predict system-level effects (Gunderson, Holling, and Light 
1995, 531). In part because of heterogeneities within resource systems, the 
effects of a condition change in one part of the system may be relatively 
insulated from the rest, whereas the same change occurring in a different 
part of the system translates more directly into system-level transforma-
tions. Discontinuities in the relationships between system elements and 
system effects make it “very difficult to extrapolate results from one scale—
frequently the plot scale—to higher spatial scales” (Swallow, Johnson, and 
Meinzen-Dick 2001, 451).
Furthermore, particularly in the ecosystem context, system processes are 
interrupted by disturbances. In biological systems, these include effects of 
infestation and disease, natural disasters, and shifts in the ambient environ-
ment. In the case of natural resources, such as water, disturbance processes 
clearly include droughts and flooding but also climate change and even 
landscape transformations caused by events such as earthquakes (which in 
addition to effects such as tidal waves have been known to alter the courses 
of surface streams and the geologic features of aquifers). Disturbance pro-
cesses introduce an element of uncertainty—not merely complexity—into 
the challenge of resource management. Combined with the natural vari-
ability of the resource systems themselves, uncertainty allows for “unknow-
able responses, or true surprises [due to] the self-organizing, ever-changing 
character of ecosystems and their response to perturbations that are unprec-
edented (at least to the current ecosystems)” (Carpenter 1996, 120). Rapid 
and adverse changes may occur for reasons that are unforeseen and poorly 
understood.
Natural variability, the presence of disturbance processes, and the lack of 
understanding of the causal processes underlying the resource system mean 
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that additional data—the usual solution recommended by standard modern 
approaches—will not always or necessarily reduce the uncertainty or make 
the problem more tractable. Jordan and Miller (1996, 110–115), for exam-
ple, describe some ecological situations (e.g., the Everglades, Yellowstone 
National Park) where, in theory, “further study and data collection should 
help improve ecological predictions, but where in practice, improvement in 
predictions is unlikely.”
In complex adaptive systems, there are changes in conditions that are 
not trends, but there are also changes in conditions that are trends. Among 
other things, scientific uncertainty with respect to complex adaptive systems 
means that we lack a clear way of knowing which changes are trends and 
which are not.
Despite all this, ecosystems are not completely beyond our comprehen-
sion and their behavior is not entirely random. But our ability to see and 
understand the order and predictability of complex adaptive systems is dif-
ferent: we can observe patterns that repeat within systems over time even 
though they do not repeat in exactly the same way each time, and sometimes 
system or subsystem conditions shift in ways that set into motion a differ-
ent set of patterns. Understanding those patterns is useful science. Still, that 
science may allow us only to make qualitative and conditional predictions 
rather than quantitative and precise ones (Wilson 2002a, 335), and that 
affects our decision making.
elements and Implications of uncertainty  
in Contemporary Watershed management
Much of the literature on complex adaptive systems has dealt with 
biological ecosystems, such as fisheries, that “may be uniquely vulnerable 
ecosystems” (Carpenter 1996, 132). Professionals engaged in the study or 
management of non-biological resource systems, such as watersheds, may 
wonder whether the difficulties described above affect them too. There 
are two reasons for answering yes: (1) the frequent use of watersheds as 
near-substitutes for ecosystems, as noted already, and (2) some recent and 
emerging issues in watershed management. These issues are the incorpo-
ration of species and habitat protection into water management, the river 
restoration movement, and the greater recognition of human-environment 
interactions.
CompLex LandsCapes    
The promotion of integrated watershed management has meant incor-
porating the protection of biological systems (most often riparian and 
aquatic species and their habitat) into the set of management priorities and 
tasks. Some of this has been a response to, and embracing of, the integrated 
water resources management literature’s advocacy of drawing together all 
water uses. Some of it has been forced by public policy—such as species 
listings under the Endangered Species Act, habitat protections stipulated in 
natural resource conservation plans, site-specific litigation—which is part 
of the institutional landscape in almost any watershed. By whatever means, 
ecosystem considerations have become a more common element of water-
shed management.
The incorporation of ecosystem protection and/or recovery tasks neces-
sitates some replacement of engineering-based hydraulic water management 
with a broader, less precise, and less controlled approach. Borrowing Wilson’s 
language, integrated watershed management exchanges the Newtonian 
world, where water was understood as a physical mass—to be captured, 
diverted, stored, and delivered in particular quantities with required quali-
ties at specific locations and times—for a new and more uncertain world in 
which water retains all those physical properties and yet is a habitat at the 
same time.
Over the same period that ecosystem elements have been integrated 
into watershed management, other ideas have emerged and been adopted 
concerning the physical dimensions of the water resource. Stream and river 
channel restoration—ripping out concrete channels and returning streams 
to meandering courses with soft beds—is being undertaken in a number of 
locations and advocated in others as a means of re-balancing flood control 
objectives with other considerations, such as reduced runoff and erosion 
and enhanced groundwater replenishment. Restoration efforts also have 
been supported by communities rediscovering the economic and aesthetic 
value of waterfronts and stream courses. Wetlands are being constructed 
and restored to achieve in situ water quality improvement in preference 
to standard divert-and-treat methods. As sound as these water resources 
management ideas are, they do reduce the engineering-based control of the 
physical water resources in a watershed.
Of course, the presence of human societies in the watershed adds 
another complex adaptive system component. Carl Walters, the early advo-
cate of adaptive ecosystem management, pointed out that focusing resource 
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management on the physical landscape alone overlooks “the socioeconomic 
dynamics that are never completely controlled by management activities.” 
The presence of human beings in the watershed creates the potential for 
unexpected dynamic responses as well. Walters (1986, 2) analogized the 
human-environment relationship to a “predator-prey” relationship and 
cautioned us not to limit our attention to the “prey,” “because the predators 
don’t sit still either.” (In the watershed context, see also Swallow, Johnson, 
and Meinzen-Dick 2001.)
The trends described above can be illustrated using a particular water-
shed. In March 2003, a federal district court ordered the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to designate a critical habitat protection area within the 
Santa Ana River watershed in Southern California for the Santa Ana sucker, 
a fish native to several Southern California streams but now found in dra-
matically diminished numbers and in only a few stretches of the river. The 
Santa Ana sucker has been a subject of considerable attention within the 
watershed in recent years (especially since its designation as a threatened 
species in 2000), and a recovery plan was developed through the collabora-
tive efforts of the Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority and the Orange 
County Water District in consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
and the California Department of Fish and Game.
The Santa Ana River watershed is already an intensively managed 
resource system, with dense networks of physical facilities and institutional 
arrangements developed to address flood control, wastewater treatment and 
disposal, drinking water quality, the allocation of water supplies across sub-
watershed basins and communities, restraint of water use and assignment 
of water rights to individuals and organizations, and the conjunctive man-
agement of surface water flows and storage with groundwater yields and 
storage. In large measure, those management approaches reflect an intent to 
minimize variability of flows and reduce vulnerability to familiar (though 
unpredictable) hazards of drought and flooding by maximizing the ability 
of agencies to store, release, move, and deliver water within the watershed 
while maintaining water quality parameters within limits needed to serve 
human consumptive purposes.
The additional feature of managing the watershed in order to avert 
the elimination of the sucker, and even try to restore the sucker popula-
tion, is affecting the watershed management challenge in ways not yet fully 
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water quality are the most frequently mentioned causes of the decline in 
the sucker population and its current threatened status, but in fact no one is 
certain whether those factors alone have caused the decline, or whether and 
how they have interacted with other causes. After all, the sucker has vanished 
from all other urbanized Southern California streams in which it was once 
found but has remained in certain stretches of the Santa Ana River, which 
is sometimes described as the most urbanized watershed in North America. 
In addition to puzzling over why the sucker population continues to decline 
in the Santa Ana (and, just as intriguing, why it has survived there despite 
dying out everywhere else), scientists have yet to determine exactly what 
water quality and riverbed conditions the sucker requires in order for its 
decline to be arrested and its recovery to begin.
No consensus exists, therefore, on what the indicators or targets for 
sucker recovery policy should be. What is almost certain is that the water 
quality and river condition indicators and targets that will be appropriate 
for the goal of sucker protection and recovery will differ from those indica-
tors and targets that have been developed and used for the flood control, 
conjunctive management, wastewater treatment and disposal, and drinking 
water protection practices in the watershed to date. Combining the policies 
and practices for species and habitat protection with the current and long-
standing watershed management practices will add complexity but also 
increase uncertainty, that is, greater prospects in the watershed for surprise, 
for unanticipated population shifts and other state changes.
The Santa Ana River watershed has been changing from a hydrauli-
cally managed watershed, where the emphasis was on physical control of 
the water, to a watershed that also has to be managed as an ecosystem, with 
all that implies in relation to complex adaptive systems. Even though the 
particular circumstances of each watershed are distinct, in some respects the 
case of the Santa Ana River illustrates how watershed management has been 
changing in the United States and elsewhere for the past couple of decades, 
adding not only to its complexity but also to its uncertainty. These changes 
raise important questions. How do these changes relate to decision mak-
ing within and about watersheds? What kinds of institutional arrangements 
might people use when attempting to manage and protect watersheds as 
complex adaptive systems? Answers to these questions require us to consider 
the uses and properties of institutions.
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CompLex adaptIve systems II: Watersheds and InstItutIons
The view of watersheds as ecosystems—and of both as complex adaptive 
systems—has substantial and far-reaching implications for decision mak-
ing. Those implications have ramifications of their own for the kinds of 
organizational and governance structures human beings devise and employ. 
Most importantly, the creation and adaptation of decision-making arrange-
ments bring the kinds of political considerations we mentioned at the outset 
into the heart of the watershed.
uncertainty, Complexity, and decision making
Complex adaptive systems pose a substantial challenge to twentieth-
century engineering-based decision models, such as rational-comprehen-
sive decision making. With its requirements for specification of objectives, 
evaluation of alternatives, and selection of the alternative that achieves the 
desired objectives at least cost, rational-comprehensive decision making 
presumes that underlying system processes and cause-effect relationships 
are understood. In the face of scientific uncertainty, this presumption may 
not hold.
Not only does rational-comprehensive decision making (or any com-
parable approach) require predictions of the system-level effects of alterna-
tive actions, it also requires agreement on which indicators are valuable for 
assessing system-level effects. As already noted, however, scientific uncer-
tainty implies a lack of consensus over what elements of a system are the 
best indicators of its overall condition. It also implies a lack of agreement on 
what a change in one or more of those indicators at any particular time sig-
nifies. Under such circumstances, the selection of policy “targets” becomes 
especially unclear, and so does our understanding of how alternative policy 
actions relate to those targets. Furthermore, if resource managers focus their 
attention on a few selected policy targets, undesired and undesirable results 
may occur as other elements of the system shift in unanticipated ways 
(Carpenter 1996, 147).
In addition to challenging our ability to pursue comprehensive decision 
making generally, scientific uncertainty poses problems for the role of sci-
ence itself in policy making. When underlying system structures are known 
(or believed to be known), remaining uncertainties result from lack of data 
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or from insufficient specification of the stochastic processes at work. Those 
kinds of uncertainty can be reduced by directing scientific effort toward the 
problem, with a justified confidence that science will facilitate or improve 
comprehensive decision making. But in the protection and management of 
complex adaptive systems, where our uncertainty concerns the underlying 
system processes themselves and we do not entirely understand the basic 
relationships that make up the system or drive its transformations over time, 
both the scientific problem and the policy problem are not just harder—
they are different.
Wilson (2002b) points out that much of environmental policy making 
and management (at least in the United States) is performed through the 
delegation of authority to regulatory agencies. This is done with the under-
lying presumptions that science will be employed in regulatory decision 
making and will also be available to check or correct regulatory errors. In 
light of uncertainty about system processes and cause-effect relationships, 
science loses some ability to provide policy makers with specific predictions 
through its usual methods of professional criticism and consensus develop-
ment (Jordan and Miller 1996, 97, 108) or to check the mistaken exercise of 
policy-making authority.
This change in the role of science and in its relationship to decision 
making poses two serious problems. One is that science’s eroded role in 
guiding decision making opens the field for the use of regulatory instru-
ments to serve other political and economic purposes, including the ability 
of some interests to use scientific uncertainty as an excuse to delay action 
(Caldwell 1996, 394; Wilson 2002b, 6). Another problem is “error prone-
ness,” as scientific uncertainty expands the prospects for regulatory decision 
making to produce misguided or maladaptive policies.
In the effort to manage and protect complex adaptive systems, failure to 
recognize and acknowledge uncertainty can magnify the error proneness of 
management efforts. Low and colleagues (2003) have observed that decision 
makers tend to underestimate the uncertainty and overestimate their under-
standing of problems. This makes error correction even more important. 
Error correction depends upon error detection, and as Caldwell (1996, 404) 
points out, “Uncertainty unacknowledged is a factor that handicaps efforts 
to discover whether error has occurred.” Wilson (2002a, 332) adds that fail-
ure to acknowledge uncertainty, or pretending it does not exist, lessens our 
ability to develop and implement management practices that have learn-
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ing elements deliberately designed into them, exposing us to more “cata-
strophic” errors that can result from an incomplete understanding of the 
resource system.
With this catalog of difficulties, it is important to insert a caveat. Just 
as uncertainty does not mean that natural systems behave randomly or are 
incomprehensible, uncertainty additionally does not mean that scientific 
research on natural systems is useless to policy makers. Despite its limits 
and imprecision, science concerning complex adaptive systems such as 
ecosystems has value. Even this limited vision “is far more valuable than a 
sense that the future is totally unpredictable and not subject to influence” 
(Caldwell 1996, 400).
Instead, the limited vision that is possible with respect to complex 
adaptive systems “is the basis for forward-looking adaptive management” 
(Wilson 2002a, 339; see also Walters 1986). In light of the contemporary 
tasks of watershed management (integrating species and habitat protection, 
restoring streams and constructing wetlands, and taking more seriously the 
dynamic and adaptive human communities within watersheds), adaptive 
management warrants consideration in the watershed context. Lee (1993) 
has argued this point effectively. (See also Swallow, Johnson, and Meinzen-
Dick 2001, 451.)
Adaptive management has high information requirements too, of 
course, but of a different sort than those required by a comprehensive 
decision-making model. In the management of complex adaptive natural 
resource systems, the general predictions underlying policy actions must be 
closely and continually compared with observations of the resource system. 
Furthermore, this close monitoring and comparison will need to be done at 
multiple scales and with respect to multiple indicators.
Arrangements are therefore needed that will enhance information 
collection, error detection, and the opportunities for adaptation. Further 
advances are difficult if scientists and policy makers do not engage questions 
of organization—such as what institutional arrangements may be able to 
counteract unacknowledged uncertainty, closely check general predictions 
against actual physical conditions, and “substitute for the hoped for role of 
science” (Wilson 2002b, 6) as a check on decision making. These questions 
about organizing decision making are of great interest to political scientists 
and others in the social sciences. The physical complexity of watersheds, 
and certain characteristics of people and institutions, however, will frustrate 
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any effort to identify and follow a best way to organize the governance and 
management of watersheds.
decision making, Governance, and Institutions
Noting the inapplicability of the Newtonian paradigm to complex adap-
tive systems, resource economist James Wilson has stated the implications 
broadly but emphatically: “We have wrongly characterized our knowledge 
of the natural environment and, consequently, have viewed the uncertainty 
and learning problem as if it were a typical engineering problem. As a result, 
we have created institutions and administrative procedures ill adapted to a 
solution of the conservation problem” (2002a, 351). Those ill-adapted insti-
tutions and procedures include efforts at comprehensive regulation through 
integrated agencies.
In the preceding section, we discussed the applicability of comprehensive 
decision making in complex adaptive systems. Some readers may have per-
ceived this to be a kind of straw-man approach, since the model of rational- 
comprehensive decision making has been subject to so many thorough cri-
tiques in the latter half of the twentieth century that it appears to have few 
remaining advocates. Yet, we believe the desire for comprehensive decision 
making still holds significant attraction in the literature on integrated ecosys-
tem management and integrated watershed management, even if obliquely. 
Comprehensive decision making is implicitly associated with the notion of 
an integrated decision-making apparatus. Advocacy of integrated decision-
making organizations, such as unified river basin agencies or watershed 
authorities, is often justified in terms of the need for comprehensive deci-
sion making that encompasses all affected interests and addresses all inter-
related resources within a watershed or ecosystem.
Other authors whose work we find useful for anyone contemplating the 
complexities of watershed management are skeptical of using an integrated 
decision-making organization for the management of complex adaptive 
systems. Their rationale appears to comprise three common themes—rec-
ognizing scale diversity, reducing error proneness and promoting learning, 
and overcoming limitations on human information-processing capabilities.
In complex adaptive natural resource systems, organizations of multiple 
scales may be useful to gather and exchange information about resource con-
ditions (e.g., Berkes 2006). Gunderson and colleagues (2002, 262) observed 
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that “resource systems that have been sustained over long time periods 
increase resilience by managing processes at multiple scales.” Such arrange-
ments are likely to include relatively small local organizations that can focus 
on particular locations or subsystems, thereby approaching a complex adap-
tive system as being modular or decomposable, made up of smaller albeit 
interrelated elements (Simon 2005).
The argument for smaller local organizations attending to particular 
subsystems does not presume that uncertainty disappears at small scales—
in other words, it is not a “complexity” argument in disguise. Rather, it 
acknowledges that complex systems are usually composed of subsystems, 
and subsystem levels are more nearly amenable to close monitoring and 
to the development of improved understanding of patterns of activity. 
Especially for geographically extensive systems with multiple and heteroge-
neous local subsystems, smaller organizations are likely to be better suited to 
monitoring and managing those local conditions, noticing changes rapidly, 
and notifying others of them. Of course, small local arrangements are not 
all that is needed (Costanza et al. 2001, 8). Overlapping organizations at 
larger scales can serve as forums for communication across local subsystems 
and as a check on local structures that behave in ways detrimental to other 
subsystems (Low et al. 2003, 106).
A second theme is the importance of reducing error proneness and pro-
moting learning, an effort that may be aided by some degree of duplication 
and redundancy of organizational structures. In the kind of adaptive man-
agement that has been advocated for complex adaptive systems like ecosys-
tems (Walther 1987; Lee 1993), the real key to progress is learning. Learning 
is likely to be maximized and accelerated in a diversified institutional setting 
where multiple interventions are being undertaken and compared within 
the same system simultaneously with opportunities to exchange results and 
observe others’ experiences (Wilson 2002a, 345–347; see also Holling 1986; 
Ostrom 2005).
We noted in the preceding section the danger of limited attention to a 
few selected indicators of system conditions, but this is exactly what a com-
prehensive organization trying to monitor and manage a complex system 
will be prone to do. Polycentric structures of overlapping organizations—
networks, federal systems, and other multiple-organization arrangements—
are one organizational option that can increase the likelihood of checks 
on the persistent maintenance of maladaptive policies and practices. Such 
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safeguards might exist within a single comprehensive resource management 
agency as well, but a century of organizational behavior research suggests 
that more nearly centralized organizations are susceptible internally to dis-
tortions of information and communications that can allow poor policies 
and practices to persist for undesirably long periods.
It may therefore be especially important to avoid organizational inte-
gration where information distortions and losses may cascade into dramati-
cally erroneous decisions and actions. Low and colleagues (2003, 103) cite 
Landau’s (1969, 354) critique of integrated hierarchical structures: “Orga-
nization systems of this sort are a form of administrative brinksmanship. 
They are extraordinary gambles. When one bulb goes, everything goes.” 
More directly in relation to the ecosystem management challenge, Wilson 
(2002a, 347) adds: “Perhaps the only reasonable institutional response to 
this problem is to maintain independent (nearly decomposable) local gov-
erning units. Their ability to probe different policies and to remain skeptical 
without great cost is one of the few ways there might be to constrain per-
sistent maladaptive policies, or viewed more positively, to assure the con-
tinuing evolution of the institution.” Ludwig, Walker, and Holling (2002, 
23) agree, employing the metaphor of a raft (representing institutions for 
managing ecological systems) withstanding unexpected or unpredictable 
waves or shifts of weight (representing the changeability of complex adap-
tive systems):
Another possible response to disturbance might be to restructure the 
raft itself. If it were constructed of several loosely coupled subunits, then 
excessive weighting or a strong disturbance might flip one part of the sys-
tem but leave the rest intact. Such a structure might not require as much 
vigilance as the single raft, and it might be able to withstand a greater 
variety of external disturbances. On the other hand, if the bindings that 
link the subunits become stiff, then the structure may become brittle and, 
hence, more prone to failure.
The concept of decomposability and the metaphor of the single raft 
bring us to a third theme, which is the limited information-processing and 
decision-making capabilities of single systems, a theme that applies con-
cepts such as bounded rationality (a characteristic of individuals) to organi-
zations. The problems of limited understanding and cognition may not be 
solved merely by the often-prescribed organizational fix of “scale matching,” 
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that is, creating organizations to correspond with the boundaries of a com-
plex resource system (Gunderson, Holling, and Light 1995, 531). Herbert 
Simon (1996, 178) advocated “nearly decomposable” rather than centralized 
organizational structures to deal with complex systems, balancing the need 
for close interaction and specialized expertise against the need for com-
munication and integration. Because of the complexity of systems and the 
uncertainty associated with large numbers of adaptive components in mul-
tiple relationships that vary continuously and discontinuously over space 
and time, “no one individual or group could hope to adequately address the 
learning problem” (Wilson 2002a, 341). With particular reference to manag-
ing water resources, Gilbert White (1998, 25) has reflected that “truly com-
prehensive analysis” is challenging. He maintains that “the constraints of 
professional training and competence, the limits of organizational authority 
and the ignorance of the outcomes of many actions, past and future, impede 
the balanced formulation of all potential solutions and options in dealing 
with such aims as efficient use of water for food production, or for transpor-
tation, or for ecosystem health.”3
Managing and protecting complex adaptive resource systems are chal-
lenging enough even if human uses, interests, and values are not at stake. The 
addition of human beings brings an additional set of multiple scales (Lebel, 
Garden, and Imamura 2005; Berkes 2006). Just as the physical dimensions of 
a watershed or other ecosystem appear at different scales, so do the multiple 
human uses and behaviors that occur in a watershed, complicating further 
the tasks of decision making, monitoring, and enforcement (Adger, Brown, 
and Tompkins 2006). Once we contemplate individuals and communities 
interacting with the natural resources within a watershed, the “how” ques-
tions about decision-making arrangements are compounded by “for whom” 
questions (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 241). When we think about how to 
make decisions and for whom, boundary issues (e.g., who belongs “in” and 
who does not) are not only complex but take on added intensity. The impli-
cations of these complexities for water resources management were con-
veyed well by Blatter and Ingram (2000, 464):
Common goods such as water are multidimensional (drinking, shipping, 
power generation, irrigation, recreation, ecological functions, economic 
development, et al.). For this reason, [a single principle] does not work 
very well as an instrument to define the one best size of a geographi-
cal area for governing water. Instead of applying economic criteria or 
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markets to the task of creating boundaries, a political process of trading 
values off against one another must take place. It is necessary to deter-
mine the most important function(s), create the government structure(s) 
corresponding to these functions, and find some mechanisms to deal 
with the interdependencies and spillovers between these functions.
As countless authors have observed, human communities have rarely 
been organized to coincide with ecosystem boundaries or even the more 
visible boundaries of watersheds. As a result, “achieving coordination often 
requires reconciling socially defined boundaries like villages with physically 
defined boundaries like catchments. . . . Organizing collective action along 
strict hydrological boundaries is difficult” (Swallow et al. 2004, 1, emphasis 
added). The communities that matter most to people, and where established 
decision-making structures already exist, typically are either smaller than 
the watershed or straddle watershed boundaries. Neither form of organiza-
tion is likely to displace the other, and reconciling them adds further com-
plexity to the task of institutional design.
Neither a single decision-making principle nor a single organization at 
a single scale is therefore likely to suffice. As a result, institutional arrange-
ments suited to decision making about complex adaptive systems may them-
selves need to exhibit some features of complexity and adaptability (Berkes 
2006). The cases we describe in this book provide a few illustrations of how 
complex institutional arrangements have evolved in watershed contexts in 
the United States.
In the uncertain world of complex social and ecological systems, insti-
tutional richness may be preferable to institutional neatness. Multi-scale 
institutional arrangements, including small and local organizations linked 
horizontally with each other and vertically with larger-scale organizations, 
may be able to achieve (1) close monitoring of local (subsystem) conditions; 
(2) representation of diverse interests associated with different physical 
components of the system as a whole; (3) error correction when manage-
ment practices undertaken with respect to one element of the system create 
unanticipated negative effects elsewhere in the system; and (4) opportuni-
ties to communicate and exchange information across subsystem elements 
and to discuss subsystem interactions and system-wide conditions without 
necessarily trying to manage all parts of the system with a comprehensive 
organization.
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In a useful article distilling decades of theoretical development about 
the organization of governing jurisdictions, Hooghe and Marks (2003) have 
distinguished between “Type I” and “Type II” governance structures. Type I 
structures are constituency-defined multi-service or multi-function organiza-
tions—that is, general-purpose governments, such as a municipality, that 
encompass a defined group of residents and provide an array of services 
(police patrol, trash pickup, parks, and so on). In the United States, Type I 
governance structures typically exhibit the familiar branches of govern-
ment, with a legislative body, a judicial forum, and an executive capabil-
ity. Type I structures may be nested—cities and counties encompassed by 
states, states within a nation, even regional and international organizations 
arranged in meso or supra levels—but they do not overlap horizontally (i.e., 
the territory and population of one city or state does not extend into those 
of another city or state), and each Type I jurisdiction is a multi-function 
mechanism for governance within its own domain. Type I governmental 
structures facilitate bargaining and trade-off decisions (e.g., whether to 
devote more resources this year to policing or to street maintenance).
Type II governmental structures are functionally defined, and their 
boundaries vary from one service or function to another. Type II structures 
are established at whatever geographical scale may be suited to funding and 
delivering a particular service—hence, a library district or regional trans-
portation authority covering a metropolitan area, an irrigation district serv-
ing a collection of farmers, and so forth. These structures do not necessar-
ily feature legislative, executive, and judicial branches—rarely in the United 
States do Type II structures have a judicial function, for example. Type II 
governments can and often do overlap horizontally, and many may operate 
in the same location because their functional responsibilities are distinct 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003, 236–240). They have the advantages of flexibil-
ity in jurisdictional size and specialization of function. On the other hand, 
because of that specialization they are usually not engaged in trade-offs or 
bargaining among service priorities. Conflicts involving their policies or 
performance generally must be resolved in the judicial systems associated 
with Type I structures.
Although these governance forms “represent very different ways of 
organizing political life,” Hooghe and Marks point out the compatibility and 
complementarity of the two:
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Type I governance reflects a simple design principle: Maximize the fit 
between the scale of a jurisdiction and the optimal scale of public good 
provision while minimizing interjurisdictional coordination by (a) creat-
ing inclusive jurisdictions that internalize most relevant externalities and 
(b) limiting the number of jurisdictional levels.
Type II governance also limits the transaction costs of interjuris-
dictional coordination, but it does so in a fundamentally different way, 
by splicing public good provision into a large number of functionally 
discrete jurisdictions. (2003, 241)
In most (perhaps all) watersheds or other ecosystems, combinations of 
Type I and Type II governance structures will exist, additional ones may 
be created and existing ones modified, and the relationships among them 
adjusted from time to time. Overall, then, the institutional arrangements 
in a watershed may themselves be thought of as a kind of complex adaptive 
system (perhaps more accurately, a complex adaptable system) composed of 
multiple elements at differing scales and operating both independently and 
interdependently.
For reasons already noted—scale differences, disturbance processes, the 
importance of reducing error proneness while increasing error detection and 
learning—complex adaptable systems of institutions may be well-suited to 
the management and protection of complex adaptive natural resource sys-
tems. Swallow and colleagues (2004, 2) have reached such a conclusion with 
particular reference to the management of watersheds:
The scale at which the physical environment is optimally managed may 
not correspond to any one decision-making body in a community. In that 
case, collective action within existing institutions or through the creation 
of new institutions becomes critical for managing watershed resources. 
Decisionmaking does not have to be embedded in only one body at one 
level, but different management responsibilities can be devolved to differ-
ent bodies. These options vary according to the size of the watershed, the 
populations occupying the watershed, and how the scale and interaction 
of resource flows affect people.
Returning to our watershed example, fortunately for Santa Ana River 
water users and for the Santa Ana sucker, that watershed already has devel-
oped a network of institutional arrangements that includes relatively small 
sub-watershed communities and agencies and some watershed-scale rules 
and organizations. Water quality is already monitored intensively in the 
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watershed, and river flows are managed under rules that were agreed to 
by upstream and downstream organizations and made part of a stipulated 
judgment enforceable in court. The two largest groundwater basins in the 
watershed are governed by court judgments and by agencies that try to man-
age the basins’ storage capacity while balancing annual yields with demands. 
There are numerous special water districts and municipal water and waste-
water utilities in the watershed that look out for their local concerns and 
monitor their conditions. There are five larger water districts that acquire 
supplemental supplies for those smaller districts and utilities and engage in 
several planning and resource management activities. And there have been 
two forums for watershed-scale communication and coordinated action—
the Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority mentioned earlier, which is a 
joint-powers agency of five water districts within the watershed, and the 
Santa Ana River Watershed Group, a nongovernmental entity convening 
organized stakeholders and interested individuals to discuss issues of con-
cern within the watershed and seek cooperative solutions.
There is in the Santa Ana River watershed a rich mix of Type I and Type 
II organizations. Rather than impeding effective management, this institu-
tional richness may aid policy making in the Santa Ana River watershed 
as its components adapt to the complex tasks of managing for ecosystem 
survival and stability.
CompLexIty, ChoICe, and poLItICs
Institutional arrangements are human creations; they are matters of choice. 
There have been recommendations to try to match organizational boundar-
ies to watershed boundaries and create comprehensive jurisdictions since 
the time of John Wesley Powell. Relatively few examples of comprehensive 
watershed or river basin agencies exist, however, and even where watershed-
scale entities have been created, they are intricately interconnected with 
smaller and larger jurisdictions of both Type I and Type II characteristics.
The impressive empirical analysis reported by Lubell and colleagues 
(2002) found that collective action in America’s watersheds is being 
attempted and accomplished instead through literally thousands of “water-
shed partnerships” and network-style structures involving numerous pri-
vate and public organizations of varied sizes and functions. Why is this so? 
Why have we so rarely chosen to create comprehensive organizations based 
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on hydrological boundaries? Is the partnership approach merely the path of 
least resistance? Are watershed stakeholders relying on these complex, poly-
centric arrangements because it is too difficult to create the comprehensive 
watershed agencies that, deep down, they really would prefer?
The final report of the National Watershed Forum, held in 2001, is 
interesting in this regard. After three days of meetings, the hundreds of 
participants—some of the Americans most intensively involved in water-
shed management—generated several pages of “key recommendations and 
findings.” These included five pages of findings and recommendations con-
cerning watershed governance, organization, and participation. Not one of 
those findings or recommendations called for the establishment of more 
centralized and comprehensive watershed-scale agencies. Rather, most of 
the recommendations emphasized maintaining a variety of organizations 
at a variety of scales while enhancing their exchange of information and 
coordination of activities (National Watershed Forum 2001, 15–17, 37–38).4 
Indeed, the participants recommended the establishment of even smaller, 
sub-watershed “stream teams” to monitor local conditions more closely. 
Altogether, the forum’s findings and recommendations displayed an intrigu-
ing congruence with the analysis in this chapter about the relationship 
between nature’s complex adaptive systems and humans’ complex adapt-
able systems. Even individuals closely involved in and committed to water-
shed management did not recommend the creation of integrated watershed 
agencies, and they were inclined toward greater organizational complexity 
rather than less.
Nature has many complex adaptive systems—watersheds, continents, 
lakes and seas, prairies, tropics, wildlife habitats, and so forth, from the micro 
to the intercontinental scale. Human beings still have to choose how (and 
around what) to organize their activities. We do not get to just let nature do 
the choosing for us, pointing to topographical boundaries or other physical 
features as a way of defining communities of interest and crafting decision-
making processes. Despite their importance and visibility, it is not clear why 
watersheds or river basins should have primacy in the shaping of human 
decision-making systems.
Furthermore, even if people chose to organize decision-making arrange-
ments around watersheds, that would hardly be the end of the choices to be 
made. For good or ill, nature’s watershed boundaries have been altered by 
human actions in many cases all over the planet. So even if we zero in on 
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watersheds and river basins, we still have to choose how to bound the deci-
sion-making arrangements. Is Los Angeles in the Owens Valley or not (not 
should it be, but is it)? Is Denver in the Colorado River basin or not? Are San 
Diegans in the Sacramento River watershed? Should San Franciscans get to 
participate in decisions about the Hetch Hetchy Valley? One could pose an 
almost endless list of such questions, and they are not idle ones—they must 
be addressed in order for watershed management to proceed. As Walther 
(1987, 443) observed, the effort to establish integrated resource manage-
ment in any location confronts “institutional environments that are ruled 
by culture, politics, and tradition and that have a history.” Communities of 
interest already exist in and for many watersheds, and topographical features 
do not go far in telling us who they are or how they should be involved.
Who is “in” and who is “out”? Who gets to decide what we are going to 
do? How do we decide? These are political questions, and they are inescap-
able no matter what natural boundaries we try to employ and no matter what 
organizational structures we try to construct. Michael McGinnis (1999, 499) 
sagely observed: “Watershed policymaking is both a scientific and a politi-
cal enterprise. The mythical separation of politics from administration will 
not suffice in watershed policymaking because of the diverse values held by 
policymakers and the scientific uncertainty endemic to physical sciences in 
this policy area.” In the chapters that follow, we will explore the politics of 
watershed policy making and management as it has evolved in the United 
States (primarily), with particular attention to the choices that have been 
made about how to connect institutional landscapes with physical ones.
Complex systems of institutional arrangements can appear chaotic to 
some observers—and understandably so. The institutional landscape of a 
watershed, like its physical and ecological landscape, can be and often is 
complicated. Although there are ways to make sense of that landscape (such 
as the distinction between Type I and Type II structures), we understand 
that institutional arrangements in a watershed are likely to be complicated 
and, on initial view, even confusing. Institutional complexity in a water-
shed can be viewed as an intrinsically undesirable trait to be minimized, 
an intrinsically desirable trait to be maximized, or a phenomenon that is 
intrinsically neither good nor bad but a fact of life and where the extent 
and kinds of complexity will vary from one watershed to another. Those 
variations to greater or lesser degree will reflect the physical, biological, and 
human terrain. In some ways they may work well to reduce environmental 
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damage and achieve sustainable human-environment relationships, and in 
other ways, poorly. Because our goal is not to prescribe a best way to orga-
nize water resource management, we do not have a model organization to 
hold up before our readers.
Instead, we proceed to the remaining chapters, operating from the 
premise that there may be sound reasons for institutional complexity in the 
watershed, but the questions of what institutional forms that complexity 
takes and how institutional arrangements operate are empirical ones. They 
are also political questions—it is not only a physical watershed, it is a politi-
cal one too. Questions about the institutional landscapes of watersheds are 
questions about the social and political tools people use to govern and man-
age themselves and their relationships to one another and to nature.
notes
1. That observation coincides with Milon, Kiker, and Lee’s comment (1998, 
37) about the rise in attention to ecosystem management during the same decade: 
“Within the past decade ecosystem management has become a central theme in state 
and federal environmental resource management and a powerful issue in environ-
mental policy debates. A recent survey [Yaffee et al. 1996] showed that more than 
600 projects related to ecosystem management are underway around the U.S. Under 
the Clinton Administration, a high level of federal commitment to an ecosystem 
management approach has developed despite many obstacles.”
2. “A watershed is a complex ecosystem” (Brandes et al. 2005, 87).
3. In a comparison of two cases, for example, Slaughter and Wiener (2007) 
found that the concentration of decision making in a single agency was less effective 
in detecting and solving complex problems in a watershed than polycentric arrange-
ments in another one.
4. Participants even suggested replacing watershed coordination teams orga-
nized at the federal and regional scale with ones organized along state boundar-
ies (National Watershed Forum 2001, 37). Since almost no state boundaries in 
the United States match watershed boundaries, this recommendation is a notable 
departure from the watershed management literature’s emphasis on superseding 
traditional political jurisdictions in favor of regional-scale entities.
The research and policy literature on watershed management expanded 
rapidly from the late 1980s to the present, as has the number of initia-
tives undertaken in the United States to create watershed-based efforts at 
resource management. The concept has shown great appeal among aca-
demics and policy makers (Walther 1987, 439; Milon, Kiker, and Lee 1998, 
37) and has spawned considerable activity (Kraft et al. 1999; Lubell et al. 
2002).1 It is not an exaggeration to characterize this combination of publi-
cations and actions as a “watershed movement.” The “movement” is not so 
much a formally organized effort as a burgeoning literature of academic 
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The principal thing that experience suggests is that pragmatism is the 
best policy: it leads to the most effective regional organizations.
martha derthIck (1974, 226)
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and practitioner recommendations to organize water resources manage-
ment around watersheds rather than around the discrete water resources—
streams, lakes, aquifers, wetlands—they contain (e.g., Harkins and Baggs 
1987; U.S. EPA 1991; Bates et al. 1993; Doppelt et al. 1993; Goldfarb 1994; 
Naiman 1994; U.S. Coastal America Organization 1994; MacKenzie 1996; 
Newsom 1997; Gregg et al. 1998; Hinchcliffe, Thompson, and Pretty 1998).
Despite the rapid increase in the number of writings about watershed 
management over the past twenty years, the idea of watersheds (or river 
basins) as the appropriate units for resource planning and management is 
hardly new.2 Each of the different water management eras Sabatier, Weible, 
and Ficker (2005) identify, from the beginning of the twentieth century to 
the present day, includes an emphasis on watershed management. The water-
shed is considered the appropriate scale for organizing water resource man-
agement because all water sources and uses within a watershed are interre-
lated. Not only are the water resources in a watershed related to one another, 
but they are intertwined with land and other natural resources. Accordingly, 
the uses and conditions of any natural resource within a watershed may 
(and very likely will) affect the others (see Pereira 1989, xv–xvi; Bates et al. 
1993, 93; Kerr and Chung 2001, 539).
As Derthick (1974) has noted, the scale issue has a close counterpart: 
that of coordination. Given the variety of water and land resources within 
a watershed and the multitude of uses made of them, what would be the 
best way to coordinate and manage such complexity? The answer, accord-
ing to a number of scholars (see Holmes 1972; Goldfarb 1994; Adler 1995; 
Kenney 1999; Sabatier, Weible, and Ficker 2005), varies by time period 
or era. Each era is characterized by a distinct management approach or 
suite of approaches, which at the time was argued to be the best approach, 
especially compared to the approaches that preceded it. As time passed, 
that best approach became subject to sustained criticism for its failure 
to address new and pressing issues or realize cherished values, and was 
eventually transformed, with new approaches promising to address the 
many pitfalls of the previous era. For instance, Sabatier, Weible, and Ficker 
(2005, 36–38) argue that the “Environmental Era” replaced the “New Deal 
Era” as environmental values came to the forefront along with distrust 
of federal water agencies and their commitment to realizing environ-
mental values. In turn, the “Environmental Era” has been replaced by the 
“Watershed Collaborative Era” as citizens and local organizations attempt 
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to gain greater access to decision making and efforts center on holistic 
management approaches.
Thus, one common way of reading the historical record is as a constant 
search for the best way to govern watersheds, with the one best way rede-
fined as circumstances change.3 Each era does not represent a sweeping away 
of previous management approaches as much as a grafting of new strategies 
and policies to old ones. The current era, the “Watershed Collaborative Era,” 
has certainly not seen the abolition of the specialized federal and state water 
quality agencies and programs that emerged during the “Environmental 
Era,” just as new agencies and programs in the “Environmental Era” did not 
replace the large federal water development agencies that blossomed during 
the “New Deal Era.”
Even though each era is characterized by a new best approach to manag-
ing watersheds, that new best approach is often a blend of idealism and prag-
matism. Idealism appears in the consistent desire to create a comprehensive, 
integrated watershed authority, and pragmatism emerges by settling for the 
approach that is feasible at the time and comes closest to the ideal. In 1972, for 
example, the National Water Commission recognized the desirable qualities of 
a federal corporation like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), but realized 
that such a form was unlikely to be adopted, and instead recommended the fed-
eral-interstate compact commission as the preferred form for water resources 
planning and management (National Water Commission 1973). It was the 
most comprehensive and integrated form thought politically feasible.4
This chapter examines this underlying set of political issues during three 
eras: 1933 to 1965, or roughly from the New Deal to the formal creation of 
river basin commissions with the passage of the 1965 Water Resources Act; 
1965 to 1980, the period covering the creation, operation, and dissolution 
of the river basin commissions; and the 1980s to the present, covering the 
emergence of the watershed movement and the creation of many different 
types and forms of watershed collaboratives.5 The overall period covered, 
from 1933 to 2007, encompasses the major concerted efforts to realize in 
practice comprehensive, integrated watershed management in the United 
States.6 We choose to focus on three broad time periods for clarity and econ-
omy. We wish to explore how elected officials, public managers, and water 
users were regularly confronted with and repeatedly addressed a variety of 
political concerns. Whether examining a single era or multiple eras, the con-
stancy of political issues remains.7
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Although there are distinctions among the eras, in this chapter we 
focus on their underlying unity. That unity centers on politics: they all 
share a common set of political issues and concerns that policy makers 
and citizens alike struggled with. The common political challenges include 
the motivation for pursuing integrated management; the scale at which 
water should be managed; who should participate in decision making; 
what values, benefits, and goals are to be realized; and the obstacles that 
limit achievement of comprehensive, integrated watershed management.8 
Explicitly drawing out the common and enduring political issues and 
questions turns attention away from the search for the one best way to 
manage watersheds and instead centers it on the ever-present challenges 
of realizing a range of conflicting and compatible goals and values in the 
context of complex adaptive and adaptable biophysical and social systems. 
The eras are characterized by a common set of political issues; they differ 
in the answers adopted.
As Goldfarb (1994) has noted, the contemporary watershed movement 
has its roots in the unified river basin management movement. That move-
ment unfolded over much of the twentieth century, ending in the 1980s when 
the Reagan administration dissolved the Title II river basin commissions. 
The centerpiece of unified river basin management had been basin-wide 
programs with multipurpose storage projects. Prior to 1965, the president, 
Congress, and federal water agencies experimented with different forms of 
river basin planning and management, typically centering on a board or 
council, located either in the Executive Office of the President or among 
cabinet departments, and individual ad hoc river basin planning commit-
tees. These experiments had little direction from the president or Congress, 
except for the short-lived National Planning Board, and they were criticized 
for failing to realize comprehensive management plans or tight coordina-
tion among federal agencies (Derthick 1974, 136).
The Title II river basin commissions changed that. Created by the 1965 
Water Resources Act, the commissions were composed of representatives 
from federal water agencies and the states located in the respective basins. 
Each commission was granted a director with an independent budget and 
a small staff to oversee day-to-day operations and support planning activi-
ties. The commissions were guided and supported by the Water Resources 
Council, located in the Executive Office of the President. Overall, commis-
sions lagged in their planning activities; many produced general studies of 
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their river basins, but few produced detailed documents identifying specific 
water projects and none was able to prioritize projects (Derthick 1974).
By the time most of the river basin commissions were formed and 
operational—in the mid-1970s—their time had perhaps already passed. In 
1980, Wengart wrote: “As a major governing concept in water policy, inte-
grated river basin development is in trouble. In the public mind, it is being 
superseded by concerns for environmental improvement, protection of eco-
systems, and the complex problems of water pollution control” (1981, 9). 
Citizens were increasingly concerned with environmental values not readily 
captured by the kinds of traditional management activities and traditional 
water projects on which the commissions focused.9
Even though the commissions were dissolved at the beginning of 
President Reagan’s first term, the federal government, state and local gov-
ernments, and citizens did not abandon the hope of “watershed” manage-
ment. Attention turned during the 1980s from more ambitious (from an 
engineering and financial standpoint) river basin projects to a more modest 
“best management practices” approach, and from the federal government to 
state and local governments as the locus of watershed planning, with federal 
agencies such as the EPA strongly encouraging such activity as an important 
approach for addressing non-point sources of water pollution.
Thus, within each era some ideas and approaches prevailed, which pro-
vide points of contrast even as we recognize the consistency of certain politi-
cal issues and challenges. For each era we can characterize dominant ideas 
and directions concerning (1) why integrated management should be pur-
sued; (2) at what scale and (3) by what means water resource activities would 
best be organized in order to achieve integrated management; and (d) the 
goals and values to be achieved via integrated management. We begin with 
the issues and ideas motivating efforts toward integrated management.
motIvatIon for Integrated management
A given across all three time periods is that the diverse dimensions of a water-
shed, natural and human, are intertwined, making integrated management 
necessary. What differed over time were the types of watershed interactions 
emphasized and in need of integration and coordination. Earlier periods 
focused on the interaction among water development projects within a sin-
gle basin. Later periods focused on the interaction among the biophysical 
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dimensions of a watershed and how to minimize the environmental impacts 
of water development projects and other destructive uses of river basins.
river Basin development, 1933 to 1965
The beginning of this era was marked by the Great Depression and an 
unprecedented federal response to realize economic recovery on a national 
scale. One of the centerpieces of economic recovery was massive invest-
ment in public works, particularly large-scale, multipurpose water projects. 
Not only did the construction of the projects provide jobs for thousands 
of people, but improved navigation, flood control, water for irrigation, 
and hydropower spurred economic development and recovery. The major 
federal water development agencies, the Army Corps of Engineers and the 
Bureau of Reclamation, had been established decades earlier and, over time, 
had been authorized to engage in the planning for and construction of mul-
tipurpose projects (Holmes 1972). What was missing were plans for com-
prehensive river basin development and institutional mechanisms to ensure 
that the water development programs of the federal agencies fit within and 
were coordinated with the comprehensive plans. As Holmes (1972, 13) 
argued, “New Deal planners were very intent on avoiding the accusation of 
maintaining a pork barrel composed of ill-planned, jerry-rigged projects.” 
Integration was vital for ensuring that the many water projects to be built 
were complementary and coordinated, promoting comprehensive devel-
opment of the waters of a river basin. At the scale of the project, multiple 
uses required coordination; at the scale of the river basin, multiple proj-
ects needed coordination. Thus, integration, as discussed below, centered 
on experimenting with a variety of coordinating mechanisms, all of which 
were found wanting, providing considerable justification for new forms of 
river basin management.
river Basin commissions, 1965 to 1980
By the 1950s, criticism of river basin development identified a lack of 
both comprehensiveness and integration. The lack of comprehensiveness 
centered on two issues. First, most multipurpose water projects provided 
water, electricity, and flood control for irrigation districts and rural commu-
nities. Increasingly, representatives of urban areas demanded that a larger 
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range of uses be incorporated within existing and new projects, particularly 
municipal and industrial water supplies and recreational opportunities. 
Second, most of the benefits of multipurpose water projects were directed 
to a narrow range of constituents—farmers and residents of rural areas, pri-
marily located in the western United States. Critics of the federal water agen-
cies wanted to see the benefits of water projects extended more equitably 
across the United States and include uses valued by urban residents.
The lack of integration also centered on two issues. First, critics argued 
that the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation managed 
to avoid close coordination and integration of their water activities. On a 
number of occasions the two agencies engaged in public squabbles over who 
was to plan and develop particular projects in a river basin, such as the King 
and Kern Rivers development, in which the Army Corps of Engineers won 
out over the Bureau of Reclamation (Knott and Miller 1987, 154). In other 
river basins, public conflicts were avoided by the two agencies’ carving up 
of different portions of a river basin. For instance, the bureau was allowed 
to build irrigation projects in the upper Missouri River Basin, and the corps 
was allowed to build several main-stem dams to regulate flooding and pro-
vide navigation improvements (Knott and Miller 1987, 154). Second, the 
lack of integration extended to who was allowed to participate in river basin 
planning and development. Many federal agencies with interests in a river 
basin—such as the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and the 
Federal Power Commission, among others—resented the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ domination of decision making (Derthick 1974, 137). They were 
joined by states and localities who also sought more active participation in 
river basin planning (Holmes 1972). In the end, Congress and the presi-
dent attempted to respond to these criticisms through the passage of the 
Water Resources Act of 1965, which attempted to centralize and integrate 
river basin management to an extent never seen before or since, as will be 
discussed below.10
the Watershed movement, 1980s to 2007
The motivation for integration over the past two decades is distinctly 
different from the previous two eras. No longer were public officials, manag-
ers, and water users faced with the challenges of integrating new multipur-
pose projects into river basins. Rather, they were confronted with integrating 
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a host of environmental values into water management. Thus, the focus 
moved from attending to interactions among multiple-use projects across a 
river basin to the environmental effects of the previous seventy-five years of 
river basin development.
The lack of comprehensiveness and integration of water management 
activities in previous eras was largely blamed for many environmental prob-
lems. The lack of coordination among water resource programs established 
a relatively lax management setting in which agricultural, industrial, and 
other forms of development flourished to the detriment of the condition 
of the nation’s water resources (McGinnis 1999, 497). Furthermore, envi-
ronmental water programs—such as contamination prevention and reme-
diation, wetlands protection, and species preservation—were adopted in an 
incremental and uncoordinated fashion that failed to recognize the con-
nections among these programs and the water problems they were meant 
to address (Mann 1993; Behrman 1993, 11; U.S. EPA 1995, iii). Finally, the 
incremental and uncoordinated programs created barriers to citizen partici-
pation. The presence of multiple governmental units and agencies operating 
within any given watershed, each carrying out some program or policy that 
affected only one portion of the overall water environment therein, discour-
aged active public participation. Citizens found it difficult to know or learn 
where to find information, whom to contact or how, and how to participate 
effectively (Nakamura and Born 1993, 812). In the end, “the need to inte-
grate across traditional program areas (e.g., flood control, wastewater, land 
use) and across levels of government (federal, state, tribal, local) [led] natural 
resource management toward a watershed approach” (U.S. EPA 1995, iii).
Across each of the eras, the need for comprehensive, integrated man-
agement was clearly articulated, whether its purpose was to coordinate 
river basin development or environmental restoration. What was also clear 
to advocates in each era was that management in previous eras was “frag-
mented,” “piecemeal,” “inadequate,” “myopic” (Milon, Kiker, and Lee 1998, 
38), and the like. Thus, within each era, the promise to finally realize com-
prehensive, integrated management was made.
scale of organIzatIon
Across each of the eras, elected officials, public managers, and citizens sup-
ported management at the river basin or watershed scale. As the Environ-
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mental Protection Agency has noted, however, a watershed can mean many 
things, because “watersheds occur on a range of scales from the subnational 
or regional (e.g., the Mississippi watershed) down to local scale (e.g., the 
watershed of a small creek)” (U.S. EPA, 1995, 1–8). How a given watershed 
was defined, and therefore the scale at which watershed management should 
occur, differed over time, ranging from a regional meaning of watershed to a 
local meaning of watershed, as described by the EPA.
river Basin development, 1933 to 1965
The scale of comprehensive integrated management during the era of 
river basin development was distinctly regional. Early plans and projects were 
developed for the main stems of major rivers—such as the Tennessee, the 
Colorado, the Columbia, the Mississippi, and the Missouri. Comprehensive 
planning centered on the main stems of rivers, with little attention paid to 
tributaries. A prime example of a main-stem focus is the development of the 
Colorado River. From the Colorado River Compact, an agreement initially 
adopted by the seven basin states in 1922 that allocated the water of the river 
among the states, to the Boulder Canyon Act of 1928, in which Congress 
directed the Bureau of Reclamation to build and operate the major proj-
ects that would allow the basin states to realize the compact’s water alloca-
tions, to later acts and developments, attention centered almost exclusively 
on the main stem, leaving the basin states to do what they would with the 
Colorado’s tributaries. Only in the last decade, as severe drought has per-
sisted over much of the basin and as tension has risen among the basin states 
over one another’s water use, have some states attempted to extend basin-
wide management to include tributaries.
river Basin commissions, 1965 to 1980
As suggested in the previous section on motivation for integration, 
this era began with formal efforts to engage in more comprehensive and 
integrated management efforts than what occurred during the era that 
preceded it; this period includes a more comprehensive view of scale. The 
emphasis remains on regional river systems, as river basin commissions are 
organized around such systems, but planning and management extend to 
encompass tributaries (Holmes 1979). The planning process established by 
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the 1965 Water Resources Act included Type I plans that provided a broad 
overview of the water resources, problems, and challenges occurring within 
the basin and Type II plans that addressed specific problems and solutions 
all within the context of Type I plans. The specific problems and solutions 
often focused on tributaries (Derthick 1974). For instance, the Ohio River 
Commission, as part of its Type II planning process, included instream flow 
studies on different tributaries, such as the Monongahela River (Holmes 
1979; Joering 1980).
The Monongahela River, although certainly a tributary of the Ohio 
River, is a major river in its own right, highlighting the flexibility of the 
terms “watershed” and “river basin.” In practice, the boundaries of river basin 
commissions were hydrologically based, but whether they encompassed a 
single major river and its tributaries or multiple rivers with no single major 
drainage largely depended on the desires of the states that formed the com-
missions. Contrast the Ohio River Commission with the New England River 
Basin Commission, which encompassed twenty-eight river basins, sixteen of 
which were either interstate or international (McCrea 1980). Thus, efforts 
were directed toward comprehensive planning at scales that encompassed 
major rivers and their primary tributaries.
the Watershed movement, 1980s to 2007
Sabatier, Weible, and Ficker (2005) argue that the primary distinguish-
ing feature of the Watershed Collaborative Era is the active participation of 
a wide variety of stakeholders, most notably local citizens, in watershed gov-
ernance. We would add one more—the scale of organization.11 Watershed 
collaboratives are organized at the scale of streams or segments of smaller 
rivers. They are intrastate and, in a number of instances, intracounty. These 
streams and stream/river segments were rarely, if ever, considered in the 
previous two eras; they were simply too small. They are now the focus of 
active planning and management. Watershed management at the local scale 
is viewed favorably because it is ecologically meaningful, and “the health of 
an entire watershed can be measured by the health of the aquatic ecosystem” 
(McGinnis 1999, 498).
The scope of management during the first two eras centered on regional-
level watersheds with some attention paid to major tributaries. Once the fed-
eral government removed itself from river basin planning and plan funding, 
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such efforts faltered. Watershed planning and management fell to the states, 
where its scope and purpose substantially changed. Local watershed plan-
ning focused on addressing serious water quality degradation of streams 
and stream segments.
organIzatIonal BasIcs
How to organize planning and management of watersheds was constantly 
debated and experimented with over time. Who should participate, how 
should decisions be made, and how will implementation occur? Although 
organizational form varied, decision-making and implementation processes 
remained remarkably similar.
river Basin development, 1933 to 1965
The organization of comprehensive integrated river basin management 
consisted of variations on two distinct forms. The first, more centralized 
form, which lasted for a decade, was a congressionally created or funded 
organization under the direct control of the president. The second, volun-
tary form consisted of a committee of cabinet-level secretaries and their 
staffs who consulted with each other on river basin activities by agencies 
within their departments.
The centralized form, which at different times in its incarnation was 
named the National Planning Board, the National Resources Board, and the 
National Resources Committee, assisted the president in planning the many 
public works projects (water projects being the most important) for recov-
ering and rebuilding the economy (Holmes 1972). Over the ten years of 
its existence, from 1933 to 1943, its membership varied. Sometimes it only 
consisted of three “non-aligned” experts from the business or university sec-
tors who were trusted to give the president sound advice. At other times 
it consisted of three “non-aligned” experts and the secretaries of war, inte-
rior, agriculture, and labor (Holmes 1972, 14–18). Much of its water proj-
ect planning was conducted by a water committee whose makeup reflected 
that of the board’s, three “non-aligned” experts and representatives from 
the Departments of War, Interior, Agriculture, and Labor. The committee 
developed river basin plans and studies of water projects for congressional 
adoption based on basins as entire units. This committee, in turn, relied 
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on regional committees to investigate and develop plans and proposals for 
specific river basins. The regional committees usually consisted of field rep-
resentatives of the major federal agencies, although on occasion, state repre-
sentatives were invited to participate (Holmes 1972).
The National Resources Board exercised a variety of powers that sup-
ported its efforts at comprehensive, integrated river basin development. It had 
the authority to review and revise the six-year construction plans of the Army 
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, and it eventually gained 
authority in conjunction with the Bureau of the Budget to review the two 
agencies’ budgets and to prioritize projects slated for construction. Overall, 
the board exercised powers that allowed the president to provide some direc-
tion and coherency to river basin development (Holmes 1972, 18).12
In 1943, Congress abolished the National Resources Planning Board 
(Holmes 1972, 22). The secretaries of agriculture, interior, and war and 
the head of the Federal Power Commission voluntarily created the Federal 
Interagency River Basin Committee as a coordinating mechanism, although 
it had no central executive supervision. It largely mimicked the structure 
of its predecessor with a central committee and numerous regional com-
mittees organized around specific river basins. And, like its predecessor, 
participants were federal government political appointees, public manag-
ers, and experts, although state representatives were occasionally invited to 
participate. Unlike its predecessor, however, it could not develop integrated 
river basin plans, nor could it settle conflicts among different federal agen-
cies. These limitations were largely due to its decision rule, consensus, and 
the manner in which the regional river basin committees were organized. 
Consensus decision making led to logrolling, with federal agencies carving 
up river basins and basin projects among themselves. Furthermore, regional 
committees were convened only after agencies had created project propos-
als or after a single agency invested extensively in planning for a particular 
river basin, making any type of integrated planning across agencies virtu-
ally impossible (Holmes 1972, 38). Not surprisingly, both the national and 
regional committees were regularly criticized for their inability to coordi-
nate the activities of all federal agencies in a coherent manner. Also, federal 
agencies resented the dominating position of the Army Corps of Engineers 
on many of the regional committees, and states actively pressed for a more 
central role (Derthick 1974, 135–137).
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river Basin commissions, 1965 to 1980
By the end of the 1950s, reports of study commissions were piling up, all 
urging greater centralization and coordination of river basin development 
(Holmes 1972). One particular report, issued by the Senate Select Commit-
tee on National Water Resources in 1960, spurred action. It envisioned a 
looming water crisis that could only be adequately addressed through cen-
tralized and coordinated river basin planning and by the expansion of exist-
ing agency programs to encompass water quality, municipal and industrial 
water supplies, recreation, and fish and wildlife protection and enhance-
ment (Holmes 1972, 41).
The 1965 Water Resources Act attempted to realize more centralized 
and coordinated river basin planning and management largely by formal-
izing the practices of the previous era. The act created a Water Resources 
Council located in the Executive Office of the President. As a cabinet-level 
council, the council consisted of the secretaries of agriculture, army, interior, 
HEW, and the Federal Power Commission, with the secretary of the interior 
as the chair. Its primary tasks included developing regular national assess-
ments of regional water supply and demand, establishing river basin com-
missions, reviewing river basin plans, and developing more standards for 
project evaluation besides just cost-benefit analyses, among others (Holmes 
1979, 256). It operated on the basis of consensus.
The Water Resources Council would only agree to the creation of a river 
basin commission upon a state’s request and with the concurrence of all 
states in the basin. The commissions consisted of a federal representative 
appointed by the president who oversaw the commission’s staff and who 
was to coordinate the other federal members of the commission. The other 
federal members consisted of representatives from each federal agency with 
an interest in the water resources of the basin. Also, each state appointed a 
representative. In practice, participation in commission activities was much 
broader. Many commissions created and relied on citizen advisory commit-
tees to assist in developing both Type I and Type II plans. The citizen advi-
sory committees consisted of local government officials and representatives 
from voluntary associations and civic groups.
Commissions were forums for coordination and planning, not inde-
pendent decision makers. Operating on the basis of consensus, each com-
mission was responsible for preparing and updating comprehensive plans. 
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No government was responsible for carrying out the plans unless they were 
adopted by the legislatures of the states (Derthick 1974, 138–140; Holmes 
1979, 256). No state ever adopted a commission plan, and, in fact, most 
commissions labored under the twin burdens of inadequate staff and fund-
ing and the rule of consensus to even develop plans. Those commissions 
that did develop plans largely put together wish lists of projects, unable to 
prioritize among them (Derthick 1974).
Derthick (1974, 151) argues that states were reluctant partners in join-
ing and participating in commissions. States that did participate did so for 
defensive reasons, protecting their interests from the adverse actions of either 
the federal government or other state governments. In other words, com-
missions were valuable to the extent they provided states with veto power 
that they otherwise would not have been able to exercise.
The Water Resources Council and the river basin commissions were dif-
ferent from the coordinating committees of the 1950s in some important 
respects. The commissions’ operations were not solely dependent on federal 
agencies; rather, they had an independent federal representative appointed 
by the president who was supposed to coordinate the federal agencies and 
settle conflicts among them. Furthermore, commissions had their own 
staffs and some funding to carry out their planning work. Also, participa-
tion was considerably broader. Federal employees were just one of several 
groups participating instead of the only participants. State and local offi-
cials and citizens participated on commissions and in commission activities. 
In other respects, the Water Resources Council and the river basin com-
missions replicated the weaknesses of their predecessors, namely, consen-
sus decision making, which inhibited the development of comprehensive 
integrated river basin plans and voluntary implementation. Components of 
plans would be realized only if federal or state agencies agreed to adopt and 
implement them.13
the Watershed movement, 1980s to 2007
Sabatier, Weible, and Ficker (2005) argue that watershed partnerships 
and collaboratives arise, in part, as a reaction to three defining characteris-
tics of environmental regulation—the fragmentation of environmental pro-
grams across many different agencies, inadequate opportunities for citizens 
to participate in decision making, and the contentiousness of adversarial 
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legal proceedings. The organizational forms adopted to address the three 
challenges distinguish collaboratives and partnerships from the committees, 
councils, and commissions of earlier eras.
Fragmentation and limited participation are addressed through the 
same mechanism—the identification and inclusion of stakeholders of all 
types—citizens, nonprofit organizations and civic groups, business associa-
tions, government officials at all levels—representing the full range of inter-
ests, including water quality, water quantity, land use planning, agricultural 
policy, wildlife management, and habitat protection and restoration. As the 
EPA succinctly states: “All parties with a stake in the specific local situation 
should participate in the analysis of problems and the creation of solutions,” 
and “The actions undertaken should draw on the full range of methods 
and tools available, integrating them into a coordinated, multiorganization 
attack on the problems” (U.S. EPA 1991, 1).
Once a broad range of stakeholders is convened, they work with facili-
tators to elicit and share information about resource conditions; develop-
ment and its impacts within the watershed; the beliefs, interests, values, and 
concerns of all participants; possible courses of action to remedy perceived 
problems; and so forth. The partnerships exercise little formal authority; 
rather, they provide a forum in which management plans and projects are 
discussed and revised and eventually turned over to the public-sector agen-
cies for implementation (Sabatier et al. 2005).14 Accordingly, consensus 
decision-making processes are supposed to be used to develop goals, plans, 
and projects. Consensus decision making is viewed much more positively 
than in previous eras, when it was largely considered a tool used by federal 
and state agencies and state governments to protect their interests and their 
turf by vetoing plans and projects. Consensus decision making is the key to 
successful partnerships because it allows for people from diverse and con-
flicting backgrounds to sympathetically learn with and from each other and 
to search and find common ground on which to build collective action.
The movement’s impact on policy makers is evident in the consider-
able amount of activity to promote watershed-scale planning groups, coun-
cils, interagency coordination efforts, collaborative watershed partnerships, 
and the like. At least some, and perhaps most, of this activity has occurred 
in response to federal and state initiatives (Goldfarb 1994). That activity 
has been promoted in several ways by the national government, although 
it is occurring mostly at the regional and substate levels (Gregg et al. 1998; 
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Nakamura and Born 1993; Sabatier et al. 2005). McGinnis (1999, 498) 
reports that “17 federal resource agencies and state governments officially 
have embraced some form of watershed approach” and that more than 200 
watershed groups have been created in California alone. Kenney and col-
leagues (2000) identified 346 watershed partnerships in the western United 
States. Sabatier and colleagues (2005) believe that total is an undercount as 
they found 150 in California and 60 in Washington. A survey by Yaffee and 
colleagues (1996) found more than 600 ecosystem management projects—
many of them watershed projects—in the United States.15
In one of the few large-n empirical studies of watershed partnerships, 
Leach and Sabatier (2005) examine the keys to success of partnerships and in 
so doing reveal strengths and weaknesses of these informal advisory bodies. 
Leach and Sabatier randomly sampled 47 of 150 identified watershed part-
nerships in California and 29 of 60 partnerships identified in Washington. 
They used three measures of success: (1) reaching agreement on issues, goals, 
implementation actions, and management plans; (2) implementing projects; 
and (3) perceived effectiveness of partnership actions (Leach and Sabatier 
2005, 241). Many of the partnerships reached agreement on issues and goals 
with fewer developing implementation actions and management plans. 
Partnerships in which members believed their watersheds were in crisis were 
more likely to reach agreements, as were partnerships with higher levels of 
trust, particularly those that were in existence for three years or more. Of 
the seventy-six partnerships, only thirty-six, or 47 percent, had attempted to 
implement projects. Project implementation largely depended on funding 
and the age of the partnership. Finally, partnerships that implemented proj-
ects and that were infused with trust and norms of reciprocity were evaluated 
more positively by their stakeholders (Leach and Sabatier 2005, 250).
Watershed partnerships can point to a number of successes. The inclu-
siveness of membership and consensus-based decision making result in par-
ticipants viewing partnerships as highly legitimate forums for engaging in 
conversations, discussions, and arguments over problems, goals, and solu-
tions to watershed problems. Such legitimacy is built through growing levels 
of trust, as widely divergent participants come to know one another better 
and discover common ground. Furthermore, given the extensive participa-
tion of federal, state, and local officials,16 they hold promise of supporting 
and encouraging intergovernmental coordination. As Lubell and colleagues 
(2005, 288) note, however, the success of watershed partnerships ultimately 
Watersheds, PolItIcs, and InstItutIons    43
rests in results, and at present it is unclear whether collaboratives improve 
environmental conditions in their watersheds.
Collaborative, and even primarily nongovernmental, watershed arrange-
ments have had achievements. An important question remains regarding 
whether such achievements represent proof of concept—that is, whether 
they validate the collaborative partnership as an organizational type—or 
have been instead due to particular circumstances in certain locations at 
certain moments. Leaning more toward the latter interpretation, Woolley 
and McGinnis (1999, 591) surmised:
If watershed organizations succeed . . . we expect that this will be due 
to several special conditions. First, it could be because the actual range 
of interests or ideas represented in the organization is not very broad 
or deep. This can be the case of some watersheds that are not very large 
or organizations that do not incorporate a very wide range of kinds of 
economic activities. Second, successful cooperation could be because the 
“facts” about the condition of the watershed are clear and uncontested 
and point unambiguously to a set of actions that must be taken, but this 
is rarely the case. Third, it could be because the organization is not, in 
fact, truly voluntary, in the sense that it operates under a more or less 
explicit threat of external intervention by some other governmental level.
Gregg and colleagues (1998) employed more optimistic language but 
reached a similar substantive conclusion:
While broad governance issues . . . are at the core of the watershed move-
ment, most individual watershed initiatives are much more pragmatic, 
concerned with finding and implementing solutions to localized prob-
lems. In fact, one of the strengths of watershed initiatives is their ability 
to focus their activities directly at the most pressing natural resource 
problems of particular watersheds, often operating outside of normal 
governmental processes and free from the constraints of inflexible man-
dates or program requirements.
Both sets of authors, then, share the view that successful watershed efforts 
are often not comprehensive, not integrated, and not legitimized with formal 
authority but focused on particular concerns that are deemed to require 
separate and immediate attention.
Even Lubell and colleagues (2005, 289–290), who argue that watershed 
partnerships represent a quiet revolution in watershed management, are 
cautious. They state:
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The collaborative approach to watershed management is not a magic bul-
let that addresses all situations at all times or that will even be appropriate 
most of the time. . . . [W]e recommend that the collaborative approach to 
watershed management be used as a method for resolving environmental 
and socioeconomic problems only when there are high stakes, high social 
distrust, high governmental distrust, and high knowledge uncertainty. 
Collaborative approaches are particularly useful for addressing issues 
that perplex command-and-control institutions, such as nonpoint source 
pollution and habitat destruction. Collaborative approaches are probably 
not justified when existing institutions are already adequate.
In other words, watershed partnerships should be used as a last resort for 
particularly problematic watershed settings.
Most watershed-scale arrangements established thus far have been on 
what Nakamura and Born (1993, 808) call the “weaker” end of the spectrum: 
watershed discussion forums, advisory bodies, interagency agreements to 
collaborate on research, and the like (see Lubell et al. 2002). These typically 
have little capacity and no authority to take formal decisions, only advisory 
decisions; implementation largely rests with their governmental partners; 
and they do not have the ability to sanction entities within the watershed 
whose behavior fails to conform to plans.
Over the past seventy-five years, comprehensive integrated watershed 
management efforts have taken a variety of organizational forms, from a 
national planning agency in the Executive Office of the President and its 
regional river basin committees to the hundreds of watershed partner-
ships and collaboratives currently in existence. Not only have organiza-
tional forms differed over the eras but so too has participation. During the 
river basin development era, participation was largely restricted to experts 
in the federal agencies in charge of planning and building water projects. 
Participation broadened over time to eventually include state officials for-
mally seated on river basin commissions, and with watershed partnerships, 
participation was actively sought for all stakeholders representing a wide 
variety of interests. Although organization forms and participation varied, 
decision rules and implementation processes did not. The dominant deci-
sion rule was consensus, and plan implementation was largely voluntary, 
relying on the support and cooperation of individual government agencies. 
In the earlier eras, both practices were singled out as the primary sources of 
failure of comprehensive integrated management (Derthick 1974; Holmes 
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1979). Whether consensus decision making and voluntary implementation 
will also spell failure for many of the watershed partnerships is an open ques-
tion, although there is nothing distinct about the structure of such partner-
ships to suggest otherwise.
goals and values of IntegratIon
The goals, benefits, and values to be realized by engaging in comprehensive, 
integrated watershed management varied over each time period, particularly 
biophysical goals. Biophysical goals center on uses made of a watershed, such 
as water for irrigation, protection from flooding, low-flow regulation to pro-
tect water quality, or the protection of rich riparian habitat. In contrast, overall 
political and socioeconomic goals and values tended to remain stable, varying 
by the emphasis placed on the different dimensions of the overall goal. For 
example, protecting and enhancing democracy runs throughout each era, but 
what democracy means and how it should be realized changes over time.
river Basin development, 1933 to 1965
The biophysical goals of this era were clear-cut. Large-scale water proj-
ects were to realize either singly or in combination the goals of navigation, 
flood control, irrigation water, and hydropower. These biophysical goals 
were stepping-stones to accomplishing pressing political and socioeco-
nomic goals. Large-scale public works projects were the keys for realizing 
both short-term and long-term goals. In the short term, such projects put 
many people to work and pulled the nation out of the Great Depression. In 
the long term, water projects supported regional economic development—
plentiful and inexpensive power and water spurred investment in agricul-
ture and industry and flood control protected such investments.
Furthermore, multipurpose water projects realized economy and effi-
ciency through several avenues. Multipurpose water projects avoided water 
waste by capturing and storing river flows and floodwaters that would oth-
erwise be lost to the oceans. And, only those projects that were efficient, or 
cost-effective, were built. The federal water agencies were required to subject 
their plans and projects to cost-benefit analyses.
More than efficiency and economy, though, multipurpose water projects 
protected and enhanced democracy by ensuring an equitable distribution 
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of benefits. Navigation projects and improvements and publicly owned 
and operated power projects protected the average citizen from railroad 
and power trusts, granting them ready and affordable access to the trans-
portation and energy they needed to raise and ship their products to mar-
kets (Holmes 1972, 13).17 Overall, large-scale water projects were viewed as 
examples of how science and technology could be used to transform nature 
to enhance people’s lives (Holmes 1979, 77). In other words, they were 
socially transformative.
river Basin commissions, 1965 to 1980
The biophysical goals of this era included all of those from the previ-
ous era—navigation, flood control, irrigation water, and hydropower—plus 
many others, such as municipal and industrial water supplies, water qual-
ity protection and enhancement through low-flow regulation and dilution, 
recreational areas and opportunities, and protection of areas of natural 
beauty. Like the previous era, these many goals were accomplished pri-
marily, although not exclusively, through the construction and operation 
of multipurpose water projects and their careful placement (Holmes 1979, 
111). These projects were not necessary to spur regional economic develop-
ment as much as they were needed to respond to rapidly growing urban 
populations, a booming economy, and increasing demands for recreational 
opportunities by greater numbers of affluent citizens.18
Attempting to realize a wider variety of goals, some of which were in direct 
conflict, in an economical and efficient manner required something more 
than cost-benefit analysis. Additional techniques were necessary. The Water 
Resources Council developed and advocated the use of multiple objective 
planning processes. River basin objectives would be identified and weighted; 
multiple alternatives, both structural and nonstructural, for achieving objec-
tives would be identified and evaluated. The best combination of alternatives 
for achieving the objectives would be selected. The goal was to move beyond 
justifying each project through cost-benefit analysis and toward achieving 
the optimal use of water and land resources in a basin by selecting the best 
combination of projects and activities (Holmes 1979, 267).
The optimal development of river basins required greater participation 
and consent from a broader cross-section of policy makers and citizens. No 
longer could critical development decisions rest largely in the hands of fed-
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eral government experts. Participation in decision making was expanded by 
the composition and functioning of river basin commissions. Notably, state 
representatives took seats alongside federal representatives as voting mem-
bers of the commissions. Some commissions also actively relied on a variety 
of citizen and science advisory groups to provide assistance and input to 
planning processes (Harrison 1980; Joering 1980). Commission meetings 
governed by consensus allowed the major state and federal actors to meet 
together, to share information and problems, to learn about interests and 
activities, and to eventually agree on specific goals, thereby transforming 
relations among participants who previously found themselves at odds with 
one another (Joering 1980). Consensus-building processes supported coop-
eration and eventually coordination (Joering 1980).
the Watershed movement, 1980 to 2007
The biophysical goals of the previous eras largely rested on reengi-
neering river systems to meet human needs. The biophysical goals of the 
watershed movement era are notably different. They entail reengineering 
human uses to restore and protect the natural processes of watersheds and 
the environmental services those processes provide. Reclaiming watersheds 
involves placing water back in the stream, operating dams to mimic the 
natural hydrographs of rivers, preventing non-point source pollution from 
degrading water quality, protecting and restoring wetlands, and so forth. 
These biophysical goals are not only different from those of earlier eras, but 
they directly challenge them and seek to reverse their effects.
Socioeconomic goals also differ from previous eras. Science replaces 
economics as the primary guide for action. Basic scientific information 
about different dimensions of a watershed guides the selection and adop-
tion of projects. Economic decision making, even cost-benefit analysis, is 
still used to justify projects, but different sorts of projects, such as dismantling 
dams. Also, environmental services, such as water cleansing and flood con-
trol provided by wetlands, are valued and compared to the costs of replacing 
such services if the wetlands are destroyed.
But most importantly, the partnerships support democracy. Just as 
multipurpose water projects were viewed as experiments in democracy, 
enabling people to pursue productive livelihoods and so become active and 
contributing citizens, watershed partnerships are also viewed as experiments 
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in democracy, but a different type of democracy. Partnerships support the 
practice of direct democracy, allowing citizens to make decisions that directly 
affect their lives rather than allowing those decisions to be made by experts. 
Partnerships engage citizens in self-governance, allowing them to take con-
trol of their lives and their communities. In so doing, partnerships also forge 
a new identity among residents of a watershed. No longer are these residents 
only citizens of a town or a state; they are citizens of a watershed with all the 
benefits and responsibilities that entails for ensuring good governance.
Each era differed in the goals and values pursued, but advocates in each 
era repeatedly pointed to the transformative powers of comprehensive inte-
grated watershed governance.
conclusIon
Nationwide efforts toward comprehensive, integrated watershed manage-
ment in the United States have a long and rich history—from large-scale 
river basin commissions organized by federal law to watershed partnerships 
organized around smaller, intrastate watersheds. While engaging in such 
efforts, policy makers, public managers, interest groups, and citizens have 
repeatedly struggled with answering fundamental political questions. How 
watershed management unfolded depended on how the questions were 
answered.
During the river basin development era, the goals were to stimulate eco-
nomic activity and regional economic development by investing in large-
scale multipurpose projects. Participation in planning, development, and 
construction was limited to government experts who built and operated 
the projects. Decision making and plan implementation changed over time. 
Initially, the president, through the National Resources Committee, created 
by executive order, exercised some control over the development of inte-
grated river basin plans and negotiated with Congress and the federal water 
agencies over plan implementation. Once Congress eliminated the National 
Resources Committee, planning floundered on the consensus decision pro-
cesses of the Federal Interagency River Basin Committee.
Frustration over the limited goals, limited participation, and weak deci-
sion-making processes of the river basin development era eventually led to 
a search for a better way to manage river basins, and a new comprehensive 
integrated watershed planning and management effort unfolded. Answers 
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to the political questions incrementally changed. Goals and values changed 
by adding municipal and industrial water users and recreational enthusiasts 
as beneficiaries of water projects. Decision-making processes changed by 
formalizing the processes of the previous era into a formally constituted 
council in the Executive Office of the President that oversees the river basin 
planning processes of the river basin commissions. Although the council 
consists only of cabinet secretaries, participation in planning is extended 
to states, local governments, and citizens through the constitution of the 
commissions and their use of citizen advisory committees. Furthermore, 
a federal representative, independent of the federal water agencies, serving 
as commission chair and controlling an independent staff and budget, was 
believed to be sufficient to bring the federal agencies on board in develop-
ing and supporting integrated river basin plans. Decision-making processes 
remained the same, however; at all levels, decisions were by consensus, and 
implementation of plans was voluntary. In the end, most commissions 
functioned no better at developing and implementing integrated river basin 
plans than did their predecessors (Derthick 1974).
The watershed movement emerged not only in reaction to the disman-
tling of the river basin commissions but primarily in reaction to the excesses 
and shortcomings of more than a decade of environmental regulation 
(Sabatier, Weible, and Ficker 2005). In some ways, advocates of watershed 
planning were justified in their harsh criticism of the status quo approaches 
to water resources management as “fragmented,” “piecemeal,” “inadequate,” 
“myopic” (Milon, Kiker, and Lee 1998, 38), and the like. Not only were no 
formal efforts at comprehensive integrated management occurring among 
the water development agencies (with the dissolution of the council and 
commissions), but federal efforts appeared all the more fragmented because 
of the addition of numerous environmental programs spread across different 
federal agencies, with no attempt to coordinate them either. Consequently, 
the search for comprehensive integrated management begins again, but in a 
distinctly different manner.
The answers to the political questions are not just incrementally differ-
ent, as was the case in the transition between the river basin development 
and river basin commission eras, but qualitatively different. The overarching 
goal is ecosystem health to be achieved by mitigating the effects of decades 
of watershed development. Achieving ecosystem health is a complex pro-
cess requiring considerable time and information about such things as non-
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point pollution sources and the structure and function of ecosystem pro-
cesses. Not only are the goals qualitatively different but so is participation. 
Although government employees are primary participants, so too are the 
many citizens and representatives of different nonprofit and private organi-
zations. However, decision-making and implementation processes remain 
similar to those from the previous eras. Watershed partnerships constituted 
of members from a wide variety of interests and walks of life use consensus 
decision processes to develop common goals and plans, and implementa-
tion of those plans is voluntary. Those that succeed are likely to do so in spite 
of—not because of—such institutional mechanisms. They have the right 
combination of leadership, constituency support, and resources that allow 
them to move forward and act.
Historically, efforts at comprehensive integrated watershed manage-
ment have failed. Not only has there been no one best way, but whatever 
way was chosen proved neither comprehensive nor integrated. Why? These 
efforts have all been grounded in relatively weak coordinating mecha-
nisms, which as Derthick (1974, 143) explains, act as a “ ‘forum of peers,’ 
which is less an organization than a meeting place of organizations. . . . The 
forum is supposed to foster goodwill, facilitate communication in matters 
of shared interest, and provide a setting within which mutual adjustments 
may take place, but it lacks authority or other means for inducing mutual 
adjustments.” Furthermore, particularly in the first two eras, comprehen-
sive integrated planning and management efforts were centrally planned as 
opposed to responding to pressing needs or problems in particular river 
basins. Derthick (1974, 227) argues that “for a regional organization to be 
centrally planned is practically a guarantee that it will be weak and ineffec-
tual.” The reasons are many. Centrally planned organizations “imposed” on 
river basins are not likely to have strong constituent support, nor are they 
likely to have independent sources of funding. Also, they typically do not 
interfere with or challenge the authority of existing agencies. For the most 
part, they simply reflect the interests of their centralized creators, in this 
case, the president and Congress (Derthick 1974), who were searching for 
means of coordinating the federal agencies.
Ironically, a somewhat similar argument may be made in relation to 
many of the watershed partnerships. Their widespread emergence begin-
ning in the late 1980s was not a coincidence. Numerous federal and state 
agencies viewed partnerships as promising mechanisms to assist them in 
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addressing particularly vexing environmental problems, such as mitigating 
non-point source pollution and restoring riparian habitats. Congress and 
state legislatures alike directed agencies to work with local collaboratives, 
providing technical expertise and funding (Koontz et al. 2004, 8). Although 
some partnerships are initiated by citizens and others by governments, they 
all bear the imprint of governments, from statutorily defined environmen-
tal goals to participation by government employees. Whether partnerships 
accomplish integrated management and a more equitable distribution of 
power among stakeholders will largely be determined by the actions of gov-
ernments (Koontz et al. 2004, 184).
If most efforts to create comprehensive integrated watershed manage-
ment end in failure, is watershed management impossible? Our answer 
to that question is no, and in the remainder of the book we explain why 
comprehensive integrated watershed management does not occur and how 
watershed management typically unfolds instead. As we will explore in the 
following chapters, answers to both questions are based in politics, in the 
limits to human decision making and transaction costs, and in the political 
and organizational features of polycentricity.
In the end, we agree with Derthick’s conclusion (1974, 230): “[I]n the 
formation of regional organizations with operating or regulatory functions 
the best results are likely to be achieved ad hoc, in response to particular 
needs that can be shown to require organization on a regional scale and to 
require it so urgently that the inevitable costs in administrative confusion 
are worth paying”(emphasis added). In the following chapters, we examine 
the many different and inevitable choices that people must repeatedly make 
in governing the different dimensions of watersheds, choices that are likely 
to keep integrated management elusive.
notes
1. The sheer volume of literature on watershed management that has been pro-
duced in the last twenty years appears to distinguish this period from previous ones. 
Derthick (1974), in analyzing regional organizations, including river basin compacts 
and commissions, theorized at the time that little had been written about the appro-
priate functions or ideal forms for regional organizations because political scien-
tists have paid scant attention. Much of the recent literature is by political scientists 
(Lubell et al. 2002; Weber 2003; Koontz et al. 2004; Sabatier et al. 2005).
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2. This does not prevent contributors to the literature from having different 
views of its origin, as the following examples attest. “The concept of watershed-
based policymaking is not new. In 1878, John Wesley Powell, head of the U.S. 
Geological Survey, proposed to Congress that new states in the semiarid West be 
organized and governed in accordance with the appropriate watershed boundaries 
rather than straight-line political boundaries. For Powell, the watershed was the ideal 
medium for a new form of self-governance” (McGinnis 1999, 498; see also Bates et 
al. 1993, 170–171). “The United States Inland Waterways Commission, appointed 
in the 1890s to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the nation’s interior water 
resources, ‘reported to Congress in 1908 that each river system—from its headwa-
ters in the mountains to its mouth at the coast—is an integrated system and must 
be treated as such’ ” (U.S. EPA 1995, 1-1). “The Tennessee Valley Authority became 
‘an exploratory concept in soil and water management because of its approach to 
erosion control; “watershed management” was a term first used there and an agency 
spawned by the approach—the U.S. Soil Conservation Service—was to have a major 
influence throughout the world’ ” (Newson 1997, 97). “Since the 1970s, there has 
been dramatic and imaginative experimentation with new approaches to water and 
land resources management at the state and local levels. Many of these efforts have 
reinvigorated the idea that most water resource problems should be addressed on 
a watershed basis, and have experimented with ways to achieve a more integrated, 
or at least better coordinated, resources management” (Nakamura and Born 1993, 
807). “One of the most striking and innovative characteristics of water management 
in the 1990s is a renewed interest in local, generally sub-state watersheds as the pre-
ferred administrative unit” (Gregg et al. 1998; see also Kraft et al. 1999, 10).
3. Derthick (1974, 3) characterizes the historical record as a series of intellectual 
fads and fashions.
4. For additional examples, see Water Resources Activities in the United States: 
Reviews of National Water Resources During the Past Fifty Years, printed for the use 
of the Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources, 86th Cong., 1 sess., 
1959.
5. These eras are a modification of those used by Wengart (1981), who also used 
three eras, nineteenth century to 1933, 1933 to 1965, and 1965 to 1980. We drop his 
first time period and add the contemporary period of “watershed collaboratives.”
6. Prior to 1933, policy makers and technical experts alike expressed consider-
able interest in comprehensive river basin development. Not until 1933, however, 
with the creation of the National Planning Board as part of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, was there a formal organization charged with coordinating the activi-
ties of the different federal water agencies (Holmes 1972). For instance, in the early 
1900s a series of high-profile study commissions, such as the Inland Waterways 
Commission and the National Waterways Commission, issued reports that pro-
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posed the creation of bodies to coordinate the work of the several federal water 
development agencies (Holmes 1972). Also, prior to 1933, the federal water devel-
opment agencies were all granted powers to engage in planning for comprehensive 
river basin development. For instance, the Army Corps of Engineers used the Board 
of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors to review all river basin studies (Horton 1972). 
However, there was no single person or agency charged with reviewing and coordi-
nating the plans and construction activities of the different agencies.
7. For an excellent analysis of how political issues were addressed in a variety of 
ways within a single time period, see Koontz et al. (2004).
8. These criteria are commonly accepted in the political science watershed 
collaborative literature; see Koontz et al. (2004) and Sabatier, Weible, and Ficker 
(2005).
9. Derthick (1974, 150) quotes Minnesota’s commissioner on the Great Lakes 
and Souris-Red-Rainy commissions as saying: “The Federal legislation is designed 
not to create independent state planning bodies to take over planning responsibili-
ties which are too much for Federal agencies to carry. They are designed, instead, to 
supply a basis of state legitimation for the traditional construction activities of the 
Federal development agencies, i.e., the Corps of Engineers, the Social Conservation 
Service, and the Bureau of Reclamation.”
10. As Holmes (1972) notes, in a five-year period between 1949 and 1955, sev-
eral congressional and presidential study commissions and committees all recom-
mended greater centralization and integration of federal water resources planning 
and development. Most recommended the creation of an agency in the Executive 
Office of the President to oversee coordination and integration, supplemented with 
river basin committees.
11. A water historian may disagree with both assertions, because most river 
basin commissions had citizen advisory committees, some of which were quite active 
in thwarting major water projects (McCrea 1980), and the Soil Conservation Service 
actively engaged in soil erosion and flood control “treatments” of small watersheds 
since the early 1940s (Holmes 1972). In neither instance, however, were citizens or 
small watersheds defining aspects of an era until recently.
12. It is important not to attribute too much power to the president to guide 
and control river basin development. As Holmes (1972) argues, Congress was largely 
hostile to the efforts of the president to control the activities of the federal water agen-
cies. “The Corps planning work was set up so that Congress made decisions regard-
ing not only general policies of water resources development, but also the choice, 
timing, and extent of Federal investment in individual projects. . . . [Congress] . . . 
considered the President’s attempts to subordinate its planning activities to coordi-
nated executive branch plans and policies to be usurpations of congressional power” 
(Holmes 1972, 21).
54    Watersheds, PolItIcs, and InstItutIons
13. As Holmes (1979, 278) noted, “Some contemporary observers considered 
that the proposed Council would only be another version of Interagency Committee 
on Water Resources (ICWR), the national interagency committee device of the fif-
ties. They asserted that such committees had proven incapable, because of inter-
agency logrolling, of developing water policies and plans responsive to contempo-
rary problems and majority political demands.”
14. Others have summarized partnership processes as follows. The processes 
entail stakeholder identification and involvement, leading to consensus on goals and 
an identification of actions to be taken to reach them, followed by assignment of 
responsibilities among agencies and organizations, producing implementation to be 
accompanied by monitoring and evaluation (see, e.g., Goldfarb 1994; U.S. EPA 1991, 
2; 1995, 1–4). A more detailed set of process prescriptions for statewide oversight 
and coordination (U.S. EPA 1995) included the establishment of basin management 
plans using rotating five-year cycles for the completion of planning, modeling, per-
mitting, and monitoring among all the watersheds within a state.
15. Case studies can be found in Nakamura and Born 1993; U.S. EPA 1995; 
Kenney 1997; Gregg et al. 1998; Heathcote 1998; Hinchcliffe et al. 1998; Milon, 
Kiker, and Lee 1998; Reimold 1998; Bolte et al. 1999; Kraft et al. 1999; Sabatier 
and Quinn 1999; Tucker et al. 1999; Kenney 2000; Weber 2003; Koontz et al. 2004. 
Leach and Pelkey (2001) reviewed the literature on watershed partnerships, noting 
that most studies involved one or a few cases and, from the studies, culled 210 “les-
sons learned.” Grouped into twenty-one themes, the lessons range from funding to 
adequate scientific and technical information to use of consensus rules (Leach and 
Pelkey 2001).
16. In a study of national estuary programs by Lubell and colleagues (2002), 60 
percent of participants were government officials. In the watershed partnership study 
by Leach and Sabatier (2005), 57 percent of participants were government officials.
17. Holmes (1972, 13) states: “Multipurpose projects involving public power 
operations were hailed as ‘experiments in democracy,’ combining regional economic 
growth with widespread distribution of benefits among the people.”
18. The Water Resources Council and the river basin commissions did not 
directly and actively engage environmental values; rather, the federal agencies 
active in both organizations began addressing environmental values because of the 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). For example, the effects of the 
NEPA on the Army Corps of Engineers included more public participation, such as 
well-publicized hearings beginning at pre-planning stages. Also, the corps commit-
ted to giving equal weight to environmental values, along with economic and tech-
nical factors, and selected those projects that were not merely economically justified 
but were the best solution to the problem at hand (Holmes 1979, 117).
The political choices that people confront in governing watersheds include 
deciding how to structure the governing institutions and organizations, who 
will participate in making decisions, how decisions will be made, and how 
decision makers will be held accountable. Several watershed writers accept 
politics as a given but express a weariness with existing political choices and 
a hope or desire for a different type of politics—a politics that is more reflec-
tive, collaborative, and cooperative; a politics that unfolds outside of present 
governments and dominant political institutions. Even savvy and experienced 
scholars such as Gregg and colleagues (1998, 26) convey such a sentiment in 
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their discussion of collaborative watershed efforts: “One of the strengths of 
watershed initiatives is their ability to focus their activities directly at the most 
pressing natural resource problems of particular watersheds, often operat-
ing outside of normal governmental processes and free from the constraints of 
inflexible mandates or program requirements” (emphasis added).
Of course, Gregg and colleagues may merely be pointing out that political 
decision making can be improved when governance structures better match 
the watershed setting. (On this point, see also E. Ostrom 1992.) That is cer-
tainly a laudable aim, and we do not suggest for a moment that all institutional 
arrangements are equally good or bad. Political settings and choices may be 
more or less conflictual, more or less rigid, more or less open and account-
able; what they cannot be is nonpolitical. And politics matters a great deal. 
In the end, policy alternatives are understood—and to a great degree either 
embraced and implemented or undermined and abandoned—in relation to 
whom they include or exclude, or whom they affect and how; how decisions 
are made and by whom; and how decision makers may be held accountable 
for their decisions. They are understood and accepted or rejected, in other 
words, on the basis of political considerations. As Scharpf (1997) notes, and 
as has been amply demonstrated in the watershed literature, policies believed 
to be optimal, in that they maximize a specific value or two, such as wetland 
protection or nutrient reduction, are rarely adopted as designed (see also 
Nakamura and Born 1993, 808). Usually they are modified because of politi-
cal reasons, and (despite the somewhat politics-weary tone found in much 
of the watershed literature) that is not necessarily a bad thing.
Our goal is therefore to place some of the political choices that are 
embedded within watershed management in plain view and discuss them, in 
the hope that a clearer understanding of the political nature of the watershed 
will be useful for resource managers and their fellow citizens in recognizing 
those choices and their implications. In this chapter we focus directly on 
three sets of political issues—boundaries, decision-making arrangements, 
and accountability—all of which are unavoidable, even in collaborative 
efforts to manage watersheds sustainably and scientifically. We hope that the 
discussion illuminates not only the issues themselves but the necessity and 
value of being more explicit about them.
The chapter closes with a case study of the Platte River Basin. After 
more than a decade of conflict over endangered species issues, the gover-
nors of the three basin states and the Department of the Interior adopted 
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the Platte River Cooperative Agreement. The agreement commits Nebraska, 
Colorado, and Wyoming to providing additional water to the river to protect 
and enhance critical habitat and to mitigate the effects of new water uses on 
river flows. In developing the agreement and devising a governing structure 
to implement it, the participants had to make explicit choices about who 
participates, how decisions are made, and how participants are to be held 
accountable. The Platte River case therefore provides an illustration of these 
fundamental political choices at work.
BoundariEs: Who should MaTTEr in WaTErshEd  
dEcision-Making arrangEMEnTs
The hope for a best way of governing watersheds can sound at times like a 
hope for watershed management without politics—more scientific, ratio-
nal, and comprehensive, less bogged down by special interests and inter-
governmental rivalries. This can be heard to some degree in the language 
about organizing management around watershed boundaries, because they 
are “natural” and “real,” unlike “political boundaries” that create undesir-
able “jurisdictional externalities.” Other scholars have pointed out, however, 
that the physical setting is less determinative and perhaps even less a “given” 
than thought. As Griffin (1999, 509) observed, “One problem with using 
watersheds as the geographic unit for management is that watersheds may 
not always be well defined. Omernik and Bailey (1997) report that approx-
imately one third of the coterminous United States may possess physical 
characteristics that make watershed delineation problematic.”
Besides, Brunson (1998, 65) noted: “All boundaries are social constructs, 
marking human-perceived differences in the nature and identity of places. 
. . . Even ecosystem boundaries are social constructs in that they reflect the 
spatial extent of natural conditions that characterize a human-defined cat-
egorization within the continuous range of actual and potential conditions.” 
In the watershed context, Woolley and McGinnis are more direct still:
Each watershed organization faces a boundary identification problem. 
Watershed organizations cannot depend merely on scientific informa-
tion in the planning process. Each group struggles with a basic political 
issue—defining boundaries and planning issues. The benefits of the 
watershed focus—broadly about connections and interdependencies over 
a relevant geographic area—do not include the elimination of conflict 
58    ThE EssEnTials of WaTErshEd PoliTics
and contention. Watershed planning, therefore, is always a scientific and a 
political activity. (1999, 591, emphasis in original)
Furthermore, a new batch of boundary questions emerges once one 
decides to try to organize management at the watershed scale. What is the 
appropriate watershed scale at which to govern? Should decision-making 
bodies be organized around small-scale watersheds that feed into larger 
watersheds that in turn feed into even larger watersheds? Or should a set 
of governance boundaries be drawn around a large-scale watershed? What 
about watersheds that have been tied together through human intervention, 
as is so common in the western United States with its history of inter-basin 
water transfer projects? Should these artificially linked water resources be 
governed as a single watershed (and if so, what happened to our notion of 
watersheds as “natural” boundaries?) or as separate ones despite the canals, 
pipelines, and pumping stations that connect them? All of these are politi-
cal questions, ones that the physical setting alone cannot answer. As expe-
rienced water resources managers know, topographical maps cannot give 
us all the answers. Moreover, until decisions are made concerning who is in 
and who is out of the watershed, and thus who may have access to decision 
making about its resources and their use, science cannot answer how much 
water can be used, how much timber can be harvested, and how much land 
can be developed and in what manner.
Political scientist Deborah Stone (1988) notes that who gets what is as 
important as how they get it, but defining “who” and “how” is not a straight-
forward process. Each may be defined in a multitude of ways, and each defi-
nition is likely associated with a different notion of equity or fairness. Who, 
and whose interests, should be represented in watershed decision making has 
long been debated in the literature. Defining “who” involves distinguishing 
some people from others. People will predictably and understandably con-
test the distinctions made, either fighting to get in and be counted or seeking 
ways to escape and avoid what they perceive as the burden of belonging.
At one end of the spectrum in the debate over who should be included 
in decision making are Bates and colleagues (1993), who provide some of the 
strongest statements for the viewpoint that everyone affected by or affecting 
a water resource should be included in decision-making processes, whether 
located within the watershed or not. They refer to “the whole community” 
for any given water resource and define it in the following ways:
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Western watersheds all implicate more diverse communities than ever 
before. Today’s community of interest is likely to include—in place of the 
old miner-farmer-rancher-industrial coalition that made western water 
policy—citizens determined to reduce government expenditures; Indian 
tribes; residents opposed to continued rapid growth in their geographic 
communities; environmentalists; citizens who want western rivers, lakes 
and aquifers managed to guarantee sustainability for their children and 
grandchildren; recreationists of all stripes; businesspeople whose liveli-
hoods depend on the West’s emerging recreation economy; and those 
who simply believe, fervently, that western rivers should be allowed to 
retain the incomparable, eternal qualities that provide so much inspi-
ration, reflection, and fulfillment. All of these and other identifiable 
interests need to be represented in modern water policy, and in most 
watersheds nearly all of them are clamoring for recognition. They will be 
heard, one way or another. (Bates et al. 1993, 9)
The essential importance of water places a special value on the manner 
in which decisions are made respecting its use and availability. The whole 
community must be considered in those decisions, and all interests must 
have a meaningful opportunity to participate. (Bates et al. 1993, 182)
For Bates and colleagues (1993, 197), fairness requires that all who are 
touched by the effects of water use, no matter how separated by time and dis-
tance, be involved in a meaningful way in decisions that affect it. All should 
be allowed to participate and to have their interests represented. Given the 
importance of water, they conclude, an expansive notion of “who” must be 
adopted. Their viewpoint is echoed in statements by countless others argu-
ing that watershed management should encompass “all affected interests.”
At the other end of the spectrum, Ingram and colleagues (1984) take 
a less sanguine view of broad-based participation in watershed decision 
making. Regional decision making at a watershed or river basin scale always 
bears the risk of overlooking or undervaluing local impacts. Ingram and 
colleagues (1984) argue that the people who are most affected by water-
shed uses, which are most often geographic communities situated within the 
watershed, must be given the greatest weight in decision making. They cau-
tion: “It is important to look at consequences from a particularized or local-
ized perspective as well as basin wide. Despite the fact that physical scientists 
describe river basins as general, interconnected systems, the experience of 
impacts is often discrete and localized” (1984, 326). Thus, “the appropriate 
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geographic boundaries within which to identify interests in institutional 
assessments should be drawn from an understanding of the stakes rather 
than river basin boundaries, subject matter, or other artificially imposed 
limits” (ibid.).
Furthermore, in those discrete and localized settings that often exist at 
the sub-watershed scale, decisions about water resources are also decisions 
about the nature, strength, and future of communities. “Water still symbol-
izes such values as opportunity, security and self-determination. . . . Control 
over it signals social organization and political power. . . . Strong commu-
nities are able to hold on to their water and put it to work. Communities 
that lose control over water probably will fail in trying to control much else 
of importance” (Ingram 1990, 5). Weber (2003) broadens the discussion to 
include economic considerations. Members of place-based communities 
often rely heavily on natural resources for their livelihoods. Severely restrict 
logging in national forests, or substantially reduce irrigation water from fed-
eral water projects, and local economies buckle. Thus, for economic as well 
as political and cultural reasons, local communities situated within water-
sheds need to be represented in watershed decision-making processes.
Thus far, nothing has been stated that would raise serious disagreement, 
even though the statements quoted above come to the issue of inclusion 
from differing perspectives. One could finesse the choice rhetorically: broad 
inclusion of “all affected interests” sounds good, as does the representation 
and protection of local communities where the impacts of watershed man-
agement actions are felt most strongly. There is a deeper puzzle, however, 
that is harder to elide once it is articulated more starkly. If we say that “all 
affected interests” should be included, for instance, what do we mean by 
someone or some group having an “interest” in the watershed? Does “having 
an interest” mean living in the watershed? Using resources from the water-
shed? Visiting the watershed regularly, or even occasionally? Hoping to visit 
the watershed someday? Caring about the watershed even though one never 
expects to live or visit there?
To put it even more bluntly, can one “have an interest” in a watershed by 
just “taking an interest” in the watershed? Can I put myself “into” a water-
shed by an act of choice or an exercise of will because I want to be included? 
And would this be a unilateral act on my part, or do others who claim to 
be connected with that watershed have some say in whether I am “in” or 
“out”? When we define boundaries, we are saying (whether we acknowledge 
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it explicitly or not) who is in and who is out, who “counts” and how much 
and who doesn’t count at all. In more mundane political terms, who has a 
vote, a veto, or both, or neither?
With these questions in mind, let us go back to the points raised by 
Ingram and colleagues on the one hand and Bates and colleagues on the other. 
Ingram’s argument that local communities should be protected in decision-
making processes raises some important concerns over the involvement of 
non-local communities of interest recommended by Bates and colleagues 
(1993). The potential loss of control and the fate of one’s local community, 
if watershed-scale decision making is opened up to non-local communities, 
are serious issues with no easy resolution. Even though Bates and colleagues 
(1993, 195) advocate opening watershed decision making to all who are 
affected by or interested in the watershed, they also make the case (perhaps 
unintentionally) against involving non-local communities of interest:
The trade-offs inherent in water decisions can be calculated in broad 
equivalents: a car wash in Los Angeles consumes the water of a fam-
ily farm in Owens Valley; a farm in La Paz County is worth two golf 
courses in Tucson; a subdivision in the Denver suburbs with Kentucky 
bluegrass lawns uses the amount of water needed to keep a pristine 
western Colorado mountain stream full of fish; turning down the air-
conditioning temperature by two degrees in Phoenix requires releases 
of water from hydroelectric dams that destroy a season’s boating in the 
Grand Canyon. What does all this mean to the L.A. car wash customer, 
the Denver lawn waterer, the cattle rancher, the golfer, or the Phoenix 
resident? It’s tough to appreciate the difference one more clean car, green 
lawn, golf course or cool Phoenician will make. (Bates et al., 1993, 195)
Do those Phoenicians, Angelenos, and Denverites count as “affected 
interests” who need to be included in watershed decision making for La Paz 
County, the Owens Valley, and Colorado mountain streams? Those distant 
urbanites number in the millions, to say nothing of the financial resources 
under their control. If watershed policy making is opened to all of these 
affected people who, according to Bates and colleagues (1993), have a hard 
time understanding the local impacts of their distant choices, why wouldn’t 
they choose to maintain their lifestyles over those of a comparatively small 
number of farmers or recreational fishers and kayakers? On what basis 
would we exclude them from participation in decision making about the 
resources of those valleys? Now the boundary problem can be seen in sharper 
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resolution—who is going to be in the political watershed and who is not is 
a question with answers and implications that cannot be seen or defined 
topographically.
Suppose we opt instead to keep the distant nonresidents out of the politi-
cal watershed. To be “in” the watershed would then mean to be physically con-
nected with it in some direct way—living there, for instance. Critics of giving 
precedence to the values of local communities of place rightly note that such 
communities often fail to, or are incapable of, attending to legitimate val-
ues that transcend their boundaries (Tarlock 2000b). As Karkkainen (2002) 
notes, not only are the Florida Everglades and the Chesapeake Bay regional 
ecosystems to be used and enjoyed by local residents, they are national trea-
sures with national interests attached to them, interests that deserve to be 
recognized. For every Owens Valley–like tragedy that supporters of the poli-
tics of place can cite, supporters of opening watershed decision making to 
many interests can point to numerous streams and rivers reengineered to 
serve the narrow economic needs of the local community while thought-
lessly disregarding a host of other values, such as ecosystem protection. In 
addition, some commentators on the many local watershed collaboratives 
springing up across the United States have questioned how participatory 
such efforts really are in practice and how diverse are the interests they rep-
resent (e.g., Kenney 2000; Weber 2003). Weber provocatively raises the ques-
tion of whether some local watershed collaboratives are really just instances 
of multinational corporations co-opting and coercing local activists (2003, 
6), and others have speculated that companies’ participation in collabora-
tive local watershed initiatives is driven primarily by their desire to avoid the 
regulatory “hammer” held by state or (more likely) federal agencies.
Ultimately, debates over who should be included within decision-making 
processes are debates over which values should be given the greatest weight. 
Whose values will be served? Some values do not easily or readily corre-
spond to geographical communities or boundaries. Bates and colleagues 
(1993) argue for a more expansive notion of who should count in hopes of 
more directly injecting conservation, sustainability, and protection values 
into policy decisions. Yet, as their own examples illustrate, including non-
local communities of interest in decision making may lead to unintended 
and/or undesirable outcomes. Water demands by urban residents or com-
mercial interests may win out over conservation efforts by local watershed 
residents.
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Arguments over boundaries and inclusion often hinge on the outcomes 
advocates are trying to promote; they are political arguments. If advocates 
for ecological values believe that local watershed users are also committed 
to those values, they will argue for excluding nonresident interests whose 
inclusion would threaten those values (the “keep L.A. out of Owens Valley” 
argument). On the other hand, if those advocates believe local residents will 
not promote ecological values, they will argue for including nonresident 
interests (the “ANWR is a national treasure” argument). Advocates of com-
mercial interests in the consumptive uses of water make the same sorts of 
arguments, but in the opposite direction.
Dismissing the inconsistency of these stances as hypocritical is too easy, 
or at least misses the larger point that each stance is connected strategically 
with a political goal. The famed twentieth-century American political theo-
rist E. E. Schattschneider (1960) nicknamed such strategies “managing the 
scope of conflict”: one set of interests is likely to advocate defining the situ-
ation in ways that keep the scope limited and another set of interests will try 
to define the situation in ways that draw in more participants, each antici-
pating the effects that the narrower or broader scope will have on the likeli-
hood of their preferences prevailing.
Of course, conflicts and policy choices are not fixed in time. As the 
social and economic landscape of a watershed changes, so do the impacts of 
boundaries identifying who matters. Changes in population concentrations 
or in economic activities bring different values to the fore within a water-
shed. Many water districts, formed several decades ago by irrigators, now 
find that a majority of their members are municipal and industrial water 
users and that most of their water is used in urban areas for nonagricultural 
purposes. Beyond the watershed, as administrations change in state capi-
tals and in Washington, D.C., different values will be pursued, impacting 
watershed policies and activities. Neither defining communities of interest 
broadly nor giving pride of place to local, geographic communities guaran-
tees that a particular set of values will be pursued consistently over time as 
the watershed setting and its context change.
organizing WaTErshEd dEcision-Making arrangEMEnTs
The choice of decision-making arrangements or, using Stone’s (1988) termi-
nology, defining “how” decisions will be made is just as political as deciding 
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“who” matters. All institutional structures for water resources decision mak-
ing “are likely to have different policy orientations. They are also likely to 
vary in their accessibility and responsiveness to particular interests, their 
capacity to generate the appropriate flow of information, and their prefer-
ence for certain problem solutions” (Ingram et al. 1984, 328).
How should decisions be made? The answer most commonly given in 
the watershed management literature currently is consensus, in part because 
of the widespread adoption and experimentation with watershed initiatives 
that are based on collaborative working groups of officials from govern-
ment and nonprofit organizations and citizens, who typically use consen-
sus as their decision-making rule (Kenney 2000). Weber (2003, 4) notes the 
stark contrast between “business as usual” and a collaborative approach to 
addressing and resolving environmental problems. “Instead of centralized 
hierarchy, government experts in control, specialized agencies, and layer 
upon layer of written rules and procedures, GREM [Grassroots Ecosystem 
Management] is premised on greater decentralization of governance, shared 
power among public and private actors, collaborative, ongoing, consensus-
based decision processes, holistic missions (environment, economy, and 
community), results-oriented management, and broad civic participation.”
Consensus, which requires that all participants consent to a decision or 
action before it is taken, is viewed positively for a variety of reasons. First, 
cooperation is emphasized over conflict. Discussion and debate are contin-
ued, information is shared, and alternatives explored until no one insists on 
opposing a proposed solution (Scharpf 1997, 144). Second, the consensus-
 building process supports the emergence of productive working relationships 
that emphasize problem solving over staking out a position and defending it 
at all costs (Kenney 2000). Third, consensus decision making produces more 
legitimate and acceptable solutions than do other forms of decision making 
because all participants must consent to a proposal before it is adopted. As 
Scharpf (1997, 144) notes, “consenting parties cannot claim to be injured.” 
For all of these reasons, consensus exhibits some attractive normative fea-
tures. Not only does it work to build community as people search for com-
mon ground, but it protects individuals’ interests from being subjugated to 
community interests.
Although certainly consensus possesses some attractive features, politi-
cal scientists have good reasons to be skeptical about consensus, which is in 
essence a unanimity rule. For reasons that have been explicated theoretically 
ThE EssEnTials of WaTErshEd PoliTics    65
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962) and observed in empirical settings, unanimity 
rules are understood as having the potential to impede collective action by 
empowering each individual with a veto. A single person can hold out for 
what he views as a better deal for himself or those that he represents. Scharpf 
(1997, 144) has labeled such situations as joint decision traps “in which the 
beneficiaries of the status quo can block all reforms, or at least extract exor-
bitant side payments.” In practical settings, consensus-based decision mak-
ing has led to gridlock, a search for the lowest common denominator that 
all participants can agree upon, or a “something for everyone” form of dis-
tributive policy (Milon, Kiker, and Lee 1998; Coglianese 1999; Coglianese 
and Allen 2004).1 As Coglianese (1999, 31) states, “Consensus building shifts 
the ultimate goal away from reaching a quality decision and moves it toward 
reaching an agreeable one. A consensus among a select group will not always 
equate to socially optimal policy.”
Gridlock and a something-for-everyone form of distributive policy mak-
ing become more likely the greater the number of participants and the more 
diverse their interests. Bates and colleagues (1993, 3) describe current west-
ern water policy as “a Gordian knot.” Yet it seems a reasonable question to 
pose whether the meaningful involvement of the interests of every person 
or group that affects or is affected by a watershed, even those separated by 
distance and time, would combine with the requirement of consensus-based 
decision making in such a way as to cut the Gordian knot or pull it even 
tighter. It can be challenging to imagine a single watershed restoration proj-
ect that could be adopted and implemented using such an approach, even in 
a relatively small watershed.
Consensus may be the recommended approach to decision making in 
watersheds for at least two reasons. One may be that those who advocate it 
sincerely believe it is the best means of proceeding toward collective deci-
sions. Another may be that consensus has dominated the watershed man-
agement literature because any other manner of decision making seems 
worse. Consensus seems to promise something other than the types of con-
flicts and risks that would attend other forms of decision making (Kagan 
1997; Kenney 2000).2
Move away from consensus, and what remains? Alternatives include 
some form of majority or super-majority voting process. It is not unusual 
to find decision-making bodies operating with a combination of consensus 
and voting. Participants attempt to develop consensus positions on issues; 
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however, if that fails, participants can bring the issue to a vote. The advan-
tages of combining the two decision-making approaches rest in the ability to 
make decisions even in the face of significant disagreements among partici-
pants. Although the normal operating procedure is consensus, which allows 
participants to avoid overriding the interests of a minority, voting allows 
decisions to be made when necessary. Scharpf (1997, 144) suggests that this 
combination of decision rules emerges in settings where the norm of reci-
procity operates and participants expect to be in the minority position at 
varying times. The Fraser Basin Council in British Columbia, Canada, for 
example, is renowned for its use of consensus decision making, yet consen-
sus is always reached in the shadow of council rules that allow the coun-
cil president to call for a vote. Presidents have occasionally used the threat 
of calling a vote as an instrument for moving contesting council members 
toward a consensus (Blomquist, Calbick, and Dinar 2004).
Although voting has the agreeable quality of allowing collective action 
to occur, especially among large numbers of people even in the face of con-
flict, it is purchased at the expense of permitting the exploitation and domi-
nation of minority interests (Ostrom 1987). There are a number of mecha-
nisms that attempt to minimize and correct for the possibility of minority 
exploitation, such as dividing power among several decision-making bodies; 
separating executive, legislative, and executive powers and allowing them 
to check one another; and providing opportunities for the independent 
review of actions and decisions. Discussion of these familiar accountability 
mechanisms will be further elaborated in the next section. However, there is 
another limitation of voting mechanisms, especially from the perspective of 
proponents of consensus decision making. Voting showcases politics, in the 
sense of bargaining, vote trading, compromising, presenting information 
about one’s positions and actions in the most favorable light, and casting 
doubt on the veracity of the information provided by one’s opponents, and 
occasionally treating decision making as a zero-sum game—what is gained 
by one side is lost to the other. All of this is a far cry from the reasoned delib-
eration and search for common solutions that consensus processes ideally 
support.
The desire for reasoned deliberation and solutions that serve the public 
interest may explain why in the watershed literature, prior to the emergence 
of consensus-based watershed initiatives, attention was and continues to be 
focused on integrated management. As described in Chapter 2, advocates of 
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integrated watershed management desire to see put in place watershed-scale 
authorities with broad functional powers peopled by well-trained experts 
who could develop and implement policies that take into account and man-
age the many interconnected dimensions of a watershed. Integrated water-
shed management has been likened to a restoration of rational planning 
(Walther 1987, 440), a form of decision making in which expert elites draw 
together information about all alternatives in order to reach reasoned con-
clusions about which choices will best serve social goals. Decision making 
would be, using Scharpf ’s (1997) terminology, hierarchical. Hierarchical 
decision making eliminates the transaction costs of coordination, whether 
that involves developing a consensus among decision makers or building 
support among a majority of officials, and instead allows an expert, either 
an individual or an agency, to make decisions (Scharpf 1997, 172). The per-
ceived benefits of such an approach are several and are strongest in their 
contrast to existing decision making that occurs in many watersheds. For 
instance, fragmented and uncoordinated decisions would be replaced with 
comprehensive and integrated decisions. Also, decisions would be based on 
scientific expertise and not on narrow distributive concerns.3
The criticisms leveled at this approach include information demands 
and motivation concerns (Scharpf 1997). Hierarchical decision making makes 
a number of information assumptions that are rarely met. It presumes that 
(1) social goals are known with some precision and remain constant over 
the relevant period (Milon, Kiker, and Lee 1998); (2) the number of social 
goals to be pursued is limited and those goals do not contradict one another 
(O’Toole 1993); and (3) decision makers are able to comprehend everything 
from land use planning to biological systems and their responses to eco-
nomic and political dynamics (Newson 1997, 311).
Furthermore, hierarchical decision making assumes that authority will 
be exercised in a benevolent manner. The expert decision makers will pur-
sue the public good and not their own personal goals or the goals of vari-
ous special interests. Just like voting systems, however, the exploitation or 
oppression of underrepresented or minority interests can occur in elite rule. 
Jacobs (1978) vividly recounts the tragic tale of how watershed planning in 
the Rio Grande systematically worked to the detriment of an “inconvenient” 
minority of native Latino and Indian farmers in the Española valley north 
of Santa Fe. Despite procedural guarantees of public hearings and partici-
pation, regional watershed planning for the Rio Grande became in effect 
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“top-down planning.” The endeavor to make decisions for and about the 
watershed as a whole led to the diminution of the effects on several small 
(and relatively powerless) sub-watershed communities.
Ultimately, the search for a more deliberative or a more rational decision- 
 making structure may be a misguided search for a sort of bloodless orga-
nization. Consensus holds the promise of reaching sensible and fair deci-
sions without the conflict and strategic behavior characteristic of traditional 
approaches. Hierarchical decision making allows experts to devise good 
policies based on science and professional standards of conduct, once again, 
avoiding the difficult negotiations, compromises, and trade-offs that so often 
characterize watershed governance. In practice, however, consensus and 
hierarchical decision making consistently deliver on their promise in rela-
tively simple and conflict-free settings. Move beyond such settings and their 
shortcomings become immediately obvious, just as do the shortcomings 
of different forms of voting systems. In other words, choices among deci-
sion-making processes are choices among imperfect alternatives (Komesar 
1994).
accounTaBiliTy in WaTErshEd govErnancE
We turn next to an examination of accountability, which among other 
things involves reflecting upon whether decision-making authority has been 
exercised appropriately. Ensuring that authority is exercised appropriately 
depends on the form that authority takes. If it takes a traditional form, such 
as a state legislature or a federal agency, well-understood and commonly 
used forms of accountability will most often be used. Members of a repre-
sentative assembly are primarily held accountable through elections. Agency 
employees are held accountable through legislative oversight, professional 
norms, and organizational directives.
Watershed governance, however, has historically raised challenging 
and difficult accountability issues because of the remarkable institutional 
experimentation and innovation that have occurred in the United States 
over the past several decades. Many of the organizational and institutional 
experiments do not fit neatly within existing authority and accountability 
structures. For instance, decision makers may not be public or elected offi-
cials; rather they may be what are commonly called stakeholders and may 
even be community volunteers. How are volunteers and other stakeholders 
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to be held accountable? Weber (2003) suggests that nontraditional forms 
of accountability must be recognized if institutional innovation is to be 
encouraged.
Accountability allows for the correction of mistakes and discourages 
the abuse of power. However, accountability is not an either/or proposition. 
It has a primary dimension of answerability (Heywood 2004), where some 
assess the performance of others, and a consequent dimension of respon-
siveness, where it is possible to challenge and revise decisions and actions 
that are regarded as unsatisfactory (Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Romzek 
1998).
Consequently, accountability can take a variety of forms and political 
choices must be made about which types are to be used to ensure good gov-
ernance of a watershed. The different forms of accountability relationships 
include hierarchical, legal, political, and professional (Romzek and Dubnick 
1987; Radin and Romzek 1996). Hierarchical accountability rests on an 
organization’s rules, regulations, and organizational directives as means 
of holding employees in check. The behavioral expectation according to 
Romzek and Ingraham (2000) is obedience to regulations and organiza-
tional directives. Those who are higher in a hierarchy can use the rules and 
regulations to direct, guide, and assess the performance of those lower in 
the hierarchy. Professional accountability relies on individuals internalizing 
norms of appropriate behavior that are acquired from professional prac-
tices, work experience, and training (Knott and Miller 1987; Wilson 1989; 
Romzek and Ingraham 2000). An individual’s actions are compared to the 
accepted practices of the individual’s profession, often by superiors or by 
professional boards, to gauge whether that individual exercised professional 
judgment in acceptable ways.
Legal and political accountability relationships call to mind more tra-
ditional forms of accountability. Legal accountability rests on laws and con-
stitutions and determining whether a public employee or public official 
complied with legal and constitutional mandates (Romzek and Ingraham 
2000). Oftentimes such determinations are made by courts, through the 
process of judicial review, but they may also be made by legislative oversight 
committees. In addition, legal accountability encompasses veto powers. The 
president may veto an act of Congress, or Congress may override the veto 
of a president. Finally, political accountability involves responsiveness to key 
external stakeholders (Romzek and Ingraham 2000). Elected officials are 
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subject to regular elections by their constituents. Public managers maintain 
political support by responding to their agencies’ key constituencies and to 
important elected officials.
In most settings, all of these accountability mechanisms are pres-
ent; however, one or two are primary on a day-to-day basis. For instance, 
employees within many public agencies are subject to both hierarchical and 
professional accountability mechanisms. Not only are they expected to fol-
low organizational directives, but they are also expected to exercise their 
discretion in light of professional practices and norms (Wilson 1989). For 
elected officials, accountability mechanisms are much more likely to be 
political and legal, and much less likely to be professional and hierarchi-
cal. In other words, the types of accountability mechanisms that decision 
makers are most likely to be subject to depend on their positions and their 
organizations. Political appointees are less directly subject to the discipline 
of elections and more directly subject to legal mandates and organizational 
directives. Judges are directly subject to professional standards of practice 
and conduct and legal mandates, and not hierarchical accountability rela-
tions or political accountability mechanisms.
Romzek and Ingraham (2000) argue that during times of crisis and 
times of reform, all four types of mechanisms may come to the fore. For 
instance, as intense conflict erupts in some watersheds over endangered spe-
cies, the actions of public agencies come under increasing scrutiny. Not only 
may the watershed science developed by the agencies be sent out for review 
to professional organizations to determine if the agencies abided by scien-
tific protocols and developed “good” science, often at the insistence of angry 
stakeholders, but the agencies may be reviewed by congressional committees 
to ensure that they are following legislative mandates, and executive office 
science advisory committees may be brought in to examine the conflict.
When crisis or failure occurs and multiple accountability mechanisms 
respond, it often becomes apparent that each mechanism demands contra-
dictory behaviors. The former director of the Buenos Aires Wildlife Refuge 
in southern Arizona discovered this in his attempt to protect threatened 
Chiricahua leopard frogs (Tobin 2004). In the midst of a drought, a water 
hole that was home to some of the threatened frogs was on the verge of dry-
ing up. A University of Arizona researcher gained permission to move some 
of the frogs to a pond on his property; however, if held in captivity over an 
extended period of time, adult frogs eat all tadpoles, eventually eradicating 
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the population. Before the frogs perished, the wildlife refuge director wanted 
to move the frogs to the refuge. Organizational directives and legal mandates 
dictated that he follow established procedures and seek permission to move 
the frogs. However, the frogs would have died before the permission pro-
cess resulted in a decision. Therefore, he decided to move the frogs without 
permission. He was subsequently removed as director of the refuge and he 
now may be charged with a federal felony for moving a threatened species 
without a permit (Tobin 2004).
Part of the conflict surrounding the case of the Chiricahua leopard 
frogs is over which accountability mechanism should hold precedence. 
Hierarchical and legal mechanisms require that the director be strictly disci-
plined and follow the established procedures, regardless of individual situ-
ations. Professional and political mechanisms laud the director’s actions as 
prudent and appropriate in the face of certain death for the endangered frogs. 
In addition to showing that holding public officials, even scientists, account-
able is not always a straightforward process, the incident demonstrates that 
accountability issues involve political choices that cannot be avoided by 
arguing that all accountability mechanisms must be used. Choices must 
be made among them. Should an agency be tightly circumscribed by legal 
mandates and requirements that also provide numerous opportunities for 
key stakeholders to intervene and challenge agency decisions? Should pub-
lic employees be primarily guided by professional norms and practices that 
are more loosely guided and constrained by legal mandates? Should elected 
officials be primarily disciplined through regular elections, or should they 
also be subject to the legal mandate that they can only serve for a limited 
number of terms? Much like defining whose values should matter most and 
selecting decision-making processes, there is no one correct answer to these 
questions.
Watershed governance has historically raised accountability issues that 
extend beyond making choices among different mechanisms and resolv-
ing conflicts among competing accountability claims. Because watershed 
boundaries do not match political jurisdictions, accountability in whatever 
form it may take becomes problematic as attempts are made to manage at 
the watershed level. How do, and how should, new forms of watershed gov-
ernance fit within the existing political system and all of its familiar account-
ability mechanisms? Such questions have been raised for decades as citizens 
and public officials have struggled with the many issues and challenges created 
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by watersheds. Writing in 1966 about the river basin commissions then in 
vogue, Colorado attorney and future U.S. senator Gary Hart wrote in the 
University of Colorado Law Review:
Regional agencies such as the Delaware River Basin Commission combine 
legislative, executive and judicial functions. The establishment of such a 
unique governmental agency to some extent results in destruction of the 
traditional system of checks and balances. The agency itself is responsible 
to no electorate and no single legislature. . . .
Much can be said for the creation of regional water resources devel-
opment agencies with broad governmental powers and some independent 
status of their own. The same arguments support the establishment of 
strong regional agencies designed to meet other regional needs. The thesis 
of this article, however, is that traditional, institutional protections, viz., 
the basic “checks and balances,” must be established concurrently with and 
in proportion to the authority given regional development agencies.
With the administrative and legislative recognition of the river basin 
as the fundamental water unit, attention must be given to the revolution-
ary possibilities for regional water resources development which this 
suggests. What kinds of agencies will supervise and manage this devel-
opment, and what powers will they have? What relations will they bear 
to existing forms and structures of government—the federal system of 
government in this country? It is not too soon to begin consideration of 
such serious questions. (Hart 1966, 46–47)
Hart’s comments remain relevant, although the context has changed 
from mid-twentieth-century basin commissions to early twenty-first-century 
collaborative watershed bodies. According to Tarlock (2000b, 79–80), a 
critic of watershed initiatives, one reason for the growing popularity of 
informal collaborative processes for addressing watershed problems is that 
collaboration offers an alternative to the rigidities and limits of governmen-
tal management. Weber (2003, 4) more explicitly makes that point: “GREM 
[Grassroots Ecosystem Management] also relies extensively or exclusively 
on collaborative decision processes, consensus, and active citizen partici-
pation, which means that private citizens and stakeholders often take on 
leadership roles and are involved directly in deliberative decision-making, 
implementation, and enforcement processes along with government offi-
cials, especially when it comes to how goals are to be achieved.”
Weber (2003, 67) concisely captures the accountability problem: “Can 
the new governance arrangements known as grassroots ecosystem manage-
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ment produce positive-sum, or broad, simultaneous accountability without 
detracting from obligations and duties to state and national interests? Or 
does improved accountability to local interests have to come at the expense 
of accountability to broader public interests, whether it is state and national 
interests, or future generations?” In a very careful and in-depth examina-
tion of accountability mechanisms present in local collaborative watershed 
efforts, he argues that accountability occurs at different levels and along 
multiple dimensions. Local collaborative efforts, even if they do consist of 
unelected volunteers, are accountable in numerous ways to the citizens of 
the communities and localities in which they are organized. Collaborative 
efforts are open to all who wish to participate, and collaboratives often 
engage in considerable outreach and education in their local communities. 
Furthermore, consensus decision making encourages deliberation, discus-
sion, and the exchange of ideas. Thus, open meetings and consensus deci-
sion making mean that it is virtually impossible for a narrow set of interests 
to dominate and drive the process. Rather, a wide variety of people, repre-
senting a variety of interests and values, participate.
Weber argues that watershed collaboratives are accountable to regional 
and national interests and values as well. Such broad-based accountability 
occurs through several mechanisms. Most importantly, watershed collabora-
tive efforts are strictly advisory bodies that “rely on negotiation, broad-based 
representation of interests, self-generated information regarding watershed 
conditions, and persuasion (rather than mandates and coercion) to shape 
policymaking and problem solving” (Weber 2003, 62). Since collaboratives 
are advisory, they cannot develop enforceable rules and regulations. In addi-
tion, the federal agencies that participate in collaborative efforts remain 
accountable for faithfully abiding by and implementing the federal laws 
over which they have jurisdiction. Thus, according to Weber (2003), local 
watershed initiatives are fully accountable both to the local communities 
within which they operate and to national interests and values as reflected 
in environmental laws.
To others it remains uncertain how collaborative nongovernmental 
efforts relate to the administration of existing environmental laws, and 
how citizens can challenge decisions made through collaborative efforts 
(Tarlock 2000a, 195; Coggins 2001, 165). Wester and Warner (2002, 68) con-
cur: “Serious thought needs to be given to how hard-won democratic rights 
in conventional social and political domains are [to be] assured in the river 
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basin domain.” Thus, the very attractiveness of watershed initiatives to their 
supporters—that they may operate “free from the constraints of inflexible 
mandates or program requirements” (Gregg et al. 1998)—is their primary 
vulnerability in the view of their detractors.
ThE PlaTTE rivEr cooPEraTivE agrEEMEnT
Boundaries, decision making, and accountability are regularly contested, 
challenged, and changed in the Platte River Basin of Colorado, Wyoming, 
and Nebraska. Historically, the states controlled the allocation and use of 
water within their boundaries. Numerous times they engaged in cooperative 
agreements with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to develop and store their 
water through the building of large surface water projects. Thus, they began 
to share decision-making authority over water with the federal government. 
On occasion, the states fought over shared water resources and they called 
upon federal entities to help them solve their conflicts. In 1923, Colorado 
and Nebraska turned to the compacting process and devised the South Platte 
River Compact. In the 1940s, Nebraska filed suit against Wyoming over the 
North Platte River, asking the U.S. Supreme Court to equitably divide the 
waters of the river between the two states. The Supreme Court responded 
by issuing a North Platte River water decree, which Nebraska has repeatedly 
attempted to enforce through lawsuits before the Supreme Court.
River allocations, either through compacts or decrees, required states 
to take each other into account in their administration of water. All of these 
actions involved conflict, but also cooperation, and all were aimed at a single 
purpose—withdrawing as much water as possible from the river and put-
ting it to beneficial use. The passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
eventually called into question the single-minded focus of drawing water 
from the river and spurred another round of changes in boundaries, deci-
sion making, and accountability. To understand these changes requires some 
background.
Background
The Platte River begins high in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado. The 
North Platte River rises in North Park, Colorado; flows north into Wyoming; 
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South Platte River begins southwest of Denver, in South Park, Colorado, 
where for a brief stretch it flows south before twisting to the northeast, 
through Denver and Greeley, and then turning more to the east where it 
eventually flows into southwestern Nebraska. At the town of North Platte in 
south central Nebraska, the two rivers join to form the Platte River. Flowing 
east from there, the Platte begins a big bend, southeast and then northeast, 
before emptying into the Missouri River near Omaha. The Big Bend section 
in south central Nebraska is a major bird feeding area in the central flyway 
of North America (Platte River Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust 2004).
Between 1900 and 1940, large dams and reservoirs were built to pro-
vide flood protection, irrigation water, and hydropower. Multiple dams and 
reservoirs—Pathfinder, Seminoe, and Guernsey, in Wyoming; the Antero, 
Elevenmile Canyon, and Cheeseman, in Colorado; and Kingsley Dam and 
its reservoir, Lake McConaughy, in Nebraska—have tamed the river (Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement 2003, 2–14). Habitat for migratory 
birds—cranes, piping plovers, and least terns—disappeared rapidly as the 
river was rebuilt to serve human uses. Annually, it generates 300 megawatts 
of power, irrigates over a million acres of farmland, and provides water to 
3.5 million people (Supalla 2000, 253). Between surface water diversions 
and groundwater pumping, river flows have been substantially depleted. 
Prior to the reengineering of the river, it is estimated that the average annual 
flow at Grand Island, Nebraska, right in the middle of the Big Bend region, 
was 2.6 million acre-feet. Today that flow has been roughly halved (Platte 
River Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 2003, 2–21). It 
should come as no surprise that in 1978, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS), under the auspices of the ESA, declared the whooping crane, the 
interior least tern, the piping plover, and the pallid sturgeon threatened or 
endangered (Draft Environmental Impact Statement 2003). Thus began the 
struggle to reclaim habitat and to allow more water to remain in the river.
Federal courts have interpreted the ESA as providing the FWS with 
broad grants of power to recover endangered species. As Aiken (1999) notes, 
federal courts have handed down decisions concerning water and the ESA 
in three cases, and “[i]n all three of these cases the interests of endangered 
species were placed above the interests of appropriators. . . . If the FWS deter-
mines that appropriated water is needed in order to accomplish the recovery 
of endangered species, the endangered species get first claim. In negotiations 
regarding the recovery of endangered species, the FWS negotiates from a 
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very strong legal position” (Aiken 1999, 127; emphasis added). With the list-
ing of endangered species on the Platte River, the FWS designated critical 
habitat for species in the Big Bend area of the river in Nebraska and began 
working with the state to protect and enhance the habitat.
Initially, the FWS and the State of Nebraska were the two primary par-
ticipants engaged in endangered species recovery efforts on a rich but limited 
segment of the river. However, recovery and protection efforts around the 
Big Bend area reverberated throughout the entire basin, eventually result-
ing in a basin-wide recovery effort involving many participants. Between 
1978 and 1998, all proposed water projects in the Platte Basin were stopped, 
deferred, or substantially modified, engendering considerable conflict, par-
ticularly in Colorado and Nebraska, that sometimes flared up to the high-
est levels of the national government (Aiken 1999).4 For instance, the Two 
Forks reservoir that was to supply water to the Denver metropolitan region 
was killed when the EPA, after close consultation with the White House, 
denied permits for the project. What captured people’s attention, though, 
was a high-profile case that significantly affected the operation of an existing 
water project. Two Nebraska power and irrigation districts operated Kingsley 
Dam and Lake McConaughy, just upstream of the Big Bend area. When 
their operating licenses came up for renewal, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), under pressure of a lawsuit, requested that the dis-
tricts dedicate up to half of their stored water to habitat recovery. Although 
one district voluntarily complied, the other refused, challenging the FERC 
decision in court. Eventually, the State of Nebraska intervened, overrode the 
district, and began negotiations with FERC. The state proposed to create in 
the reservoir an environmental storage account, owned and operated by the 
two districts, to support habitat and to be controlled by the Nebraska Game 
and Parks Commission. The districts agreed to provide up to 100,000 acre-
feet of water annually for the account, which FERC accepted (Aiken 1999).
Boundaries
Aiken (1999) argues that the re-licensing of the hydropower dam in 
Nebraska set in motion actions on the part of states and the federal gov-
ernment that eventually led to a basin-wide cooperative agreement. The 
Nebraska dam was the first existing water project subjected to the ESA in 
the Platte River Basin. Nebraska public officials came to realize that species 
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recovery efforts in the Big Bend region were becoming increasingly onerous, 
and that those efforts depended not only on what occurred downstream in 
Nebraska but what occurred upstream in Colorado and Wyoming. Officials 
in the two upstream states came to understand that it was simply a matter 
of time before existing water uses in their states would come under federal 
scrutiny. At the urging of Nebraska, and with the support and cooperation 
of the U.S. Department of the Interior (which contains the FWS and the 
Bureau of Reclamation), Wyoming and Colorado agreed to cooperate to 
address endangered species issues (Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
2003).
Thus, the boundaries determining who directly participates in endan-
gered species conflicts and their resolution dramatically changed. No longer 
would participation be confined to the owners and operators of local water 
projects, the federal agency licensing the projects, and the FWS. Rather, it 
would broaden to a negotiating group of higher-level authorities—state gov-
ernors, the secretary of the interior, the FWS, and the Bureau of Reclamation, 
which had built major federal water projects in each state. These officials 
represented entities that together exercise considerable authority over water 
allocation and use across the entire river basin.
From 1994 to 1997, the Department of the Interior and the three states 
devised the Platte River Cooperative Agreement. The three states agreed that 
by 2010 to 2013 they would provide 130,000 to 150,000 acre-feet of water for 
habitat recovery, mitigate new water uses, and monitor species response to 
improved habitat conditions (Cooperative Agreement 1997). The increment 
of water is intended to substantially reduce the impact of existing water uses 
on the river. In addition, all new uses must also mitigate their effects. If the 
states abide by the agreement and provide the promised water, they will be 
deemed in compliance with the ESA and can avoid consultations on new 
and existing water uses. In other words, if new or existing water projects are 
in compliance with the agreement, they cannot have their licenses refused 
or revoked over endangered species. If, however, even one state fails to abide 
by its commitment, the entire agreement fails and endangered species con-
sultations will be resumed. Furthermore, if after the agreement is in place 
for thirteen years and if the research suggests that the increment of water 
is insufficient to adequately protect the endangered species, the three states 
and the Department of the Interior will negotiate over an additional incre-
ment of water (Cooperative Agreement 1997).
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Even though the Platte River Cooperative Agreement signaled a dra-
matic redrawing of boundaries and of who was allowed to directly partici-
pate in decision making, local entities and projects were not excluded, as 
we will see. Owners and developers of local water projects could opt out 
of the cooperative agreement and attempt to obtain licenses through the 
regular permitting process, and that would include endangered species con-
sultations. Given the precedent set by the Nebraska hydropower dam, with 
the FERC demanding and receiving over half of the water of one of the 
power districts, local districts were unlikely to pursue this option. Rather, 
the participation of local entities was redirected to the state level. Local 
water users and project owners and operators had to abide by state require-
ments in order to have their projects covered by the cooperative agreement. 
Furthermore, local entities had to cooperate with state agencies and abide 
by state laws if the states were to realize the commitments they made in the 
cooperative agreement.
The boundary shift achieved some goals of Nebraska officials but also 
placed new challenges upon them. First, Nebraska is required to ensure that 
new water uses do not affect the Platte River. Second, it must ensure that 
the additional amounts of water that Colorado and Wyoming deliver to its 
borders are safely shepherded to the Big Bend region. The two issues are 
closely linked: if new water uses within the state are not effectively mitigated, 
they could easily consume the water that the other states make available for 
restoration of the river.
The major use of water in Nebraska is for agriculture. The major source 
of water for agriculture is groundwater that is hydrologically connected to 
the Platte River. Consequently, groundwater pumping must be carefully reg-
ulated if Nebraska is to meet its commitments under the cooperative agree-
ment. Until very recently, Nebraska water law placed very few restrictions 
on groundwater use. Groundwater is governed by local natural resource 
districts. Districts, by law, have the authority to develop and administer 
groundwater management plans; however, no district straddling the Platte 
River has chosen to do so. In effect, then, overlying landowners may pump 
as much groundwater as they can put to beneficial use on their lands. The 
only requirement is that they obtain state well permits and do not violate 
well spacing rules (Mossman 1996).
Agricultural interests have actively and effectively resisted state-level 
efforts to require natural resource districts to develop and implement 
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groundwater management plans that would limit the effects of pumping on 
surface water flows (Mossman 1996). Farmers believe they are being asked to 
bear a disproportionate share of the burden of protecting endangered spe-
cies and that in so doing their livelihoods will be undermined. Furthermore, 
they resist granting the state additional powers to regulate groundwater, a 
resource that historically has been under local control. Agricultural interests 
have attempted to avoid becoming participants in protecting endangered 
species. By all these means, they have worked to opt out of the process and to 
prevent the boundaries of water conservation and habitat protection from 
being drawn around them.
As a result of this strong opposition from agricultural groups, it took 
the Nebraska legislature, governor, and several citizen task forces almost a 
decade to develop and adopt legislation requiring integrated water resources 
management by natural resource districts and the Department of Natural 
Resources in over-appropriated basins. Natural resource districts, which 
have authority over groundwater, now must adopt regulations to limit the 
effects of groundwater pumping on surface water flows, and the Nebraska 
Department of Natural Resources, which has authority over surface water, 
must adopt conservation and best management practices for surface water 
users (Mossman 1996; Aiken 2004). Following the passage of legislation in 
2004 granting the Department of Natural Resources the authority to declare 
over-appropriated basins, the department declared the Platte River upstream 
of the Big Bend region as over-appropriated. The immediate effect was to 
forbid the development of new wells until a management plan for the area 
was adopted (Nemec 2005).
The Platte River watershed consists of nested sets of overlapping bound-
aries with different groups of participants central to each. States and federal 
agencies are the primary participants in providing for endangered species 
recovery; however, such efforts rest on the intricate relations between states 
and local water users. The ability of states to deliver the first increment of 
water and to protect river flows from new uses depends centrally on their 
ability to persuade, cajole, entice, and coerce local water users to change how 
they acquire and use water. Although local water users and environmental 
groups have seats at the Platte River governing table, as discussed below, 
their authority relative to state and federal representatives is highly circum-
scribed. Rather than being full and active participants at the watershed level, 
they are full and active participants at the state level, where they participate 
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in legislative hearings, agency rule makings, blue ribbon panels, and court 
cases, and where as citizens they vote.
The reluctance of agricultural interests in Nebraska to embrace close 
regulation of groundwater pumping and the cause of endangered species 
certainly appears to vindicate a healthy suspicion of local, place-based inter-
ests. As argued earlier in the chapter, local interests may focus on economic 
activities to the exclusion of a variety of other legitimate values. That, how-
ever, would be too simple a reading of this case. At various times, actors at a 
variety of scales—including federal agencies, state governments, and inter-
est groups—supported, were indifferent to, and opposed addressing endan-
gered species issues. FERC, for example, a federal agency charged with abid-
ing by the ESA, only reluctantly addressed endangered species issues after it 
lost a court case brought by the Whooping Crane Trust, a small nonprofit 
organization located in the Big Bend region of Nebraska (Aiken 1999). The 
Whooping Crane Trust was created when Nebraska sued two federal agen-
cies for funding and licensing a large surface water project in Wyoming that 
would have siphoned off a large volume of water from the North Platte, 
negatively affecting crane habitat. Nebraska successfully claimed that the 
agencies neglected the consultation requirements of the ESA (Aiken 1999). 
Federal, state, and local entities often represent a variety of interests and 
values—interests and values that change over time.
Ultimately, the question of boundaries is not so much either/or—either 
everyone who takes an interest in a watershed participates or only local and 
directly affected interests participate. Nor is it safe to assume which values 
will be best realized by governments or groups organized at which scales. 
Instead, as we see in the Platte River Basin, the question of boundaries is 
primarily a question of how: how to accommodate the many, varied, and 
conflicting interests present in a watershed. Most often, in the United States, 
it has been a process of defining multiple decision-making arenas that over-
lap one another and that at varying times complement and at other times 
conflict with one another.
decision-Making Processes
The decision-making processes established by the cooperative agree-
ment are also varied and contingent: they depend on who is making the deci-
sion and the level of conflict involved. The agreement creates a governance 
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committee that reviews, directs, and provides oversight to the activities 
undertaken as part of the cooperative agreement. The governance commit-
tee consists of a representative from each state, an FWS representative, a 
Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) representative, two environmental represen-
tatives, and three members representing specific water interests, for a total 
of ten representatives. A quorum is met with the representatives of the FWS, 
BOR, each state, and two of the other representatives. Thus, although a quo-
rum is possible without a majority of the water and environmental interests 
present, a quorum is impossible without all of the federal and state repre-
sentatives present.
Informal consensus is the preferred decision-making mechanism, 
although a voting process may be used if consensus cannot be reached (Co-
operative Agreement 1997, 9–10). The governance committee’s bylaws state: 
“The Governance Committee will attempt to operate by informal consensus. 
Votes will be taken when appropriate” (Draft Platte River Recovery Imple-
mentation Program, 2003, Attachment 6, 3). Yet, even voting must achieve 
near-unanimity: nine of the ten representatives, including all of the federal 
and state representatives, must vote in the affirmative for the governance 
committee to act.
Furthermore, the governance committee is allowed to establish spe-
cialized committees to carry out specific duties. For instance, a financial 
management committee provides oversight for funds provided to the gov-
ernance committee, contracts engaged in by the governance committee, and 
the payment of expenses. It consists of seven representatives, one for each 
state and federal agency, one for water interests, and one for environmental 
interests. A quorum consists of the representatives from the states and fed-
eral agencies. Consensus is the only decision rule. If consensus on an issue 
is not reached, the issue is passed along to the governance committee with 
a complete report outlining the different viewpoints on unresolved issues 
(Cooperative Agreement, 1997, 2–4, Milestones).
These decision-making rules appear designed to encourage the partici-
pants to identify and process differences and conflicts before coming to a 
collective decision. Action by a minority is avoided, but the federal agencies 
and states can ensure through their veto capabilities that they do not have to 
take actions that would violate laws that they are bound to uphold.
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accountability
Earlier we asked how, and how should, new forms of watershed gover-
nance fit within the existing political system and all of its familiar account-
ability mechanisms. The Platte River Cooperative Agreement demonstrates 
the relevance of this question. The agreement exemplifies the new forms 
of watershed governance that do not easily or readily fit within familiar 
accountability mechanisms.
Often when states engage in cooperative undertakings to address shared 
problems, they develop compacts, which are enforceable agreements recog-
nized and protected under the U.S. Constitution. For states to engage in a 
compact, they must first receive permission from Congress. Once a com-
pact is negotiated, each participating state’s legislature must ratify it, as must 
Congress (Zimmerman 2002). States may enforce compacts by bringing 
their grievances before the U.S. Supreme Court—the court of original juris-
diction in addressing conflicts among states. Compacts are thus buttressed 
by familiar accountability mechanisms—multiple legislative approval points 
and judicial oversight.
The Platte River Cooperative Agreement, however, is not a compact. It 
is a purely voluntary arrangement among the states. Any party to it may 
withdraw at any point. The legislatures of the three states do not have to 
ratify the agreement, nor does Congress. Yet the states have promised con-
siderable sums of water and money, have committed to future projects and 
activities that will provide additional volumes of water for the river, and 
have committed themselves to working for new state water laws and codes 
that will allow the realization of their commitments. Furthermore, the gov-
ernance committee and its specialized committees that oversee the agree-
ment and that have the authority to commit states and federal agencies to 
engage in various activities are populated by appointed officials and citizens. 
Although the appointed officials are at least accountable to elected officials 
who appoint them, citizen appointees are accountable to no one save the 
interest groups they represent. At first glance, all of the familiar account-
ability mechanisms appear to be missing. Is it possible to hold the parties to 
the agreement accountable?
If we view the agreement through the lens of Weber’s (2003) argument 
that accountability occurs at different levels and along multiple dimen-
sions through a variety of mechanisms, and not just through the lens of 
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traditional forms of accountability, then we see an arrangement laced with 
accountability mechanisms. The parties to the agreement—federal agencies 
and states—utilize multiple methods for holding one another to commit-
ments made. Furthermore, the water users, citizens, and taxpayers subject 
to the agreement and to paying for it have access to multiple accountability 
mechanisms, some familiar, some not.
First, the parties to the agreement bound themselves tightly together. 
If the states abide by the agreement and if they provide the promised water, 
they will be deemed in compliance with the ESA and they can avoid con-
sultations on new and existing water uses, which to this point have resulted 
in new uses that require federal permits disallowed and existing uses threat-
ened. Thus, the states and the major water users in the states have much 
to gain from abiding by the agreement. If, however, the agreement is not 
followed, if even one state fails to abide by its commitment, the entire agree-
ment fails and endangered species consultations will be resumed. The par-
ties to the agreement either succeed or fail together.
Second, the states established readily measured goals tied to specific 
time lines in order to track their overall progress and to detect whether a 
state was failing in its commitment. In addition, to ensure that the water 
committed by the states does not simply get absorbed through new uses, 
each state is required to mitigate the effects on the river of all new surface 
and groundwater projects. Wyoming and Colorado argue that their state 
laws require new users to cover their impacts. And they agreed to ensure that 
outcome. If it were discovered that new uses were not adequately covered, 
the states committed to providing additional amounts of water that they 
have under their control (Draft Recovery Implementation Program 2003). 
Nebraska, with the passage of major water legislation in 2004, can make 
the same commitment. Its water laws require that all new water uses are 
mitigated.
In an environment with such high stakes and with an appreciable level 
of uncertainty, monitoring water users’ actions and the natural system 
becomes critical. The cooperative agreement contains four major monitor-
ing provisions. First, each state is required to provide data on water use to 
the governance committee several times per year. The data are to include 
baseline flows of the river, existing water uses, new water uses, and how new 
uses were covered. Each state also provides a final year-end water account-
ing. Second, an employee of the FWS acts as a water accounting manager. 
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The accounting manager, working with each of the states and water project 
operators, monitors river flows and directs the release of water at times and 
places to best assist in the protection and recovery of species. The account-
ing manager is also required to report to the governance committee multiple 
times throughout the year. Third, the implementation plan establishes a rel-
atively sophisticated biological response monitoring program targeted at the 
Big Bend region of the Platte River. Its purpose is to monitor the response of 
endangered species to determine whether the program is achieving its goals 
of protecting and recovering the species. Information from the biological 
monitoring program is provided to the water accounts manager to inform 
his water release decisions. Fourth, the information is supplied to the gov-
ernance committee to be used to modify implementation plans. Overall, the 
implementation plan envisions a relatively sophisticated monitoring system 
that requires the participation of all participants. The states monitor their 
own water users, an accounting manager monitors the states, a group of 
scientists monitors the biological responses of the species, and the gover-
nance committee monitors each of the individual monitoring mechanisms. 
The monitoring plan holds the potential to provide participants with suffi-
cient information to determine whether all are following through with their 
commitments.
Furthermore, the parties to the agreement hold one another account-
able through the decision process, much as Weber (2003) argued concerning 
small-scale watershed collaboratives. The preferred decision rule is consen-
sus, which requires discussion, deliberation, and the exchange of ideas. If 
consensus cannot be reached, then voting is allowed, but it requires that all 
of the state and federal representatives, and most of the water and environ-
mental representatives, vote in the affirmative in order to reach a binding 
decision. These decision rules prevent bare majorities and single holdouts 
from dominating the process. The combination of decision rules allows the 
participants to hold one another to account without holding one another 
hostage.
The participants to the agreement may hold one another account-
able for decisions and actions, but what about larger forms of democratic 
accountability? Can those who are not direct parties to the agreement exer-
cise some forms of accountability? The answer is yes, although these forms 
tend to be weighted more heavily toward legal mechanisms and less toward 
political, hierarchical, or professional mechanisms. The federal agencies and 
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states remain bound by federal and state laws. If the governance committee 
makes decisions that appear to violate those laws, citizens may invoke judi-
cial review. Also, at the behest of local water users, the governance commit-
tee agreed to limit its powers. The agreement specifically forbids the exercise 
of certain types of authorities that the states, under other circumstances, 
are allowed to exercise. For instance, states are not allowed to exercise their 
powers of eminent domain in order to condemn private property or water 
rights. All acquisitions of private property and water rights are to be from 
voluntary sellers. Thus, for citizens, water users, taxpayers, and property 
owners, their first and most prominent forms of accountability are legal.5
The creation of the Platte River Cooperative Agreement and its imple-
menting governance structure provides an enlightening glimpse of the many 
and difficult political decisions that must be made in devising workable and 
accountable institutional arrangements for governing watersheds. At no 
time did the authors of the agreement and governance structure engage in 
“either/or crafting,” that is, either consensus or majority rule, either all inter-
ests or local interests, either political accountability or legal accountability, 
and so forth. Rather, the authors of the agreement developed multiple ways 
of addressing boundaries, decision making, and accountability, typically 
with a primary approach buttressed by secondary approaches.
No doubt, there is plenty to criticize concerning the Platte River Coopera-
tive Agreement. It is complex in its governing structure and its science, it is 
incremental and effects only gradual change, it is slow to make decisions, 
it provides state governments and federal agencies with disproportionate 
influence, it does not provide for a single decision maker, and it fails to take 
advantage of some traditional political accountability mechanisms, such as 
allowing citizens or state legislatures to vote on the agreement.
It is certainly all of those things, but all of those things must be under-
stood in context. Before the agreement, all new water projects were shelved 
or substantially modified. Before the agreement, existing water projects were 
subject to substantial revision as they came up for re-licensing. If the agree-
ment fails, endangered species protection in the Platte River Basin will revert 
to business as usual: a project-by-project battle to protect endangered spe-
cies. Given that context, it is understandable that its designers view it as a 
more effective, efficient, equitable, and adaptive approach than what pre-
ceded it and what is likely to occur if it fails.
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conclusion
By now, it should be apparent that there are multiple ways of defining who 
matters in decision making, how collective decisions should be made, and how 
decision makers should be held accountable. Furthermore, there is no one 
best way to define who should matter or how decision making or account-
ability should be realized. As is so often the case in politics, it depends. It 
depends on the issues, their causes, their impacts, and possible solutions, 
and how those things are distributed across space, time, and people. In prac-
tice as well as in theory, multiple answers are available to these issues, and 
many different choices have been made.
The answers are invariably imperfect. They involve trade-offs. Using a 
more expansive notion of who matters risks undervaluing local interests; 
privileging local interests may neglect broader values. Consequently, the 
choices people make in watersheds are contested and challenged.
Furthermore, watershed settings are dynamic—economic activity, 
demography, culture values, and understandings of human-nature interac-
tions change, and at least some of today’s choices will not make sense in 
future circumstances and will be contested and challenged anew. Watershed 
settings in the real world also have histories. In choosing among the imper-
fect institutional alternatives available, people do not begin from scratch. 
Ordinarily, they try to accommodate new circumstances, and realize more 
pressing values, by adding to existing arrangements and then figuring out 
how to make it all work in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness.
These arguments are pragmatic, but they are not merely pragmatic 
inductions derived from numerous watershed case studies. They are also 
analytical, deducible from some basic considerations of governance and 
management in a watershed or other setting. The next chapter presents such 
an analysis.
noTEs
1. See Milon, Kiker, and Lee 1998 for an account of consensus results in the 
Everglades Restoration Project; and see Coglianese 1999 for an evaluation of con-
sensus decision making used by the EPA to develop the report on Enterprise for the 
Environment.
2. As Kagan (1997, 873) states, “The contemporary search for collaboration 
often springs from a desperate effort to hold at bay the costly and alienating delays 
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and deadlocks that spring from litigation—litigation that in turn springs from the 
complexity of our legal system.”
3. As Scharpf (1997, 174) notes, proponents of integrated watershed manage-
ment are not the only ones enamored with hierarchical direction: “[S]ubstantive 
policy research . . . is characterized by a strong elective affinity to hierarchical coor-
dination. Policy recommendations are characteristically addressed to an idealized 
‘policymaker’ with the assumed capacity to overrule the preferences of other actors, 
regardless of any conflicting interests and perceptions. . . . [E]conomic theorists 
following Pigou who were impressed with the inefficiency of market failures have 
opted for hierarchical state intervention in the economy to correct negative exter-
nalities; and transaction-cost economists following Coase who were impressed with 
the difficulties of negotiated agreements have opted for vertical integration in hier-
archically organized firms to avoid the high costs of contracting under conditions 
of uncertainty and opportunism. From all of these perspectives, the focus is on the 
social benefits that can in principle be achieved through hierarchical coordination 
rather than on the contextual preconditions for the effective exercise of hierarchical 
authority.”
4. In Wyoming, the Grayrocks Dam and reservoir were substantially modified 
and the owners of the proposed Deer Creek reservoir were required to purchase and 
manage critical habitat as a condition of building it; in Colorado, the Wildcat and 
Narrows irrigation projects have been deferred, the Two Forks reservoir that was to 
supply water to the Denver metropolitan area was stopped, and numerous special-
use permits issued by the U.S. Forest Service that allowed communities to impound 
and divert water on Forest Service land were modified; in Nebraska, the Little 
Blue / Catherland irrigation project, the Perkins County Canal, the Enders irrigation 
project, the Prairie Bend I and II irrigation projects, and the Landmark irrigation 
project were all stopped (Aikens 1999, 128–137).
5. Legal mechanisms are not the only ones that may be exercised. At the request 
of numerous citizens and interest groups, the governance committee, in coopera-
tion with the Department of the Interior, commissioned a review by the National 
Research Council of the science used to develop the agreement. The National 
Research Council review supported the science developed thus far and urged that 
it be more broadly developed. Thus, professional review of data and modeling was 
exercised.
IntroductIon
As discussed in Chapter 2, for more than a century, the U.S. government, 
at various times, has attempted to organize large-scale river basin entities 
to coordinate and manage the activities of federal and state agencies. Many 
of these efforts, especially of a national scope, such as the Title II river basin 
commissions, have failed for a variety of political reasons—turf wars among 
federal agencies, conflicts between states and federal agencies over control of 
commissions, demands by local governments and citizens for greater roles 
Imaginary Watersheds and Political realities
4
Salmon are important not merely for those who harvest them, but also 
are the ultimate barometer of the health of aquatic ecosystems. Salmon 
also have deep cultural, historic, and religious significance, particularly 
to Northwest Indian tribes. For these reasons it is not an exaggeration to 
suggest that salmon are the spiritual soul of the Pacific Northwest.
MIchael BluMM (1997, 655)
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in planning and decision making, and conflicts over the proper role of the 
federal government in water development, protection, and management 
(Derthick 1974; Allee et al. 1981).1 Nevertheless, urgent calls for comprehen-
sive, integrated watershed management continue to be made (Reisler 1981; 
Stakhiv 2003).
Derthick (1974) labels regional governments (including the Title II 
river basin commissions and the Delaware River Compact Commission, 
discussed in Chapter 6) political accidents. For Derthick (1974, 226), politi-
cal accidents occur “only in very special circumstances, when there is a for-
tuitous coming together of opportunity, leadership, and political backing, 
so that it becomes possible to go against the institutional grain and create a 
genuinely new form.” The term “political accidents” suggests two points: (1) 
comprehensive, integrated management is rare; and (2) if the political stars 
align properly, it is possible. In this chapter, we explore the second point. 
Assuming a highly favorable political environment, is it possible to devise a 
strong form of comprehensive integrated watershed management?
This question is important to ask and answer because it strikes at the 
thesis of this book—politics matters. Politics matters because as people 
cooperate, bargain, negotiate, make trade-offs, and fight over how to gov-
ern a watershed, they devise many overlapping institutional arrangements. 
Suppose, however, that a “political accident” occurs, where people agree on 
watershed goals and how to accomplish them. Would comprehensive inte-
grated watershed management emerge then?
Admittedly, this is a difficult question to answer, because such positive 
political settings do not exist. Consequently, to explore it requires an experi-
ment—a thought experiment. We engage in a thought experiment for two 
reasons. One, there are no watersheds in the United States that are free of 
institutions. Thus, to examine whether it is possible to construct integrated, 
comprehensive watershed management that will not be undermined by 
existing institutional arrangements, it is necessary to begin with a thought 
experiment that allows for a clean institutional slate. Two, a clean institu-
tional slate provides every advantage to the designers of an integrated com-
prehensive system. If it is possible to design such a system from scratch, 
then comprehensive, integrated watershed management remains a promis-
ing policy alternative. If, however, it is impossible to design such a system, 
even in a highly supportive environment, then comprehensive, integrated 
management must be set aside for more feasible options.
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We rest our analysis on the cornerstones of bounded rationality and 
transaction costs. They capture two essential and unavoidable aspects of 
social settings: human decision making has well-known and well-understood 
limitations, and the creation and operation of institutional arrangements is 
costly. It may seem unusual to emphasize two such elemental features, but 
often people advocate policies without regard for the cognitive demands of 
such policies or the costs of their creation and operation (Jones 2001). If we 
are interested in understanding what institutional designs are possible, we 
must make reasonable assumptions about how people make choices, includ-
ing choices about designing institutions, and the costs they must bear in so 
doing.
We proceed in this chapter by first introducing the key theoretical con-
cepts of bounded rationality, the different forms of transaction costs, and 
how transaction costs are linked. Second, we develop a thought experi-
ment in which we assume a watershed that is free of politics, at least ini-
tially, where we can explore the challenges of developing a comprehensive 
integrated management system in a world of transaction costs. In the final 
section of the chapter, we examine the effort to realize a more comprehen-
sive and integrated form of watershed governance in the Columbia River 
Basin. Congress created an overarching organization to bring together the 
different governments, interest groups, and citizens to protect and enhance 
salmon stocks while maintaining dynamic economies founded on inexpen-
sive hydropower. The Northwest Power Planning Council is statutorily cre-
ated with specific mandates and authorities. It has a dedicated source of 
funding and its own staff to support plan development, technical analyses, 
and monitoring. At least on paper it appears to come close to comprehensive 
integrated management under a watershed-wide authority, and, in fact, it 
can boast of many positive accomplishments, such as closer working rela-
tions between state and tribal fish and wildlife agencies, the development of 
many watershed collaboratives and watershed plans, and a greater under-
standing of adaptive management in practice, among others. But the two 
most sought-after goals—salmon recovery and comprehensive integrated 
management—have remained terribly elusive. Those goals remain elusive 
not simply because of politics but because of boundedly rational people 
struggling to achieve collective goals in the face of transaction costs.
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Bounded ratIonalIty
Bounded rationality is best understood in relation to perfect rationality, 
which is the neoclassical microeconomics model of the individual. The 
perfectly rational person makes choices so as to maximize his or her util-
ity. Individuals are quite capable of maximizing their utility because they 
exhibit perfect and boundless computational abilities and possess perfect 
and complete information. For analytical purposes, such individuals possess 
well-defined utility functions, complete and well-defined sets of alternatives 
from which to choose, and probability distributions over all possible states 
of the world. Armed with such information and computational power, indi-
viduals, when confronted with a choice, select the alternative that maximizes 
utility. As Simon (1983, 34) suggests, the model better describes the mind of 
God than of man.
A boundedly rational individual possesses limited cognitive process-
ing capabilities and information. Such an individual is intendedly rational 
in the pursuit of instrumental goals but is limited in that pursuit by her 
cognitive and information resources (Simon 1957). Boundedly rational 
people systematically and predictably violate the tenets of perfect ratio-
nality. For instance, people are influenced by how a decision is framed. If 
a decision is framed in terms of the gains that a person may realize, peo-
ple make choices as if they are risk seeking. If the same decision is framed 
in terms of the losses a person may experience, people make choices as if 
they are risk averse—same decision, differently framed, leads to different 
choices (Markman and Medin 2002). A perfectly rational individual would 
not be affected by framing. That individual would always choose the alter-
native that maximizes utility, no matter how the alternatives are framed. 
Furthermore, people are satisficers and not optimizers. They select alter-
natives that are good enough rather than expending inordinate amounts 
of time gathering information and making careful and systematic com-
parisons among alternatives. Finally, how people process information and 
make choices is influenced by goals, motivations, beliefs, and emotions. 
People who are more cooperative and altruistic tend to be more concerned 
with collective outcomes than are people who are more individualistic and 
competitive (Kopelman et al. 2002, 119). Both cooperators and competi-
tors, however, tend to attribute greater intelligence to their more preferred 
strategy than to the opposite strategy. That is, cooperators view other coop-
IMagInary Watersheds and PolItIcal realItIes    93
erators as more intelligent than competitors and vice versa (Kopelman et 
al. 2002, 121).2
None of this should be read to imply that instead of being perfectly 
rational, people are perfectly irrational. People are goal-oriented and pur-
posive, but limited in their cognitive competence (Simon 1957). Boundedly 
rational individuals can learn and adapt to their immediate environment 
and, over time, learn and adapt to changing environments; however, learning 
and adaptation will be episodic and disjointed because of the structure and 
operation of their cognitive architecture (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
At this point, supporters of comprehensive, integrated watershed manage-
ment may object and claim that they do not expect individuals to make com-
prehensive, integrated decisions; rather, they expect institutional arrange-
ments to support and guide people’s choices so that choices are more nearly 
comprehensive and integrated. Although institutional arrangements allow 
people to collectively accomplish what they could not as individuals, insti-
tutions are created by boundedly rational people and they must be under-
stood in terms of the goals and capabilities of their designers (Williamson 
1985). As Jones (2001, 14) notes, “the institutions that exist as a product 
of human culture seem to work best when the limits and potentialities of 
human nature are taken into consideration.” Assuming decision makers are 
boundedly rational is critical for understanding institutional design and 
performance.
transactIon costs
Boundedly rational people act in a costly world. They must expend re-
sources—time, money, expertise, social capital, and so forth—in developing, 
implementing, monitoring, enforcing, and revising institutional arrange-
ments. Those costs shape and constrain the types of institutional arrange-
ments that people devise (Williamson 1985).
The most common types of transaction costs are decision making, 
agency, and commitment (Moe 1989; Horn 1995). Making a collective 
decision involves information costs in identifying the problem or opportu-
nity, identifying and developing alternative courses of action, and bargain-
ing and negotiating over selecting a single course of action. Furthermore, 
in many instances the process of decision making will not occur in such 
a rational sequence (Kingdon 1995). Some people will prefer a particular 
94    IMagInary Watersheds and PolItIcal realItIes
policy alternative no matter the problem. Also, problems may be poorly 
defined and their underlying causes unidentified, but policy decisions are 
made anyway, even if they may not address the problem.
Decision-making costs are partly a function of characteristics of deci-
sion makers and partly a function of context. Decision makers with diverse 
values, preferences, and goals are much more likely to experience higher 
decision-making costs than decision makers with similar values, prefer-
ences, and goals. Diverse decision makers will have to spend more time dis-
cussing, bargaining, and negotiating in order to reach a decision. Of course, 
the ability to reach a collective decision is also a function of decision rules. 
A unanimity rule imposes very high decision-making costs, as each person 
must agree to a course of action, compared to simple majority rules. Finally, 
the larger social and physical context affects decision-making costs. Well-
defined problems with clear causal mechanisms are likely to present clearer 
courses of action and consequently lower decision-making costs.
Most decision makers do not implement their decisions. Rather, poli-
cies are turned over to others to carry out. Agency costs involve ensuring 
that policy implementers, the agents of the policy makers, put the poli-
cies into place in ways intended by decision makers. Some slippage always 
occurs between what policy makers intended and what implementers of the 
policies do. Agency costs arise from a variety of sources. Agents may not 
have the expertise or experience to competently carry out the tasks. Or they 
may pursue courses of action that are more aligned with their own values 
or interests and not those of policy makers or key constituents.3 In a num-
ber of instances, detecting agency problems is difficult. Government pro-
grams often bear multiple and conflicting mandates (the residue of high 
decision-making costs), providing implementers with considerable discre-
tion in carrying out their duties. Thus, it may be difficult to distinguish 
between purposeful undermining of policies and the legitimate exercise of 
discretion.
Finally, commitment problems arise because sometimes people are 
tempted to act in ways that run counter to what they promised.4 Commitments 
support cooperative endeavors as parties to a project are assured that at 
some later date they will not be taken advantage of. For instance, a common 
rule used to allocate resources among miners, ranchers, and irrigators dur-
ing the nineteenth century in the western United States was “first in time, 
first in right.” Those first to exploit a resource were granted rights protect-
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ing their uses from newcomers who sought access to the resources. Secure 
rights encouraged people to invest in economically productive activities. 
With rights in water, farmers could make long-term investments in irriga-
tion systems, knowing that their systems would not be rendered useless by 
others taking their water.
Commitments are made credible through mechanisms that limit the 
opportunities and the value of breaking an agreement.5 For instance, water-
use rights based on first in time, first in right are recognized and protected 
in the constitutions of most western states. For a state government to change 
to different rules of water allocation and use, the state’s constitution would 
have to be amended as opposed to simply passing a piece of legislation. 
Constitutional amendments are difficult and costly, so writing a property 
right into a constitution limits the opportunities for dismantling the right 
and therefore strengthens the credibility of commitments by individuals 
based on those assignments of rights.
The commitment coin has two sides. Credible commitments allow citi-
zens, organizations, and communities to cooperate to solve shared problems 
or realize common goals, but at the same time, it is difficult to change or 
transform credible commitments. That is, after all, what makes them cred-
ible. Over time, as circumstances change and new interests seek to partici-
pate in policy making and have their goals credibly committed to, existing 
institutional arrangements representing commitments to different interests 
act as barriers to change. For instance, urban and environmental interests 
are frustrated that agriculture controls significant portions of water in most 
western states, even though agriculture no longer dominates western states’ 
economies. Urban and environmental interests want to draw water out of 
agriculture but find it very difficult to overcome the credible commitments 
made to agriculture in an earlier time.6
These different types of transaction costs are not independent of 
one another—they are interactive. One type of transaction cost may be 
reduced, but often at the expense of increasing another type of transaction 
cost. People have to attend to these trade-offs among transaction costs to 
develop institutional arrangements. One approach to reduce decision-mak-
ing costs is to adopt relatively vague directives. Instead of spending time 
and resources agreeing on all details of a policy, decision makers may leave 
portions of the policy vague, with the expectation that policy implementers 
will imbue them with greater content and specificity. Vague directives grant-
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ing implementers more discretion, however, increase agency costs. Agency 
costs may be reduced, but usually through increased decision-making costs 
as policy makers design more specific policies to limit the discretion of 
implementers.
Commitment problems and agency costs also interact. Credible com-
mitments are costly to undo, opening the possibility of higher agency costs. 
For instance, decision makers could commit to pursuing environmental 
goals by hiring a group of professional experts with impeccable environ-
mental credentials and granting them civil service protection, making it very 
difficult and costly to fire them. Such a credible commitment raises agency 
costs. Policy makers will find it difficult to hold implementers protected by 
civil service accountable. Policy makers could anticipate these agency prob-
lems and insert a sunset clause into the environmental policy requiring 
policy makers to reconsider and review the policy and either renew it or let 
it expire. Reopening the policy to address agency problems, however, allows 
commitment problems to reemerge. In revising the policy, policy makers 
can just as easily undo their commitments to various aspects of the policy as 
they can address agency problems. Trade-offs among transaction costs are as 
ubiquitous as transaction costs themselves.
Transaction costs influence and condition the institutional choices peo-
ple make. People are not free to design any type of institution or policy they 
desire: they must settle on a tolerable mix of transaction costs. Different 
types of institutional arrangements represent different mixes of transac-
tion costs and trade-offs among them. Are decision makers willing to bear 
greater agency costs in order to avoid commitment problems? Are they will-
ing to take on greater decision-making costs in order to reduce agency costs? 
Answers to these questions are heavily influenced by the values and goals of 
the decision makers as well as the types of problems they are attempting to 
address.
a thought exPerIMent
We begin our thought experiment with an ideal situation for an advocate of 
watershed-level integrated and comprehensive management. A like-minded 
group of boundedly rational people are committed to the broad goal of 
integrated watershed management and possess comprehensive authority to 
make governing decisions on all aspects of a watershed. These watershed 
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decision makers are faced with two types of choices. First, they will have to 
choose policies for governing the watershed. Second, they will have to choose 
how to best organize and direct the people implementing the policies.
choosing Policies
Decision costs of like-minded policy makers may be lower because they 
will mostly agree on what constitutes good policy. Comprehensive inte-
grated decisions, however, present special challenges to boundedly rational 
people. Comprehensiveness requires consideration of the multiple com-
ponents and dimensions of a watershed, not just one or two. Integration 
requires that the policies are ordered and sensible, working together, not at 
cross-purposes, to realize a shared vision of the watershed. Making com-
prehensive, integrated decisions about a complex adaptive system requires 
a considerable level of information about the structure and functioning of 
the watershed and mechanisms to continuously update the information. 
Thus, information costs to support comprehensive, integrated decision 
making will be high.
Even more challenging for decision makers is choosing among incom-
mensurate alternatives. Incommensurate alternatives are things, people, 
or policies that possess multiple attributes in different combinations and 
degrees. They do not correspond in degree or extent in their attributes and 
consequences and no common metric exists to ease the choices among 
them.7 The epigraph for this chapter notes such a choice involving water-
sheds—water development versus fish, and not just fish but aquatic life, 
riparian habitat, and, in the case of the Pacific Northwest, human cultures.
Almost by definition, comprehensive, integrated watershed decision 
making means that policy makers will confront choices among incommen-
surate alternatives. As Jones (2001) notes, boundedly rational individuals 
struggle mightily with incommensurate choices. Are there mechanisms or 
decision-making processes that would ease the burden?8
One approach is to identify each attribute of each alternative, assign a 
weight to each attribute, use the weighted attributes to develop an overall 
score for each alternative, and then compare the scores of the alternatives 
and select the one with the best score.9 The decision-making costs of such a 
process for each decision that policy makers must make would be quite high, 
even for a like-minded group of policy makers.10 Other ways of addressing 
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the high decision-making costs associated with choosing among incommen-
surate alternatives involve simplifying the alternatives and their attributes so 
the burden of comprehensive integration is reduced (Jones 2001).
Derthick (1974), in examining the decision-making processes of the 
TVA, noted the struggle of the three commissioners in choosing among 
incommensurate alternatives. They handled sharp differences among them-
selves over how the major activities of the organization should be integrated 
and coordinated by specialization (Derthick 1974, 205). Each commissioner 
took control of a major activity, with little attempt to engage in close coor-
dination. Eventually, the board hired an executive director to handle the 
day-to-day operations and decisions, but the divisions among functions 
remained (Derthick 1974, 205). As Derthick (1974, 206) argues: “There was 
nothing here to suggest the incomparable superiority of the autonomous 
regional corporation as an integrative instrument. Eventually, electric power 
operations came to predominate overwhelmingly, although an ideal of coor-
dination would probably have called for harmonization of a wide range of 
related activities.”
Besides simplifying decisions, policy makers could turn to professional 
experts to develop more comprehensive analyses of alternatives and score 
them. Doing so would lower their decision-making costs but increase agency 
costs. Policy makers would have to take steps to ensure that the profession-
als who developed and evaluated the alternatives did so in a way that was 
responsive to their values.
Decision-making tools may relieve decision makers of developing copi-
ous amounts of information, but they are only useful to the extent decision 
makers rely on them. Invariably, decision makers will confront situations in 
which they prefer an alternative different from the one the decision tool sug-
gests is best. Such situations occur for a variety of reasons—an alternative 
may impose costs on a well-defined group of citizens that can least afford 
to bear them, for instance, or an alternative may require that a particular 
habitat or species receive greater protection than people’s livelihoods. The 
reasons are likely to be innumerable.
In order to commit to a decision-making tool, policy makers must 
in some way tie their hands so that they cannot discard the tool when it 
serves their purposes to do so. This may be accomplished in different ways. 
Decision makers may write into legislation that the tool must be used in 
making decisions or can be disregarded only if an extraordinary majority 
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agrees to use a different process. That is, they can avoid their commitment 
only through increased decision-making costs.
Decision makers may instead direct professional experts to use the deci-
sion-making tool and only forward to them the alternatives with the best 
scores. This, however, invites agency costs. If the experts have a stake in the 
options selected or strong preferences for particular alternatives, they may 
manipulate the decision tool to realize their preferences. A classic case of 
decision makers and professional experts grappling with decision-making 
tools concerns the relationship between Congress and the Army Corps of 
Engineers. Since at least 1936, with the passage of the Flood Control Act, 
Congress has required the Corps of Engineers to use cost-benefit analyses to 
select viable projects (Committee to Assess 1999). Over time, Congress has 
required the Corps of Engineers to engage in more sophisticated analyses and 
consider additional dimensions of projects, but cost-benefit analyses remain 
as the foundational decision tool. Congress and the Corps have struggled 
with such analyses. The budget, prestige, and political support of the Corps 
hinge on building projects, even projects with marginal or poor cost-benefit 
ratios. Members of Congress benefit from having a project in their districts 
or states, even if the project cannot be justified in cost-benefit terms, since 
the benefits are concentrated in specific districts and states and at least a por-
tion of the costs is spread across all U.S. taxpayers. Consequently, the Army 
Corps of Engineers has exercised its discretion in ways that have made some 
projects more attractive, and members of Congress have not objected.
Over the past two decades, increasing pressure has been brought to bear 
from a variety of sources—reform-minded members of Congress, environ-
mental groups, taxpayer groups, National Academy of Sciences commit-
tees, to name a few—to revise the process by which the Corps recommends 
projects to Congress (Committee to Assess 1999; Coordinating Committee 
2004; New York Times 2006). The reform that has been repeatedly pursued, 
but that has not yet received congressional approval, is independent review 
of any project costing more than $40 million (New York Times 2006). Such 
independent oversight is intended to encourage Congress and the Corps to 
renew their commitment to selecting and funding projects in a more objec-
tive fashion.
Advocates of integrated watershed management rarely assume that 
integrating and coordinating various complex and difficult aspects of 
human uses of watersheds will be easy, but they do assume that it can be 
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done reasonably well. With sufficient information, resources, and authority, 
difficult comparisons and trade-offs can be made and comprehensive, inte-
grated choices can be achieved. The above analysis suggests, however, that 
comprehensive, integrated decision making will rapidly overwhelm people’s 
cognitive capabilities. Boundedly rational people will seek to cope with such 
complexity by using a variety of simplifying mechanisms that they hope 
will reduce their decision-making costs. As transaction cost theory suggests, 
reducing decision-making costs inevitably creates opportunities for agency 
problems and/or commitment problems to emerge. People confront cog-
nitive and cost limitations in developing and selecting policies, limitations 
that push them away from comprehensive integrated decisions.
Implementing Policies
Agency costs accrue as boundedly rational policy makers try to ensure 
that the policies they have selected are implemented appropriately. Policy 
makers usually do not implement policies but turn the policies over to oth-
ers to implement. How do decision makers ensure that their agents imple-
ment policies as the decision makers would want? Once again, we return 
to the now-familiar transaction costs trade-off story, but we add a time 
dimension.
Agency problems may be anticipated and addressed in a number of 
ways, none of them costless. One approach is to select implementers from 
a profession whose values, norms, and preferences are most closely aligned 
with those of the policy makers. Policy makers may then rest assured that as 
implementers make choices, even in uncertain or unique situations unantic-
ipated by policy makers, they will do so in ways that the policy makers would 
themselves have done (Moe 1990). Another approach is for policy makers to 
define specifically and concretely the actions they want the implementers to 
follow. Providing specific instructions, guidelines, and even time lines limits 
the discretion of implementers and lowers agency costs.11
Relying on appropriate professionals or detailed instructions and guide-
lines will work as long as the values, norms, and preferences of policy makers 
do not change. Inevitably they will. At the very least, current policy makers 
can readily anticipate that they will be replaced and that their replacements 
may have different values, norms, and preferences. Current policy makers 
are then confronted with another set of choices: how to ensure the policies 
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they adopt, which they believe are best for the watershed, remain in place 
even after they are no longer in positions of authority and no longer able to 
protect their programs. In other words, how can current policy makers com-
mit future policy makers to particular courses of action?
One answer is to use mechanisms to insulate agencies, programs, and 
their employees from the reach of policy makers. Civil service systems, pre-
venting policy makers from removing employees at will, are widely viewed 
as a means of insulating public employees from politics (Frant 1993; Horn 
1995). Other examples include commission forms of agencies, in which 
commissioner terms are staggered and are for longer periods than elected 
officials; making it difficult for any particular coalition of decision mak-
ers to remove commissioners. Another mechanism is to adopt long peri-
ods between reauthorization dates, allowing a policy or program to become 
firmly established before policy makers have the opportunity to substan-
tially revise or eliminate it (Moe 1990; Horn 1995). Or policy makers may 
provide individuals with property rights in the benefits of a program. If such 
property rights are recognized and protected in the larger legal system, they 
will be very difficult to substantially alter or eliminate.
Committing to an agency or program by insulating it from future policy 
change raises the probability of higher agency costs. Programs and employ-
ees may be more difficult to terminate, not just for future policy makers but 
for current ones. The ability of policy makers, present and future, to adjust 
programs to better fit changing circumstances, or to hold employees readily 
accountable, becomes increasingly constrained.
Consequently, future policy makers come into office confronting poli-
cies, organizations, and employees, put in place by their predecessors, that 
reflect values, norms, and preferences not of their own choosing. Even if 
these new policy makers are like-minded so that they may make decisions 
readily, they are now making decisions in a context with a history, and that 
history is difficult to back out of, just as their predecessors intended. They 
must attempt to realize their preferences in a context that will make it costly 
to do so. They may proceed along several avenues, none of which are mutu-
ally exclusive. They may attempt to roll back or eliminate programs and 
agencies created by their predecessors, which is the most costly and difficult 
approach to take. Employees will attempt to save their programs and their 
jobs, as will citizens who benefit from the programs. Policy makers will 
have to spend some of their limited time and resources overcoming such 
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opposition. Although they may eliminate undesirable programs, they will 
still face the task of creating new ones better suited to their preferences.
A more attractive alternative than eliminating programs is creating 
additional programs that better suit their preferences and assign their imple-
mentation to existing organizations. Or create new organizations to imple-
ment the new programs and hire individuals whose professional values are 
aligned with those of the policy makers. In the former case, organizations 
evolve whose goals, missions, and programs may conflict. In the latter case, 
multiple organizations work in the same issue or problem area but with 
different authorities, activities, and missions. No matter which approach is 
selected, overall watershed management will begin to appear fragmented, 
piecemeal, limited, and myopic. Such appearances are amplified as bound-
edly rational policy makers struggle with incommensurate choices by sim-
plifying decisions and pursuing less comprehensive and less integrated 
alternatives.
addItIonal coMPlIcatIng Factors
Thus far, we have explored the choices made by like-minded, boundedly 
rational policy makers. Let us now assume that the policy makers are no 
longer like-minded. Instead, they hold different values, norms, and prefer-
ences. The most immediate effect is on decision-making costs. Policy mak-
ers with diverse preferences will experience increased levels of conflict and 
disagreement, leading to higher bargaining and negotiation costs as they 
search for common ground. Furthermore, incommensurate choices become 
that much more difficult and thus that much more important to minimize 
as policy makers contest over which attributes of a given policy are vital and 
which can be safely ignored, and which weights should be given to impor-
tant attributes.
Policy makers with diverse preferences can attempt to lower decision-
making costs in a variety of ways so that choices can be made and actions 
taken. One approach is logrolling, which should not be confused with com-
prehensive, integrated policies. Logrolling gives each policy maker some of 
what he or she wants, but the policies do not fit together in a comprehen-
sive meaningful fashion. Another approach is to adopt vague policy, allow-
ing each decision maker to interpret the policy as he or she prefers. The 
implementers bear the decision-making costs and the conflict of turning the 
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vague policy into a better-defined and specified policy that could be imple-
mented. Vague policies may lower decision-making costs but at the expense 
of increased agency problems. Also, commitment problems become more 
acute among policy makers with diverse preferences. Policy makers want to 
protect their hard-won policies not just from future policy makers with dif-
ferent preferences but from current policy makers as well. Addressing com-
mitment problems by insulating them from politics ensures their durability, 
but at the price of agency problems. Agency problems could be reduced, but 
at the expense of commitment.
Another complicating factor is that watersheds are complex adaptive 
systems, as discussed in Chapter 1. It is just such an environment that has 
led to the call for comprehensive, integrated management. However, such 
an environment works against comprehensive, integrated management. 
Appropriate types of flood control, water quality, habitat protection or res-
toration, stream flows, and so forth are a function of time and place infor-
mation. Water quality, threats to it, and approaches to recovering and/or 
maintaining it depend on a variety of factors, such as the type and location 
of the water sources and the types and locations of human activities that 
are impacting the sources. The transaction costs of making and implement-
ing comprehensive, integrated policies that appropriately account for the 
wide variety of circumstances within a watershed simply explode. Decision-
making costs escalate as policy makers struggle to obtain critical time and 
place information and address the distributional consequences of the poli-
cies under consideration. Commitment problems become more acute, as 
locking in one policy for one set of interests adversely affects other interests 
or limits policy makers’ ability to act in other areas. Agency costs escalate as 
implementers struggle to apply uniform policies across a diverse and highly 
differentiated watershed.
As boundedly rational policy makers struggle to make choices among 
incommensurate alternatives in a world characterized by complexity and 
transaction costs, the choices they make and the means by which those 
choices are implemented are likely to appear fragmented, duplicative, and 
narrow. We do not end up in a world of watersheds advocated by propo-
nents of comprehensive, integrated watershed management, even though 
that was our point of departure. Comprehensive, integrated management 
at the watershed level taxes the cognitive abilities of people and generates 
burdensome levels of transaction costs.
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Should we abandon the goal of comprehensive, integrated watershed 
management? The previous analysis suggests that there are hard limits to 
accomplishing such a goal. Instead of ignoring those hard limits and con-
tinuing to press for such a goal, it may be more appropriate to design water-
shed governance systems that take bounded rationality and transaction 
costs into account. Paraphrasing Jones (2001), watershed management is 
more likely to be successful if it accounts for the limits and potentialities of 
human nature.
Our discussion of bounded rationality and transaction costs has been 
relatively abstract to this point, so we now turn to a specific watershed—the 
Columbia River Basin. It provides a rich setting for exploring the effects of 
bounded rationality and transaction costs. In 1980, Congress engaged in 
an experiment by superimposing the Northwest Power Planning Council 
on the many governments within the watershed. The council was to inte-
grate fish and wildlife goals with power goals across the basin. The council 
has experienced limited success for a variety of reasons, including bounded 
rationality and transaction costs.
the coluMBIa rIver BasIn
The human uses of the Columbia River Basin are diverse, stretching across 
the entire basin and at multiple scales. Thousands of acres have been trans-
formed into irrigated agriculture. Irrigation districts and companies, large 
and small, divert millions of acre-feet of water from the river and its tribu-
taries each year. Compared with the volume of water that passes through 
the river annually, such diversions appear modest. Compared with the 
water diverted for municipal and industrial use, they are significant, and 
not merely because of their magnitude. Irrigated agriculture absorbs much 
of its water roughly at the same times that anadromous fish need it, in the 
spring for smolt to traverse to the ocean and in the late summer for adults to 
travel upstream to spawn.
Mining and timber harvesting have also sustained generations of 
people in the Columbia River Basin. The impacts of both activities have 
reverberated throughout the basin. Extensive cutting of old-growth forests 
has imperiled several species of wildlife. Mining and timber harvesting 
together have polluted the region’s streams and rivers with silt and toxic 
chemicals.
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The Columbia and Snake River Basins.
Agriculture, mining, and timber harvesting dot the landscape, but what 
has led to the most extensive and tightly intertwined human use in the 
basin is harnessing the power of the Columbia River and its largest tribu-
tary, the Snake River, for electricity generation. Over fifty major dams and 
twelve major storage projects, built by the Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Bureau of Reclamation, capture and control the flow of the Columbia 
(Wandschneider 1984). Furthermore, under the Treaty Related to the 
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Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River 
Basin, signed by Canada and the United States in 1961, Canada built a series 
of dams and reservoirs, capturing much of the spring runoff that had, until 
that point, served to propel smolt to the ocean (Wandschneider 1984; Blumm 
and Simrin 1991). The system of dams and powerhouses in an average water 
year generates 16,000 average megawatts of power, fueling a large and robust 
economy (Northwest Power and Conservation Planning Council 2005). The 
dams have also had a profound effect on what many consider the touchstone 
species of the Columbia River Basin—salmon and steelhead trout. In recent 
years, about 1 million adult fish return to the basin each year to spawn. Prior 
to dam and hydroelectric power development, spawning fish numbered 10 
to 16 million annually (Northwest Power Planning Council 2000).
These many uses of the Columbia River Basin are governed by many 
different and overlapping institutional arrangements.12 Water allocation and 
use are governed by each of the states within the basin. Although all use the 
prior appropriation doctrine to govern water allocation and use, each state 
has its own distinct system of administration and rules. Furthermore, states 
do not coordinate or consult with each other concerning overall water allo-
cations, nor do they have a mechanism, such as an interstate river compact, 
that provides a means of coordinating off-channel water uses. In addition to 
the states, the federal water agencies, especially the Bureau of Reclamation, 
are notable water allocation actors. Although federal projects, in develop-
ing water, must abide by state water laws, once the water is captured, it is 
governed by a different set of rules. Federal project water is typically not 
governed by prior appropriation; rather its allocation and use are governed 
by a series of contracts that the federal water agency enters into with water 
users, particularly irrigation districts.
A similar institutional description holds for many other uses of the 
Columbia River Basin’s resources. State and federal laws and agencies gov-
ern forests on state and federal land, respectively. Fishing, even for salmon, 
is governed by states, Indian tribes, the federal government, and a treaty 
between the U.S. and Canadian governments. Compared with water and 
forestry, fishing is more closely coordinated, with a variety of govern-
ing bodies at different scales allocating fish and devising harvesting rules 
(Wandschneider 1984, 1049).
The institutional arrangements that govern hydropower are striking for 
their limited diversity and high degree of coordination, unlike the institu-
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tional arrangements governing the other resources of the Columbia River 
Basin. Even though there are many dams and reservoirs and many electric 
utilities, the hydropower system is dominated by several large agencies and 
a coordinating agreement that tightly ties the utilities and agencies together. 
The Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation by far gener-
ate the most power. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a regional 
organization created by Congress, markets the power of the two federal 
water agencies. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses and 
monitors private hydropower plants.
The Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement of 1964 established 
detailed operating criteria and power exchange principles. It also established 
an annual system-wide planning process to maximize power production 
(Blumm and Simrin 1991, 705–707). Wandschneider (1984, 1051) argues 
that the coordination agreement acts to manage hydropower as if there were 
a single, centralized utility. The physical effect of operating the river for 
hydropower production is to shift peak streamflow from spring to winter 
when demand for electricity is greatest (Wandschneider 1984, 1050).
Human uses and institutional arrangements governing those uses have 
had a profound effect on the ecosystems of the Columbia River Basin, but 
by far the most direct and negative effect has been on salmon. Concern over 
the fate of salmon has been expressed repeatedly over the past century, but 
not until Congress adopted the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act in 1976 
was there a concerted effort to coax the federal water and power agencies 
to address the effects of their actions on salmon. Although the act was well 
intentioned, it failed to accomplish its goal of providing equal consideration 
for fish and wildlife in project planning and development. The act created 
a consultation process between federal and state fisheries agencies and fed-
eral water and power agencies. In the consulting process, projects could be 
altered to reduce their effects on fish and wildlife, mitigation measures could 
be adopted to compensate for negative effects, and studies of project impacts 
on fish and wildlife could be conducted. However, the federal water and 
power agencies were given implicit veto power. They could reject project 
alterations or mitigation efforts if they deemed them to be unjustifiable in 
maximizing overall project benefits. Even if alterations or mitigation efforts 
were adopted, they often were inadequate because it was difficult to estimate 
the impact of the project on fish and wildlife. Attempting to incorporate 
additional alterations and mitigation measures after project completion 
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was challenging, especially with regard to developing additional financing 
(Blumm 1982, 110–112).
the northwest Power act
Treating fish and wildlife as an afterthought in water projects changed 
dramatically within four years of the adoption of the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act. During the 1970s, a series of events set the stage for con-
gressional adoption of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and 
Conservation Act of 1980. Tribes successfully sued to have their treaty fishing 
rights recognized and enforced. The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service 
and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service initiated a review to determine whether 
various salmon stocks should be listed as threatened or endangered (Blumm 
and Simrin 1991, 690). The recognition of tribal treaty rights and the list-
ing process coincided with a national energy crisis and the fear of a regional 
crisis in the Northwest. Congress’s attention turned to energy policy, includ-
ing the expansion of electric generation capacity in the Northwest. Congress 
adopted the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation 
Act of 1980 (often referred to as the Northwest Power Act), addressing both 
hydropower and fish and wildlife issues. As a result, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service suspended the endan-
gered species listing process in lieu of the development and implementation 
of what appeared to be an innovative and comprehensive approach to pro-
tecting and restoring salmon stocks (Blumm 1986).
The Northwest Power Act, in its structure and directives, signaled that 
its congressional creators understood that placing fish and wildlife on an 
equal footing with hydropower would be challenging. The act moved well 
beyond what was required of federal water and power agencies under the 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, which largely required the agencies to 
take into account anadromous fish on a project-by-project basis. In con-
trast, the Northwest Power Act encompassed the entire Columbia River 
Basin, and planning and implementation activities were to be undertaken 
with the entire basin in mind (Blumm 1984).
The also act created a regional council consisting of two representatives 
from each of the basin states (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana). 
The Northwest Power Planning Council was charged with developing a basin-
wide power plan and a basin-wide fish and wildlife recovery plan. The plans 
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would guide the actions of the various federal, state, and local governments 
and public and private power producers. Council decision rules required 
a high level of agreement among members to adopt and amend the plans. 
Plan adoption and revision required a majority of members appointed to the 
council, including a member from each state or, alternatively, six members 
of the council. The former rule required only five affirmative votes, although 
each state had to vote in the affirmative; whereas the latter rule required any 
state combination that yielded six affirmative votes. No single state exer-
cised veto power, but states’ interests had to be adequately addressed for plan 
approval. In contrast, non-plan decisions simply required a majority vote 
of a quorum of members. A quorum consisted of five representatives; thus, 
only three votes were necessary to conduct day-to-day business.
Congress granted the council greater discretion in devising the power 
plan, which was to coordinate the development of additional power supplies 
among producers, than in devising the fish and wildlife plan. Congress con-
strained the council’s discretion in a variety of ways. First, the council was 
given strict time lines for developing and adopting a fish and wildlife plan. 
The council was to adopt a fish and wildlife plan within a year of receiv-
ing recommendations from the region’s fish and wildlife agencies, whereas 
the council was given two years to develop a power plan. Furthermore, the 
council was directed to develop a power plan that was fully consistent with 
the fish and wildlife plan (Public Law 96-501, section [h][9]).
Second, Congress directed the council to rely heavily on the expertise 
of the federal, state, and tribal fish and wildlife agencies in developing and 
revising a plan. The council was required to solicit in writing recommenda-
tions from these agencies for measures that would recover and protect fish 
and wildlife. Federal and state water and power agencies could also submit 
recommendations; however, the council was not required to solicit recom-
mendations from them and the recommendations from the fish and wildlife 
agencies were to be given greater consideration. This was to be accomplished 
in several ways. If recommendations were inconsistent with each other, the 
council was directed to resolve the inconsistency, giving due weight to the 
expertise of the fish and wildlife agencies. Moreover, if the council declined 
to adopt recommendations from fish and wildlife agencies, it had to justify its 
action in writing by explaining how the recommendation violated the pur-
poses of the act or how the council chose to adopt a measure that provided 
greater protection than the recommendation that was rejected (Public Law 
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96-501, section [h][7]).
Third, Congress directed the council to use several criteria in develop-
ing and revising the fish and wildlife plan. The plan should (1) complement 
existing and future activities of federal, state, and tribal fish and wildlife 
agencies; (2) be based on best available scientific knowledge; (3) use the 
alternative that is least costly among equally effective measures for achiev-
ing biological objectives; (4) be consistent with tribal rights; and (5) in the 
case of anadromous fish, provide improved survival at hydroelectric facili-
ties and provide flows of sufficient quantity and quality between such facili-
ties to improve production, migration, and survival of such fish (Public Law 
96-501, section [h][6]).
Fourth, Congress created a dedicated funding source for developing and 
implementing the plan. Consumers of electricity were to pay for the effects 
of the hydropower system on fish and wildlife through the creation of a 
Bonneville Power Administration fund. Fifth, BPA and the federal water and 
power agencies were directed to abide by the plan. In particular, they were to 
exercise their responsibilities “in a manner that provides equitable treatment 
for such fish and wildlife with the other purposes for which such system and 
facilities are managed and operated” (Public Law 96-501, section [h][11]).
For its time, the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and 
Conservation Act was innovative and creative. It was greeted warmly by orga-
nizations, agencies, and individuals who were actively attempting to protect 
the salmon of the Columbia River Basin. Viewed as the “most ambitious 
salmon recovery plan ever undertaken” (Blumm 1986, 464), the act broke 
with previous protection efforts in its scope, authority, diversity of recov-
ery measures, and funding. By creating a single entity whose jurisdiction 
spanned the basin, a more holistic and coordinated approach to the recov-
ery and protection of fish and wildlife could be realized. No longer would 
mitigation efforts occur on a piecemeal, project-by-project basis. Instead, 
a variety of critical measures could be adopted that worked together to 
recover salmon, such as simultaneously improving river flows, dam passage, 
and habitat restoration. True, the act did not address the myriad assaults on 
salmon, such as water diversions and fishing, but it did focus on a dimension 
over which the federal government held considerable leverage, the federal 
hydropower system. Furthermore, the act was more proactive than previous 
attempts at saving salmon. Best available science, not certainty in science, 
was to be the foundation of the measures and projects undertaken (Blumm 
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1984). The act envisioned changes in the operation of hydropower proj-
ects in order to improve production, migration, and survival of fish. Finally, 
recovery efforts would not compete for funding with hundreds of other pro-
grams in the annual congressional budget process, because funding for the 
recovery program was ensured by the consumers of electricity.
The Northwest Power Act’s congressional authors paid careful atten-
tion to transaction costs, providing it with independence from other well-
 established organizations and programs that it challenged, while imposing 
structure and direction to try to ensure that it achieved congressional goals. 
The balance was delicate, and it was at the trade-off points among trans-
action costs that the act was most vulnerable. Rather than relying only on 
existing organizations to carry out innovative programs, Congress created 
an independent organization that afforded each basin state equal represen-
tation. A new and independent organization holds the promise of more 
faithfully realizing its creators’ goals and intentions than does housing new 
and possibly threatening programs in existing agencies with their well-devel-
oped operating procedures and well-organized supporters. In terms of elec-
tric power, the new organization provided states with a much greater role in 
regional planning and development, a role that they actively sought, rather 
than being marginalized in the BPA power planning process (Blumm 1983, 
229). In terms of fish and wildlife, avoiding the ESA listing process required 
housing recovery efforts in an organization independent of the federal water 
and power agencies, which had demonstrated little interest in protecting fish 
and wildlife.
So that the council could move forward in a relatively timely manner 
and avoid becoming bogged down in making immediate and direct trade-
offs between fish and wildlife and electricity generation, Congress directed it 
to develop two plans—plans that took account of each other, but two plans 
nonetheless. Congress steered the council clear of some very difficult choices 
among incommensurate alternatives. Furthermore, in developing each plan 
separately, the council was to rely on two very different sets of experts and 
professionals. The power plan required the council to work closely with 
state regulatory agencies and utilities. The fish and wildlife plan required the 
council to work closely with tribal, state, and federal fish and wildlife agen-
cies. In both cases, Congress attempted to address potential agency problems 
by selecting experts whose professional values and skills were most closely 
aligned with the goals of Congress to actively engage in plan development. 
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Finally, as noted, Congress demonstrated its commitment to fish and wild-
life recovery by creating a dedicated source of funding for plan development 
and implementation.
As discussed earlier, resolving commitment problems often comes at the 
risk of agency problems. The Northwest Power Act anticipated some of the 
agency problems that could arise. In the legislation, Congress took steps to 
ensure that the council acted in intended ways by constraining its discretion. 
For instance, the fish and wildlife plan was to mitigate only the hydropower 
system’s effects on fish stocks, not other human activities that harm fish. 
In addition, the plan was to be consistent with other criteria important to 
Congress, such as protecting tribal rights and not working at cross-purposes 
with existing recovery efforts. Finally, to ensure that the dedicated source of 
funding (which was beyond annual congressional control) was used appro-
priately, the act directed the administrator of the BPA, who controlled the 
source of dedicated funding, to use the revenues to protect, mitigate, and 
enhance fish and wildlife to the extent affected by hydroelectric projects on 
the Columbia. Furthermore, the administrator was specifically advised that 
the expenditures are in addition to, not in lieu of, expenditures required 
of other entities; the administrator was not to undercut funding by paying 
for other recovery efforts out of the fund or by reducing fund expenditures 
by counting other recovery efforts against it (Public Law 96-501, section 
[h][10][A]).
Limiting agency costs is often accomplished at the expense of decision-
making costs. Certainly, Congress expended additional effort devising the 
various criteria that the council was to realize in developing a fish and wild-
life plan, but the increase in decision-making costs was largely borne by the 
council rather than by Congress. To limit the council’s ability to evade con-
gressional intent, Congress increased its decision-making costs by requiring 
the council to put in writing its reasons for rejecting measures proposed by 
the fish and wildlife agencies. Congress placed the burden of proof on the 
council to publicly justify its decisions. Limiting agency problems was fur-
ther addressed through extensive public participation requirements. Rather 
than Congress expending decision-making resources to closely monitor the 
activities of the council, Congress invited the public to take on those costs 
by providing for a variety of participation mechanisms—submitting com-
ments, attending public meetings, and participating in hearings.
Congress demonstrated a credible commitment to the recovery of fish 
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and wildlife by creating an independent organization and charging it to 
rely heavily on fish and wildlife experts in devising a recovery plan. It fur-
ther demonstrated its commitment by imposing a strict time line on the 
adoption of a plan to discourage the process from becoming bogged down. 
However, it also imposed decision rules that required a high level of agree-
ment among council members in order for a plan to be adopted, but once 
adopted, a plan would be hard to unravel or water down. The other notable 
commitment mechanism was a dedicated source of funding.
the northwest Power Planning council 
Somewhat surprisingly, given tight deadlines, super-majority decision 
rules, and hundreds of submissions of measures to be included in the fish 
and wildlife plan, the council did adopt a plan on schedule that largely fol-
lowed the directives of Congress. The plan reflected the major substantive 
measures proposed by the fish and wildlife agencies. The centerpiece was a 
water budget, controlled not by the federal water agencies that operated the 
dams but by two water budget managers who were fisheries experts. The 
more than 4.6 million acre-feet of water was to be used during the spring 
and early summer to support the migration of juvenile salmon downriver 
(Blumm and Simrin 1991, 696). The water budget managers could call for 
the water from federal water agencies at times and in places that they judged 
would be most beneficial.
The council, perhaps anticipating agency problems, placed constraints 
on both federal water agencies and the water budget managers. The water 
budget could easily be undercut by federal water agencies as they released 
water to generate power.13 For instance, they might release less “power” water 
in order to compensate for “fish” water. In an attempt to avoid that possibil-
ity, the council adopted a fixed schedule of “firm power flows” that provided 
for at least a certain level of spring flows to which the water budget would 
be added (Blumm 1984, 314–315). The council also recommended that the 
water budget take priority over reservoir fill and secondary power genera-
tion. That is, the federal water agencies were not granted the discretion to 
trade the water budget for goals that they found more desirable. The water 
budget managers, in turn, were not allowed to release water that would have 
the effect of increasing river flows above a recommended maximum.
The second major component of the plan addressed dam bypass mea-
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sures for migrating juveniles. Not only is it important to speed the passage 
of juveniles down the river, but it is also important to protect them from 
passing through the power turbines. The plan adopted spill requirements 
on the middle section of the Columbia and ordered studies and eventual 
incorporation of mechanical bypass devices on dams throughout the basin. 
Both requirements were controversial, with fish and wildlife managers argu-
ing that the measures were inadequate and dam operators arguing that less 
expensive alternatives, such as barging and trucking of juvenile salmon 
around the dams, should be used more widely (Blumm 1984).
The third major substantive component of the plan focused on rebuild-
ing fish stocks. In addition to funding a number of specific projects, the 
council created the Fish Propagation Panel to develop a coordinated, system-
wide plan for recovering wild stocks, improving hatchery operations, and 
identifying potential hatchery sites and to coordinate the propagation plan 
with existing efforts (Blumm 1984, 314–315). Overall, the council adopted 
an initial plan that was comprehensive in scope, addressing the major hydro-
electric impacts on fish and wildlife, from river flows to dam bypass systems 
to habitat restoration.
Separate and apart from substantive components, the council also 
addressed a number of issues involving coordination and funding in order to 
ensure that the federal agencies abided by the plan. The council anticipated 
agency problems by attempting to limit the discretion of federal agencies. 
In the plan, the council requested that the BPA expeditiously act to develop 
funding for the plan’s measures. Such funding would largely come through 
BPA’s rate-setting process. In addition, the council reminded the federal water 
and power agencies that according to the statute, they were to implement the 
plan to the fullest extent practicable. Consequently, the council directed the 
agencies to indicate in writing that they would implement the various mea-
sures or, if they were unable to implement the measures, to provide an expla-
nation with supporting documentation (Blumm and Simrin 1991, 679–680). 
Finally, the council requested that FERC assess the cumulative impacts of 
hydroelectric proposals instead of assessing impacts on a project-by-project 
basis. The council also directed the BPA to ensure that all power sales and 
power scheduling were in accordance with the plan (Blumm 1986, 475).
The fish and wildlife agencies had suggested a more aggressive approach 
to implementation. They requested a series of studies to examine how fed-
eral water and power agencies engaged in decision making and to identify 
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appropriate mechanisms for inserting fish and wildlife considerations into 
the decision-making processes. In other words, the fish and wildlife agencies 
wanted the council to design and adopt mechanisms that would commit 
the federal water and power agencies to implementing the plan. The council 
viewed implementation as an agency problem; the fish and wildlife agencies 
viewed it as primarily a commitment problem. In 1987, frustrated with the 
slow progress made by federal water and power agencies, the fish and wild-
life agencies once again pressed the council to address the issue. This time, 
the fish and wildlife agencies viewed the issue as an agency problem and 
requested that the council adopt a conflict resolution mechanism whereby 
the council would investigate and make a written report in response to any 
allegation that a program item was not being implemented. The council 
refused to adopt the conflict resolution mechanism, claiming that existing 
procedures were adequate (Blumm and Simrin 1991, 692–693).
Federal Water and Power agencies’ responses
The council and the fish and wildlife agencies were disappointed in the 
implementation response of the federal water and power agencies. The sub-
stantive portions of the plan became embroiled immediately in a variety 
of agency problems. First, the water budget was inadequately implemented. 
The firm power flows were often not provided, and the water and power 
agencies gave priority to reservoir fill and to the sale of electricity on the sec-
ondary power market. These activities acted to undermine the value of the 
water budget (Blumm and Simrin 1991, 676–677).14 Second, federal agen-
cies were also slow to request funding for dam bypass mechanisms, delaying 
their implementation. Dam bypass mechanisms competed with funding for 
other projects that the agencies valued more highly. Third, hatchery and 
habitat restoration projects and a variety of studies became entangled in 
funding disputes between the council and the BPA. For instance, the BPA 
refused to fund a study requested by the council to measure the effects of 
the hydropower system on fish and wildlife so that overall program goals 
could be established. After all, consumers of electricity were to pay only for 
the effects of the hydropower system and no more. The BPA stated that the 
study plan developed by the fish and wildlife agencies was unacceptable 
to BPA management and in violation of ratepayers’ interests (Blumm and 
Simrin 1991, 675). Much the same occurred with hatchery and habitat res-
116    IMagInary Watersheds and PolItIcal realItIes
toration projects in the Umatilla Basin, a tributary of the Columbia River 
(Chaney 1986).15 Conversely, the council feared that the BPA would use pro-
gram monies to fund studies that the council had not requested. Eventually, 
the council and the BPA came to an understanding over the studies that 
would be funded.
the council’s response to the Federal agencies
Given the earlier discussion of transaction costs and trade-offs, the 
council’s response to the agency problems encountered was predictable. The 
primary response was to increase the decision-making costs of the council 
and of the federal water and power agencies. The council’s decision-making 
costs increased as the council engaged in almost annual amendments to 
the plan. Although some amendments were substantive in nature, such as 
declaring hundreds of miles of streams off limits to hydropower develop-
ment and adopting spill requirements for the Snake River dams to allow 
smolt to bypass power turbines, many of the amendments were directed 
at implementation problems. The agencies’ decision-making costs were 
increased as the council subjected them to stricter time lines and directed 
them to follow more detailed and transparent decision-making processes.
In 1984, the council adopted a series of deadlines for various projects 
and activities. For instance, deadlines were established for the installation of 
bypass systems at several main-stem dams (Blumm and Simrin 1991, 681). 
In addition, time lines were established for a variety of habitat improve-
ment and fish propagation projects (Blumm and Simrin 1991, 683). Also, 
the council adopted a five-year action plan that set priorities for various 
program measures. As part of the action plan, federal water and power agen-
cies were to develop work plans and budgets for program measures and to 
make annual progress reports (Blumm 1986, 477–478).
Over the course of the 1980s, the council spent a considerable portion 
of its time attempting to cajole the federal water and power agencies into 
implementing the fish and wildlife plan. Although progress was not as rapid 
as desired, the council, nevertheless, could point to a number of accom-
plishments, from developing a solid foundation of research on a variety of 
dimensions of the Columbia River Basin, to protecting hundreds of miles 
of streams from hydropower development, to adopting a water budget, to 
funding dozens of habitat restoration projects, to adopting spill programs at 
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dams on the Columbia and the Snake, to placing the term “adaptive man-
agement” into the popular lexicon through its insistence on study designs 
that maximized learning opportunities, and so on. By the end of the 1980s, 
the council could point to a number of substantive changes. These accom-
plishments, however, were overshadowed by one disturbing fact: salmon 
stocks continued to dramatically decline.
the rest of the story
Beginning in the 1990s, the Northwest Power Planning Council was 
slowly displaced as the central actor in recovering salmon stocks. By 1990, 
Indian tribes and fish and wildlife agencies were increasingly restless and 
dissatisfied with the limited progress of the council and its fish and wildlife 
plan. The Columbia Fish and Wildlife Authority, a coalition of state and 
tribal fish and wildlife agencies, released a report calling for specified flows 
on the Columbia and Snake Rivers. The council’s water budget did not pro-
vide sufficient flows to mitigate the effects of the hydroelectric system on fish 
runs. Consequently, the authority wanted river flows established (Blumm 
et al. 1997). At roughly the same time, tribes and environmental groups 
petitioned to have various Snake River salmon runs listed as endangered 
under the Endangered Species Act. In 1991, the National Marine Fishery 
Service (NMFS) listed some Snake River salmon runs as either endangered 
or threatened. In response, the council amended the fish and wildlife plan 
by establishing specified flows on the Snake River. NMFS relied on the 
amended plan to issue a “no jeopardy” ruling, which specified that the oper-
ation of hydroelectric projects was not to jeopardize the continued survival 
of the salmon in light of the revised fish and wildlife plan. Both the council 
plan and the NMFS biological opinion were challenged in court, with envi-
ronmental and state fish and wildlife agencies charging that the plans were 
inadequate and industry groups charging that they were too aggressive and 
costly. The courts largely ruled in favor of the environmental groups and 
chided the council and the NMFS for adherence to an incremental approach 
that favored the status quo (Blumm 1995).
The results of the court cases were three plans by three different organi-
zations for the recovery of salmon (Blumm et al. 1997). In 1994, the council 
adopted a new fish and wildlife plan that established specified river flows, 
largely through reservoir drawdowns. It also established spill requirements 
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for dams throughout the basin and it relied less heavily on trucking and 
barging of smolt. Furthermore, to supplement flows in the Snake River it 
called for the leasing of up to 1 million acre-feet of water. The plan was 
largely ignored by federal water and power agencies, which focused more 
on the NMFS plan. The NMFS adopted an approach heavier on studies 
and lighter on changes in system operations than the council plan. It too 
established flow targets, albeit lower than those established by the council; 
it deferred reservoir drawdown and instead called for drawdown studies; it 
adopted a much more limited spill program; and it relied heavily on trucking 
and barging smolt (Blumm et al. 1997). A third plan, which was unenforce-
able against federal water and power agencies, was proposed by a coalition 
of tribes. It was closer in content to the council plan, although it contained 
more rigorous drawdown, spill, and hatchery components (Blumm et al. 
1997). The council recognized the confusion engendered by three plans and 
called for the reconciliation of the plans, ideally under the stewardship of 
the council. Little progress was made toward plan reconciliation, and over 
time, the NMFS, under its ESA authority, became the principal leader in 
salmon restoration efforts (Blumm et al. 1997).
In the meantime, the council has added a layer of complexity to its 
planning approach. Historically, its fish and wildlife program focused on 
the basin level. The water budget was devised at the basin level as was the 
dam bypass and passage plan. Only the rehabilitation of salmon habitat was 
concentrated in promising sub-basin areas. Initially, the council refused to 
engage in sub-basin planning. By the close of the 1980s, however, the coun-
cil realized that the sub-basins of the Columbia Basin were diverse, with 
different habitats, different salmon species, different economies, and differ-
ent threats and challenges to salmon recovery (Blumm and Simrin 1991, 
688). It instituted a sub-basin planning process that it recently completed. 
Using community participation processes, sub-basin plans were developed 
that conformed to the council’s basin-wide framework but addressed the 
unique problems and community goals of each area. The plans will continue 
to guide the council’s funding decisions as it seeks to recover, enhance, and 
protect salmon habitat.
Prospects remain rather discouraging. In 2002, Oregon State University 
and the Environmental Protection Agency formed Salmon 2100. The coali-
tion drew together thirty-three fisheries scientists and policy analysts to 
determine the likely future of wild salmon in 2100. The consensus was that 
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under current policies only remnant populations of salmon would be pres-
ent throughout the Pacific Northwest and California.
conclusIon
The shape and form of fish and wildlife recovery efforts in the Columbia 
River Basin have changed dramatically over the last three decades. In the 
1970s, the federal water and power agencies were required to consult with 
fish and wildlife agencies only on a project-by-project basis. In the 1980s, 
a new basin-wide organization, the Northwest Power Planning Council, 
developed and administered a basin-wide fish and wildlife recovery plan. 
The 1990s saw three basin-wide plans: one by the council, one by NMFS 
in response to the listing of salmon as endangered, and one by a coalition 
of tribes frustrated with the other two organizations’ plans. By the end of 
the 1990s, the council was actively overseeing the development of sub-basin 
plans as a primary mechanism for implementing its basin-wide plan.
Comprehensive, integrated watershed management remains elusive in 
the Columbia River Basin for a variety of reasons, including bounded ratio-
nality and transaction costs. The many choices among incommensurate 
alternatives, diverse agencies with missions that conflict with the overall goal 
of recovering fish and wildlife, and the complexity of the watershed all work 
against comprehensive management. Bounded rationality and transaction 
costs, however, are not the only reasons why multiple, overlapping govern-
ments and organizations are likely to emerge in a watershed. They are also 
likely to emerge because of the different values and uses people pursue in a 
watershed, as we will discuss in the next chapter.
notes
1. As Derthick (1974, 4) colorfully summarizes the politics of river basin man-
agement, “Regional organizations are excrescences on the constitutional system, 
unusual things that must be superimposed on the universe of functionally spe-
cialized federal and state agencies. The odds are against their being formed and, if 
formed, against their flourishing.”
2. See Markman and Medin (2002) for an excellent survey of the psychology 
and social psychology literature on decision making. See Kopelman et al. (2002) 
for an excellent survey of the psychology literature that applies decision making to 
environmental settings.
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3. For instance, it has become increasingly common for elected officials or key 
constituencies to complain that government employees are not using the best avail-
able science in carrying out their duties. For elected officials who desire less regula-
tion, there is often the assumption that government employees are pursuing extreme 
environmental values that scientific evidence simply fails to support. For elected 
officials who desire more regulation, there is the assumption that government 
employees are purposely failing to act as they await more certain scientific results.
4. North and Weingast (1989) used this concept to explore the relations between 
the Stuart kings and the British parliament during the seventeenth century. Kings 
increasingly turned to manipulating and seizing private property to acquire suf-
ficient resources to fight wars. In response, parliament refused to provide kings with 
a regular source of revenue. Both sides would have been better off if kings had com-
mitted to protect private property and parliament had made a reliable stream of 
revenue available to the king. However, a simple promise by the king to stop seizing 
private property hardly would have constituted a credible commitment, since he 
easily could, and had, gone back on his word. Only after several decades of conflict 
did the king and parliament devise institutional arrangements, such as a judiciary 
and a parliament independent of the crown, that acted as checks against the crown, 
making such a commitment on the part of the king credible. See David Weimer 
(1997) for numerous case studies that apply to the concept of credible commitment 
to explain the economic reforms occurring in Russia, the Czech and Slovak repub-
lics, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. Also see Gary Miller (1992) as he explores 
the problems managers experience in making credible commitments to share the 
gains realized from efficiency-enhancing activities adopted by employees.
5. Williamson (1985) calls such mechanisms “hostages.”
6. On the other hand, the security of senior water rights, which in western states 
are held mostly by agricultural users, is what makes those rights especially valuable, 
and those rights tend to command high prices in locations where transfers of water 
rights are feasible.
7. For instance, regulatory agencies make choices among incommensurate 
alternatives in devising and adopting rules. An ozone standard set by the EPA affects 
not only businesses and industries but also citizens who have chronic and severe 
respiratory ailments. Regulatory agencies are regularly criticized for the incommen-
surate choices each makes, and for the differences in choices across agencies. Some 
agencies impose quite strict rules that limit human exposures to risk; others adopt 
less strict rules, exposing people to greater risks, but there is little consistency among 
agencies. Not all choices among incommensurate alternatives involve human life-
and-death matters, but they are difficult to make nevertheless.
8. As Jones (2001, 47) notes, “Of all the limitations cited in people’s ability to 
put rational choice theory into practice, the most important is probably the difficul-
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ties people have in handling incommensurate attributes.”
9. For instance, if decision makers wanted to establish a surface water quality 
standard, they would first identify the different attributes of each standard they were 
considering, such as the effects on different types of aquatic plants and animals, the 
functioning of wetlands, the different uses of water and wetlands made by humans, 
groundwater quality, economic development, and so forth. They would then place a 
weight on each of the attributes—they may give functioning wetlands greater weight 
than groundwater quality, for instance. Once they have assigned weights to each of 
the attributes, they would then develop a score for each water quality standard and 
they would select the one with the best score.
10. The Water Resources Council attempted to develop a multi-objective plan-
ning process to be used by each of the river basin commissions that would allow the 
commissions to prioritize different projects and programs with the goal of optimal 
use of the watershed (Holmes 1979).
11. Both approaches for limiting agency costs come at the expense of other 
types of transaction costs. For instance, providing specific instructions increases 
decision-making costs. Decision makers must expend additional time and resources 
attempting to anticipate the variety of circumstances implementers are likely to 
encounter and then devise appropriate decision rules. Such actions may ultimately 
work against the larger goals of decision makers. Weighing down implementers with 
a multitude of rules and time lines may promote policy failure and not policy suc-
cess (Moe 1990).
12. Wandschneider (1984) provides a detailed description of the various insti-
tutional arrangements governing the numerous natural resources of the Columbia 
River Basin.
13. The BPA attempted to convince the council to adopt a smaller water budget 
and to adopt alternatives to a water budget (Blumm 1984).
14. As Blumm (1986, 495) noted, “the program’s clear elevation of Water 
Budget flows over reservoir refill and secondary power sale considerations has been 
frequently ignored or evaded by the federal operating agencies.”
15. The BPA also refused to fund projects that it anticipated Congress would 
appropriate funding for (Blumm 1984, 347).

As we have mentioned in previous chapters, the popularity of watershed 
management has grown as other values and goals have emerged alongside 
more traditional ones, such as water supply development and flood control. 
In this chapter, we draw together those goals and values for a closer look 
and focus on some organizational issues associated with the effort to pursue 
multiple goals and values simultaneously.
Managing a watershed conveys an incorporation of several considerations, 
including those shown in Box 5.1 and described below. The relative significance 
of each will vary according to location characteristics and residents’ values.
Multiple Goals, Communities, and Organizations
A WAtershed POlitiCAl eCOnOMy
5
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Water supply reliability involves 
reducing risks of interruption or loss 
of supplies currently relied upon for 
human activities and other uses in 
the watershed. Distinguishable from 
the earlier water management goal 
of supply development (bringing 
more water to a location to provide 
for growing consumptive demands), 
the emphasis of water supply reli-
ability is securing a supply and dis-
tribution infrastructure that is likely to be able to sustain current or foresee-
able demand levels with reduced risk of significant economic losses and/or 
health risks associated with supply interruptions. In addition to traditional 
practices, such as storing water to guard against seasonal shortages, this goal 
encompasses activities such as guarding against the failure of facilities like 
treatment plants and distribution pipelines, acquiring option contracts for 
supplemental supplies to use in the event of emergencies, cooperative agree-
ments with neighboring jurisdictions for emergency water transfers, and so 
forth.
Drought protection is distinct enough to treat as a separate goal, although 
it is obviously related to the goal of water supply reliability. Depending on 
the climatologic and hydrologic characteristics of a particular location, 
drought protection may include measures such as construction and main-
tenance of larger-scale water storage facilities, long-term underground stor-
age of recoverable water, a plan for informing water users about escalating 
drought conditions, and a plan for reducing usage based on some assigned 
priorities among categories of use.
Flood hazard reduction and flood response are distinguishable compo-
nents of flood protection. Flood hazard reduction is not exactly the same 
as flood prevention, which traditionally connotes the construction and 
maintenance of barriers such as dams and levees. Flood hazard reduction 
may include such structures, of course, but also land-use policies that locate 
interruptible land uses (parks and outdoor recreation facilities, for example) 
in floodplains for the purpose of accommodating some seasonal flooding. 
As the name implies, flood hazard reduction focuses primarily on minimiz-
ing the risks of significant losses of life and property from flooding rather 
Box 5.1. Watershed Management Goals
Water supply reliability
Drought protection
Flood hazard reduction and flood response





Habitat protection and species recovery
River restoration
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than on trying to prevent any flooding from occurring within a watershed. 
In a similar vein, flood response conveys something distinguishable from the 
older flood control, with an emphasis on emergency preparedness, rescue 
and recovery, temporary relocation of people or property, and restoration.1
Water conservation and reuse are terms with multiple meanings and 
applications. They relate to the broader notion of squeezing the greatest 
amount of beneficial use out of a given water supply. Rather than taking 
existing uses and disposal of water as given, the goal of water conservation 
and reuse is to examine current practices of use and disposal and pursue 
opportunities for reducing or redirecting them. The activities falling under 
this heading include pricing practices intended to curb lower-valued uses, 
recirculating water for cooling or landscape irrigation, and even advanced 
wastewater treatment to supplement supplies for potable use. Although it 
may also seem to be an aspect of traditional water management, water con-
servation and reuse in the contemporary watershed context are often related 
to the search for ways to accommodate emerging demands for limited water 
supplies.
Sustainable economies are among the purposes to which the above goals 
are linked. Traditional water development programs sometimes bore slo-
gans such as “water for people,” and watershed management concepts of 
sustainability are still directed largely at the communities and residents 
within the watershed. Preserving ranchlands or timber operations in loca-
tions pressured by urbanization, keeping small towns and businesses viable, 
and promoting economic prosperity while forestalling certain kinds of eco-
nomic transformation all have been touted as potential accomplishments 
of integrated watershed management and as incentives for stakeholders to 
participate.
Water quality protection in the watershed management context has sev-
eral applications, which include pollution prevention, runoff reduction and 
treatment, remediation of contamination, and salinity management. The 
goal has expanded from ensuring adequate treatment of drinking water 
supplies to protection of the source waters themselves by reducing threats 
to water quality.
Water-based recreation has been enjoyed by people for all recorded his-
tory, but its relative importance as a value for water resource management 
has risen lately. These non-consumptive uses of water are not only valued 
individually by the participants but can be important components of local 
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economies and community identities. Fishing, rafting, boating, and skiing 
have claimed places at the watershed management table alongside irrigation 
and municipal and industrial uses.
Instream flows are important for other reasons in addition to water-
based recreation. Support of aquatic species and the aesthetic values of flow-
ing water for communities in a watershed make instream flow protection 
an independent goal of watershed management in the contemporary scene. 
Also, although not often highlighted in the watershed management litera-
ture, navigation depends on instream flow protection.
Habitat protection and species recovery are of course related to instream 
flows but not identical. These goals include protection of riparian and 
off-channel habitat (for example, keeping wetlands and vernal pools from 
being eliminated by surface water diversions or groundwater withdrawals). 
Furthermore, just maintaining a certain level of instream flow—to support 
recreation, for example—may not suffice for recovery of a valued aquatic 
or riparian species that has become threatened or endangered. Thus, habi-
tat protection and species recovery constitute a distinct goal of watershed 
management not subsumed by instream flow protection or water-based 
recreation.
River restoration may also seem to be covered by other goals already 
identified, yet it has its own dimensions. River restoration efforts are not 
only in the service of instream flow preservation, species recovery, or rec-
reation; they may entail the removal of concrete channels, dams and weirs, 
abandoned bridge pilings, and the like purely for purposes of restoring the 
natural appearance and ecological health of a river itself. In many communi-
ties in the United States in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
river restoration has an economic development component: recapturing (or, 
in some locations, discovering) the value of a riverfront or a lakefront as a 
community attraction.
Two other points are important in regard to this overall topic of multi-
ple goals. First and perhaps more obviously, the multiple goals of watershed 
management may conflict in certain respects and under some conditions. 
Diverting surface water flows into storage facilities, for instance, may serve 
the goal of drought protection but not the goal of water-based recreation or 
the maintenance of instream flows. Flood hazard reduction means main-
taining unused storage capacity in reservoirs and emptying them when they 
are full, whereas drought protection indicates maintaining maximum water 
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in storage, and instream flow protection suggests steady releases of stored 
water. Goal conflict is not fatal or even tragic, since reasonable trade-offs are 
usually feasible, but it is important to be mindful of the fact that the mul-
tiple goals of watershed management are not inherently complementary.
The other important point is that although all of the goals listed above 
are relevant to the scale of a watershed, the goals themselves can be pertinent 
to, or most effectively achieved at, alternative scales within the watershed or 
across watersheds. Recreational opportunities and demands may be focused 
within a particular portion of the watershed. Depending on the physical and 
social circumstances, organizing flood hazard reduction or drought protec-
tion measures or supporting sustainable economies might be more effec-
tive across multiple related and/or neighboring watersheds. The fact that the 
various goals of watershed management are all present or relevant within a 
particular watershed does not mean that they are necessarily best pursued or 
organized at the watershed scale.
Although these may appear to be obvious or commonplace observa-
tions, the fact that watershed management involves the simultaneous pur-
suit of multiple (but not necessarily complementary) goals at multiple scales 
is a statement worth contemplating. Its implications for the design, perfor-
mance, and modification of institutions for governing and managing the 
watershed are so extensive they would be difficult to overstate. One of those 
implications is that people trying to achieve a variety of goals within a water-
shed could quite rationally opt to organize several overlapping institutional 
arrangements. Thus, in addition to the transaction cost considerations dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter, people create multiple organizations within 
a watershed because of the multiplicity of relevant goals and scales.
Beyond raising the prospect of multi-organizational, polycentric insti-
tutions within a watershed as a theoretical possibility, we can and should 
explore why and how such arrangements might emerge and how they might 
function. Equally if not more useful is to present and discuss empirical 
examples of such settings and how they work. In this chapter, we do both 
as we explore how multi-organizational arrangements can work and pres-
ent an example of a watershed governed and managed through a polycen-
tric structure that has been modified on several occasions to adapt to the 
emergence of new goals and previously unrecognized problems, as well as to 
take advantage of functional specialization and diversity of scale among the 
various organizations. The example in this chapter—the San Gabriel River 
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watershed, located in Southern California—is a substate watershed where 
coordination is at the scale of municipalities and special districts. In Chapter 
6, we will use an interstate example to illustrate polycentric arrangements at 
a larger regional scale.
An inteGrAted OrGAnizAtiOn Or MultiPle OrGAnizAtiOns?
In light of the introductory discussion, perhaps the question that begs hard-
est to be asked is why not just establish a watershed-scale governing body to 
prioritize, balance, and pursue these multiple goals? With so many interre-
lated goals, and with pursuit of one often conflicting with the achievement 
of others, it is understandable that some watershed management proponents 
are inclined to advocate an organizational umbrella under which all stake-
holders gather to discuss and plan and implement an integrated strategy.
A related question, raised also in Chapter 1, is why have water users and 
communities within watersheds rarely created such governing bodies? What 
explanation can be given of the motivations and choices of individuals in 
crafting instead the complicated and multi-layered arrangements found in 
most (if not all) American watersheds? In Chapter 4, we provided an initial 
answer to both questions. Boundedly rational people, crafting governing 
arrangements in light of transaction costs, devise a variety of arrangements 
as a means of limiting cognitive demands and easing transaction costs.
Building on that initial answer, this chapter adds that the varied arrange-
ments crafted by boundedly rational people reflect also the diverse character 
of problems and the different and sometimes conflicting values that people 
attempt to realize in the context of a watershed. People indeed seek to real-
ize a variety of values and goals in a watershed, but they line up differently 
in relation to those values and goals. Some people want less of x and more 
of y. They line up differently also because of when and where they reside in 
the watershed, the types of livelihoods they are pursuing, and other factors. 
As Lebel, Garden, and Imamura (2005) have wisely pointed out, in addition 
to the politics of scale (e.g., watershed vs. river basin vs. other area), there 
are the politics of position (related to the specific location within a given 
area) and the politics of place (related to the stakeholder’s identity, status, 
and resources). Handling such diversity is difficult within a single governing 
structure. People often choose instead to create a variety of different types of 
governments and organizations.
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One way of making sense of the complicated and multi-layered arrange-
ments found in most American watersheds is to use the theory of public 
economies, which was developed over the past fifty years to explain complex 
polycentric systems, such as the governance of metropolitan areas in the 
absence of a metropolitan government (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; 
Bish and Ostrom 1973; U.S. ACIR 1987; Oakerson 1999). The application 
is particularly apt, since so many contemporary debates about how best to 
govern watersheds echo earlier debates among scholars and practitioners 
of metropolitan government (see King 2004 for a recent review). The most 
important components of such an explanation are the provision-production 
distinction, specialization, economies and diseconomies of scale, and coor-
dination versus hierarchy.
In all social settings—from households to watersheds—decisions about 
provision of desired resources, goods, and services may be made without 
actually engaging in the production of those desired resources, goods, and 
services. Members of a household decide how (and how much) they will 
obtain of the necessities and conveniences of life—housing, food, school-
ing, entertainment—but they do not necessarily produce their own hous-
ing, their own food, their own schooling, or all of their own entertainment. 
Similarly, a community of individuals may organize a town, a water district, 
or a Web page and decide what services they want to receive, what forms and 
amounts of revenue they will contribute, what content they want to dissemi-
nate, and so forth. These are provision decisions. They do not imply that 
the individuals in the community will actually police the streets, construct 
wells or pipes, or make the Web page; they may choose to procure any or all 
of those services from other individuals or organizations that produce them 
(Oakerson 1999).
In a watershed, the provision-production distinction can help to 
explain some of the number and variety of organizations that exist when 
water users create those organizations themselves. As in the watersheds 
described in this book, there may be a few large organizations that produce 
water from large-scale projects but a larger number of smaller organizations 
that decide how much they want to receive and pay for relative to other 
water sources to which they may have access. A group of pumpers sharing 
the same groundwater basin may decide to establish a replenishment pro-
gram, but they may choose to contract with an agency that operates flood 
control facilities to operate those facilities for water conservation rather 
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than construct and operate their own. Many of the organizations found in a 
watershed are providers representing or organizing smaller communities of 
individuals and then entering into contractual or other arrangements with 
producers of water supplies, flood control, contamination remediation, and 
so forth. Classifying the organizations within a watershed into provider and 
producer categories can help to begin sorting out the arrangements among 
them, making a different kind of sense out of what may appear at first blush 
to be mere fragmentation.
Following this logic, provision decisions may be appropriately orga-
nized on a smaller scale than production decisions. Sub-watershed organi-
zations, for instance, often are organizations of water users with something 
in common (e.g., the same basin or the same part of the watershed, the 
kinds of characteristics Lebel, Garden, and Imamura [2005] call “position” 
or “place”). In these watersheds, inter-organizational and intergovernmental 
relationships often involve smaller service provision organizations contract-
ing or otherwise arranging with larger service production organizations for 
the performance of desired functions. In the smaller provider organizations, 
water users or their representatives consider information about water sup-
ply conditions and decide, for example, how much project water to provide 
themselves with, how much to divert from a stream or pump from under-
ground, how much water to purchase for replenishment or augmentation, 
how much to pay, and how to raise the money. In some cases, there are mul-
tiple producers, and the provider organizations act as buyers’ cooperatives 
on behalf of water users, securing the combination of water supplies that 
nets the best deal for them.
In this light, the distinction between provision and production brings 
into view the concept of functional specialization. There may be, and often 
are, advantages in organizing activities by taking advantage of specialization. 
Operating physical facilities such as dams is a task that could be undertaken 
by the same agency that also contracts for water supplies, monitors water 
quality, and sets groundwater production targets for every basin within a 
watershed, but it certainly does not have to be. There may even be good 
reasons for having a separate organization perform that task—or, for that 
matter, a separate organization performing each of the tasks in that short 
list. Water users in the watersheds we have observed appear to have made 
deliberate choices in both directions—sometimes adding a new function 
to the portfolio of an existing organization (e.g., having the county flood 
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control district operate the seawater barrier in the San Gabriel watershed 
described below) and other times creating a new organization (e.g., a joint-
powers agency to organize and finance contamination remediation efforts 
in the main San Gabriel Basin or a conservancy to address riparian ecosys-
tem restoration).
The choice about whether to add another organization or increase the 
responsibilities of an existing one will depend upon matters such as the 
skills required for the function, the resources available within existing orga-
nizations, the costs of coordination if a new organization is created, and 
the political issues of governance and control. There is not a single answer 
that fits all situations. Rather, it is to be expected that water users will create 
some single-function entities and other multiple-function ones based on 
considerations such as these. Their choices do not necessarily reflect hapless 
fragmentation or rampant duplication; indeed, when organizations truly 
specialize, they are not duplicates (Parks and Oakerson 1989). As Ingram 
and colleagues noted: “There are a variety of institutional structures through 
which decisions about water resources allocation and use occur. These struc-
tures are likely to have different policy orientations. They are also likely to 
vary in their accessibility and responsiveness to particular interests, their 
capacity to generate the appropriate flow of information, and their prefer-
ence for certain problem solutions” (Ingram et al. 1984, 328).
Another concept that follows closely with those of specialization and the 
distinction between provision and production is that of scale. Some activi-
ties are less costly and more efficient if organized on a large scale. Others 
exhibit diseconomies of scale, becoming inefficient or cumbersome when 
too many people or too diverse a set of interests is involved.
We will illustrate using the Southern California region, the location of 
this chapter’s case study. It might well represent wasteful duplication if each 
municipality in a watershed such as those in Southern California had built 
its own aqueduct to the Colorado River or to Northern California, because 
such a facility exhibits significant economies of scale. Instead, municipali-
ties in Southern California chose either to join the regional Metropolitan 
Water District or to contract with the state for access to its State Water 
Project. These arrangements allowed local communities to take advantage 
of scale economies without merely subsuming their interests into a regional 
governance organization. Each of those smaller local districts retains the 
ability to determine how much imported water to purchase in a given year 
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(if any) and how to pay for it, without having to build and operate enor-
mous facilities. By the same token, the large producer organizations, such 
as the California Department of Water Resources and the Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California, do not have to try to determine for 
each local community the desired mix of imported and local water sup-
plies. This is one example of provider-producer arrangements in a pub-
lic economy where the presence of multiple organizations at diverse scales 
holds the prospect of enhancing efficiency and responsiveness rather than 
diminishing them.
inter-OrGAnizAtiOnAl COOrdinAtiOn
It is reasonable to ask, of course, whether all these organizations—provider 
organizations and producer organizations, specialized by function and 
created with some effort to capture scale economies and avoid disecono-
mies—create immense coordination costs. Do they overwhelm whatever 
advantages of scale and specialization may be gained? Why not just organize 
a single authority encompassing all these activities? These questions have 
motivated nearly a century of debate in public administration, public policy, 
and political science.
Inter-organizational coordination is costly, of course, but the alterna-
tives are not costless either. Organizational integration has its own costs of 
internal coordination and communication, information distortion, control 
losses, and the like, described in the political economy literature on bureau-
cratic pathologies. Bureaucratic abilities to effectively and comprehensively 
engage in and coordinate a multitude of activities has suffered sustained 
criticism from public administration theorists and political scientists for 
more than five decades (e.g., Simon 1955; Knott and Miller 1987; Chisholm 
1989; V. Ostrom 1989; Miller 1992).
Integration costs may be quite substantial even on the scale of a water-
shed, as suggested by Behrman (1993, 11–12):
There was a study made some years ago . . . of the Columbia River basin, 
which is if anything even more complicated than the South Platte basin. 
The study looked for any empirical evidence (and there again, the control 
is very fractured) that a unified control system would produce superior 
results compared to the existing system, which is very similar to the South 
Platte. The conclusion was that there was no evidence that it would be 
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superior. The unified system, by bringing in bureaucratic control, creates 
unanticipated results that are not all that favorable.
Furthermore, Milon, Kiker, and Lee (1998) pointed out that the comprehen-
sive watershed-scale approach to Everglades restoration produced an unin-
tended bias toward engineering analyses and the construction of physical 
structures to alleviate problems rather than addressing institutional alterna-
tives based on social science analyses.
Undoubtedly, Woolley and McGinnis (1999, 579) were correct in observ-
ing, “Watershed policymaking is particularly difficult when the decision 
making context includes a large number of relatively autonomous govern-
mental and nongovernmental participants with dissimilar values.” What 
remains unclear is how much easier watershed policy making would be if a 
large number of participants with dissimilar values were operating within 
a single organization or jurisdiction. On balance, whether organizational 
integration or inter-organizational coordination is more costly is an empiri-
cal question, and the answer will vary from one situation to another.
In an earlier study of conjunctive water management in Arizona, 
California, and Colorado (Blomquist, Schlager, and Heikkila 2004), we 
uncovered no instances of comprehensive organizations with extensive 
authority to manage and engage in a wide variety of activities on a watershed 
or river basin scale. To the contrary, time after time and place after place, 
water users apparently chose not to center all water-related activities in a 
single agency. In Arizona, which is the most nearly centralized of the three 
states, specific limitations were placed on the authority that the Arizona 
Department of Water Resources (ADWR) could exercise when it was first 
created in 1980. ADWR was granted authority only to manage and limit 
demand for groundwater, not to engage in groundwater supply development 
or in surface water management. In Colorado, water users have repeatedly 
declined to extend the authority of the state engineer and division engineers. 
Water users vigorously and successfully opposed a proposal to grant division 
engineers the authority to act as water referees within water courts, insisting 
instead on referees who were independent of the state and division engi-
neers and employees of the courts. And after water users brought repeated 
litigation over the state engineer’s actions in integrating well pumpers into 
the state’s water rights system, the state legislature, state engineers, and 
water user organizations worked out a decision-making process that vets 
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proposed rules through the water courts before they take effect—again opt-
ing for polycentricity over integration in the design of institutions for policy 
making in the state’s watersheds.
COMMunities Of interest And COMMunities Of identity
Of course, there are more considerations than economic efficiency at stake in 
the watershed. The creation and preservation of institutional arrangements 
constructed around interests in a watershed is not just an effort to construct 
a local public economy and reap efficiency advantages. It also reflects real 
distinctions among groups within a watershed.
A watershed may be a single, interrelated physical system, but it places 
people in distinctly different positions. Some will be downstream, others 
up. Some may overlie a capacious and easily replenished groundwater basin, 
others will not. Some may reside adjacent to wetlands or riparian habitat 
that others wish to see preserved. Some may be at risk from contamination 
whereas others enjoy relatively pristine water. Such differently positioned 
groups may well wish to work toward watershed-scale management actions 
but through organizations that reflect their sub-watershed distinctions.
As we have observed in a number of places, within the physical system 
of the watershed is a complex social one. Overlaid upon the differences in 
people’s physical situations within a watershed are the myriad other dis-
tinctions that come from the broader social, economic, and cultural set-
tings within which the watershed is found. Topography is not destiny, as 
Woolley and McGinnis noted: “As one moves from the science of geography 
and biology to culture, definitions become increasingly subjective. A cul-
tural ‘map’ of a watershed includes political, economic, and social conven-
tions. Participants in watershed policymaking may well think of themselves 
in terms of political affiliations rather than biogeographical identification 
with an entire watershed” (1999, 579–580). Distinctions of wealth, ethnic-
ity, religion, occupation, social status, and the like will also exist among and 
between watershed residents and the groups or communities with which 
they identify (Lebel, Garden, and Imamura 2005).
Thus, in addition to the opportunities to take advantage of scale effi-
ciencies, institutional arrangements can be designed to enhance responsive-
ness and equity. There is certainly no guarantee that polycentric organiza-
tions will be more responsive or fairer than centralized ones, but neither is 
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the opposite necessarily true (Rockloff and Moore 2006). As with efficiency 
questions, the responsiveness and equity of a polycentric system versus a 
unitary one are empirical questions and the answers can differ from one 
circumstance to another. Where a particular problem affects one portion 
of a watershed more than others, organizational diversity can allow for a 
more equitable matching of costs to benefits than can a central organiza-
tion. Where multiple communities of interest or identity exist, organiza-
tional diversity can allow for more effective representation of communities 
than can combining them into a single constituency or expecting a single set 
of decision makers to take all interests into account. As always in political 
situations, the questions of who gets to decide and how are as important as, 
and often more important than, the question of what shall be done.
When water users create water resources management institutions, they 
tend to organize at least some of those entities around communities of inter-
est and communities of identity. Their communities may be defined by their 
physical position in the watershed, by their identity in the larger social sys-
tem, or (most likely) a mixture of both. People draw multiple boundaries 
that reflect their differing positions and their differing communities. Merely 
to observe or repeat that a watershed is a single community hydrologically 
or ecologically will not overcome this social reality.
Furthermore, polycentric arrangements allow decision-making pro-
cesses to vary within and among different organizational arrangements. 
Consensus building, super-majority voting rules, simple majority voting 
rules, and judicial decisions are combined and nested, allowing multiple 
opportunities for conflict articulation, conflict resolution, and the taking 
of decisions. Nested decision-making entities are a characteristic of federal 
political systems, which are the focus of the next chapter. First let us con-
sider the topics of diverse interests, functions, and values in the watershed 
through a case study from Southern California.
MultiPle GOAls, MultiPle COMMunities, And MultiPle  
OrGAnizAtiOns: the sAn GAbriel river WAtershed
The San Gabriel River watershed is a complex physical system situated in 
one of the largest metropolitan accumulations of people and commerce in 
the world. The watershed includes most of coastal Los Angeles County, from 
the San Gabriel Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. It contains two rivers—the 
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San Gabriel and the Rio Hondo—several creeks and washes, and four major 
groundwater basins. The lower area of the watershed is adjacent to the lower 
area of the Santa Ana River watershed described in Chapter 1.
Toward the midpoint of the San Gabriel River’s course from the moun-
tains to the sea, the Whittier Narrows divide the watershed’s upper area from 
its lower area. The upper area includes the Main San Gabriel and Raymond 
groundwater basins. The lower area contains the Central and West ground-
water basins. These are coastal basins, in hydrologic contact with the Pacific 
Ocean, and vulnerable to saltwater intrusion.
Three of the groundwater basins in the San Gabriel River watershed 
form an interconnected chain. Most of the Central Basin and all of the West 
Basin are confined by a surface layer of relatively impermeable clay-like soils, 
so only the northeastern portion of the Central Basin is susceptible to direct 
replenishment from the land surface. All of the natural freshwater replen-
ishment to West Basin comes from subsurface inflow from Central Basin, 
and most of the natural freshwater supply to Central Basin comes through 
Whittier Narrows from the Main San Gabriel Basin.
Virtually the entire area is urbanized; all or parts of 100 municipalities 
are found within the watershed. Urbanization brought the paving over of 
soils through which rainfall used to percolate into the underground water 
supply, the collection and export to the ocean of storm and wastewater that 
used to return underground, and the lining of miles of surface water chan-
nels for flood control purposes.
Several water resources management problems have arisen in the San 
Gabriel River watershed, owing to the combined effects of the region’s 
limited water supplies, its extensive agricultural and then urban develop-
ment, and the hydrogeology of the watershed itself. Each of these problems 
has been multi-jurisdictional in scope. Water users responded to each by 
developing new institutional arrangements. Those arrangements are fitted 
together through a system of inter-organizational and intergovernmental 
relationships.
securing supplemental Water supplies to support urban development
As the Los Angeles area began to urbanize at the beginning of this cen-
tury, municipal water departments (some of which contracted with private 
water companies) became the principal water suppliers for urban resi-
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The San Gabriel River Basin.
dences and businesses. Local surface water supplies were scarce, unreliable, 
and already committed to agricultural uses. Several municipalities turned 
to groundwater production for a more reliable local supply. A subset also 
pursued more ambitious schemes of importing water from near or distant 
sources.2
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In the 1920s, a group of thirteen cities decided to form a partnership 
to pursue water importation from the Colorado River and organized the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD). Nearly half 
of the original member cities were within the San Gabriel River watershed, 
including Los Angeles, Pasadena, Compton, Long Beach, San Marino, and 
Torrance.
After MWD’s aqueduct from the Colorado River was completed and 
began deliveries in the 1940s, MWD was interested in expanding its ser-
vice areas, and other communities were interested in joining MWD. The 
original member cities thought that allowing other communities to join 
one at a time would be administratively and financially tedious, and might 
ultimately expand the size of MWD’s board of directors to more than 100 
members. Therefore, MWD adopted a policy of requiring the formation 
of water districts covering multiple communities prior to annexation and 
membership in MWD.
This policy, and the desire of the remaining communities within the 
San Gabriel River watershed to annex to MWD for reasons described later, 
led to the formation of five municipal water districts within the water-
shed over the period 1948 through 1960. The West Basin Municipal Water 
District brought a dozen coastal communities mostly overlying that ground-
water basin into MWD. The Central Basin Municipal Water District encom-
passed another thirty-seven municipalities on the coastal plain. The Foothill 
Municipal Water District gathered four of Pasadena’s immediate neighbors 
in the upper area. The Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District 
(USGVMWD) covered twenty-two communities overlying most of the 
Main San Gabriel Basin. The Pomona Valley Municipal Water District (now 
renamed the Three Valleys Municipal Water District) straddled the hilly 
divide from the eastern edge of the San Gabriel watershed to the western 
portion of the Santa Ana River watershed, taking in some communities on 
the boundaries of each.
A few municipalities in the upper area of the watershed had chosen 
not to join any of these districts and come into MWD’s service area. By 
the 1950s, the State of California was planning the State Water Project to 
bring Northern California water to the central and southern regions of the 
state. The state was establishing its own contracts for Northern California 
water, including one with MWD that brought all of MWD’s member cities 
and districts potentially within reach of State Project water. But the option 
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also existed to contract directly with the state without joining MWD, and 
a handful of municipalities in the upper area of the watershed chose to do 
so. Those four cities (Alhambra, Azusa, Monterey Park, and Sierra Madre) 
formed the watershed’s sixth municipal water district—the San Gabriel 
Valley Municipal Water District—which has its own contract and facilities 
for delivery of State Project water.
Managing Groundwater use
By the time imported supplies from the Colorado River and Northern 
California reached the San Gabriel River watershed in the late 1940s and 
early 1970s, respectively, the watershed had become home to millions of 
residents and an immense industrial economy. During that period of devel-
opment, the public and private water suppliers had intensified their ground-
water production, significantly exceeding the rate of natural replenishment 
and creating overdraft conditions in each of the watershed’s four major 
groundwater basins.
The arrival of imported water supplies relieved some of the pressure 
on the local groundwater supplies but also triggered a new debate. Since 
imported water was much more expensive than water pumped from under-
ground, the pressing questions became who should curtail groundwater 
production, in what amounts, and how would any such arrangement be 
reached and enforced. Every water producer had a significant incentive to 
keep using groundwater in preference to imported water, but for each to do 
so would bring the detriment of all.
In this atmosphere, new organizations emerged. Water production in 
each basin was dominated by a mix of public and private organizations—
municipalities, water districts, water companies, and industrial and other 
commercial entities that pumped their own water. Nongovernmental water-
user associations were formed in three of the four groundwater basins to 
bring these diverse organizations together for discussions of the condition 
of the water supply and of their common and conflicting interests therein. 
The West Basin Water Association was formed in the 1940s, the Central 
Basin Water Association in 1950, and the Upper San Gabriel Valley Water 
Association in 1955.3
From the 1930s through the 1970s, groundwater production rights were 
defined and limited in each of the groundwater basins through a series of 
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adjudications. The adjudications were adversarial, but once the issues had 
been brought to court, the devices of civil discovery were used to develop 
a shared information base from which the parties began negotiations. In 
each of the four basins, stipulated judgments were reached by the parties, 
presented to the court, and approved.
The adjudications occurred in a series rather than all at once because the 
circumstances of each basin were different. Overdraft problems had become 
acute first in the smaller Raymond Basin of the upper area and in the coastal 
West Basin, which was exposed to saltwater intrusion from the ocean once 
underground water levels fell below sea level. The Raymond Basin litigation 
began in the late 1930s and concluded in the mid-1940s. The West Basin 
litigation began in the late 1940s and ended in the early 1960s.
Since West Basin receives its entire freshwater inflow from Central Basin, 
West Basin could not be brought back into balance once overdraft in Central 
Basin began choking off the underground flow from there. West Basin water 
users encouraged the Central Basin Water Association and the Central Basin 
Municipal Water District to adjudicate and limit pumping in that basin, too, 
which was done during the 1960s.
Finally, overdraft in the Main San Gabriel Basin was perceived to be a 
threat not only to pumpers there but to the supply of water coming across 
the Whittier Narrows from the upper area to the lower area. After the down-
stream interests had sued the upstream interests to guarantee an average 
annual flow (described in the next section), upper area pumpers used the 
leadership of the Upper San Gabriel Valley Water Association and the Upper 
San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District to initiate and complete an adju-
dication and limitation of pumping rights in the Main San Gabriel Basin.
By the mid-1970s, groundwater use in each basin of the watershed was 
limited by a court judgment that was potentially enforceable by each pumper 
against all others. Pumpers were required by the terms of the judgment they 
had negotiated to report their groundwater production monthly so compli-
ance with the judgment could be monitored.
In each basin, the court appointed a “watermaster” to collect data on 
pumping and groundwater conditions and report annually to the court. In 
the first three basins to be adjudicated (Raymond, West, and Central), the 
court appointed the Southern District office of the California Department 
of Water Resources (DWR) as the watermaster, since DWR had produced 
several reports on water conditions in these basins already and had a base 
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of data with which future conditions could be compared. Using DWR as 
watermaster also avoided creating a new organization with its own staff for 
each basin.
By the time the Main San Gabriel Basin adjudication was completed in 
1973, however, new ideas had emerged about how to manage groundwater 
basins, resulting in a different watermaster arrangement there, as described 
later. And in 1984, watermaster duties in Raymond Basin were transferred by 
the court from DWR to the new Raymond Basin Management Board. DWR 
continues to serve as watermaster for the West and Central Basin judgments.
upstream-downstream division of the river
In addition to the groundwater supplies provided by the four basins, the 
San Gabriel River itself represented a significant local water supply source. 
Like the local groundwater, water carried by the river was less expensive to 
use than imported water. Continued growth in total water use in the upper 
area in the 1950s threatened to leave almost no San Gabriel River water 
crossing over to the lower area at Whittier Narrows, costing the lower area 
a valuable resource and leaving the downstream communities even more 
dependent on imported water.
Once the Upper San Gabriel Valley Water Association and the upper 
area municipal water districts had been formed, the Central Basin Municipal 
Water District and the cities of Compton and Long Beach, on behalf of 
lower area water users, took the major upper area water producers to court 
for a determination of the lower area’s right to the waters of the San Gabriel 
River. The litigation began in 1959 but quickly turned into a negotiation 
that achieved a common statement of “Principles of Settlement” by 1961 
and a stipulated judgment approved by the court in 1965.
The settlement guaranteed the lower area an annual average of 98,415 
acre-feet of usable water through Whittier Narrows. The court appointed 
a three-member San Gabriel River watermaster, composed of representa-
tives of the upper area and lower area chosen by the water users, to monitor 
compliance with the judgment. The data on river flow at the narrows are 
provided to the San Gabriel River watermaster by the Los Angeles County 
Department of Public Works, which operates a flood control facility there. 
Accordingly, the San Gabriel River watermaster needs and has no staff, pro-
viding purely a governance function.
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Groundwater Contamination remediation
Some of the greatest challenges in the San Gabriel River watershed have 
come from water quality problems. In 1972, amendments to the California 
Administrative Code required water suppliers serving domestic consumers 
to institute adequate water quality monitoring programs. The California 
Department of Health Services suggested that producers within common 
hydrologic units avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by forming pro-
grams to monitor water quality on a regional basis. In the upper area of 
the watershed, the Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District and 
the San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District proposed to undertake the 
Area-Wide Water Quality Monitoring Program. The first Area Water Quality 
Monitoring Report for the Main San Gabriel Basin, filed on September 1, 
1974, revealed excessive concentrations of nitrates in drinking water, espe-
cially in the easterly portion of the basin. Subsequently, the Main San Gabriel 
Basin watermaster assumed responsibility for the basin’s Area-Wide Water 
Quality Monitoring Program, which quickly became the largest item in the 
watermaster’s administrative fund budget as discoveries of water quality 
problems in the watershed’s upper area multiplied.
Another concern emerging in the 1970s was the siting of municipal 
waste landfills on lands overlying the upper area’s groundwater supplies. The 
Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster published conditions for conditional 
use permits for landfills, more stringent than those imposed by existing reg-
ulatory agencies, and began a program of inspection of all active landfills 
within the Main San Gabriel Basin. The watermaster’s inspections augment 
the inspection programs of the Regional Water Quality Control Board and 
the county Department of Health Services.
In 1979, water quality monitoring discovered relatively high concen-
trations of trichloroethylene (TCE), a volatile organic chemical, in a Valley 
County Water District well in the Main San Gabriel Basin. Several nearby 
wells were tested and found to have varying concentrations of TCE and 
other volatile organics, predominantly tetrachloroethylene (PCE) and car-
bon tetrachloride (CCl
4
), all suspected carcinogens. California Department 
of Health Services and Regional Water Quality Control Board preliminary 
investigations concluded that basin groundwater supplies were potentially 
in jeopardy (Stetson 1986, 13). A threat to the upper area’s groundwater 
supplies was also worrisome for the lower area’s Central and West Basins, 
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since groundwater migrates through the Whittier Narrows from the upper 
area to the lower.
In January 1980, the affected water producers met in the USGVMWD 
offices with representatives of the state and county health departments, 
the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and the county Flood Control 
District. State and county health officials announced that they had closed 
four wells because of high TCE concentrations and would begin an intensive 
well-testing program to determine the areal extent and size of TCE con-
centrations. The Flood Control District would provide groundwater con-
tour maps with which to plot the movement of TCE concentrations. The 
Regional Water Quality Control Board would attempt to identify the source 
or sources of the TCE and recommend steps to prevent further contami-
nation. Possible remedial measures were discussed, such as aeration, water 
blending, and replacement of groundwater use via direct connections to 
imported water supplies. The Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster held a 
special meeting a few days later, where the watermaster’s attorney reviewed 
the situation for the watermaster board and staff.
Monitoring programs continued, and wells with concentrations of TCE, 
PCE, CCl
4
, or other hazardous organic chemicals were closed, or water from 
them was treated or blended with clean water to reduce contaminant con-
centrations to below state action levels. By 1985, eighty-eight wells operated 
by thirty-three different producers in the Main San Gabriel Basin and rep-
resenting one-fourth of the basin’s total groundwater production had been 
found to have concentrations of these chemicals in excess of state action 
limits. The number of active producing wells in the basin dropped from an 
average of 333 at the time of the late 1970s judgment to 237 at the end of 
the 1980s.
Four large areas of groundwater contamination in the Main San Gabriel 
Basin became Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund sites 
in 1984, making cleanup activities eligible for funding under the federal 
Superfund program. EPA officials characterized the San Gabriel site as one 
of the worst in the western United States and estimated that full implementa-
tion of basin cleanup could take up to fifty years and cost up to $1 billion.
Discussions among the Main San Gabriel watermaster, the California 
Department of Health Services, and the EPA arrived at a planned approach 
to basin remediation. The remediation program would be directed by the 
Department of Health Services, financed with Superfund monies, and 
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assisted by the Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster as the water users’ rep-
resentative, with the Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District as 
the principal provider of staff support. A technical committee and a man-
agement committee were established to coordinate aspects of the remedia-
tion effort.
In the late 1980s, the EPA shifted its focus from the long-term cleanup 
effort within the Main San Gabriel Basin to short-term efforts to treat the 
worst areas and intercept contamination plumes before they passed through 
Whittier Narrows and hit Central Basin in the watershed’s lower area. Also, 
the EPA wanted to focus on identifying the polluters so they can be forced 
to pay the long-term cleanup operation’s costs, whereas state and local offi-
cials and valley residents wanted to press ahead with full basin cleanup. The 
political question arose regarding what entity should have principal respon-
sibility for the cleanup operation.
A report released by the Regional Water Quality Control Board in 
spring 1990 recommended that the cleanup program be supervised locally 
by the Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster. The MWD, local water pro-
ducers, the overlying municipal water districts, and the watermaster agreed 
with that recommendation. However, two prominent local public figures, 
U.S. representative Esteban Torres (D–La Puente) and California state 
senator Art Torres (D–Los Angeles) opposed expanding the watermaster’s 
powers and, along with the Sierra Club and a local group called the East 
Valleys Organization, have called for the creation of a new “super-agency” to 
organize and perform the cleanup. Senator Torres sponsored legislation in 
December 1990 to create such an agency, and his bill passed the California 
State Senate in April 1991.
In August 1990, the Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster returned 
to Superior Court, seeking an amendment of the judgment to expand its 
authority to oversee the cleanup and to control pumping patterns within 
the basin in order to arrest the migration of contamination plumes. The 
watermaster’s motion was supported by the MWD, the Regional Water 
Quality Control Board, and the three overlying municipal water districts. 
The motion was opposed by the Sierra Club, the East Valleys Organization, 
and the office of Los Angeles County district attorney Ira Reiner. Those 
opposing the motion alleged a conflict of interest of the water producers 
who are represented by the Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster, and the 
lack of public accountability of the watermaster. Maxine Leichter, speaking 
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for the Sierra Club’s Angeles Chapter, said, “The Watermaster cannot protect 
both the private interests of water companies and the public’s interests.” A 
brief by the county district attorney’s office emphasized that the cleanup 
operation vitally affects all valley residents and water consumers, but the 
watermaster is accountable for its actions only to the court and the roughly 
100 water producers in the basin. There is no provision for participation by 
the general public in watermaster selection or decision making.
A negotiated result produced a new element in the watershed’s gover-
nance system. In August 1990, the Main San Gabriel Basin watermaster, the 
Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District, the San Gabriel Valley 
Municipal Water District, and the Three Valleys Municipal Water District 
formed a joint-powers agency, the Main San Gabriel Basin Water Quality 
Authority, to develop financing for the cleanup operation. The Water Quality 
Authority represented neither an independent “super-agency” nor the mere 
addition of cleanup responsibilities to an existing body; it lies somewhere 
between those alternatives. Although its form may be somewhat difficult to 
classify in traditional public administration categories, the Water Quality 
Authority has provided an organizational means for pursuing state and fed-
eral funding of the cleanup operation and supervising its ongoing progress. 
Contaminated groundwater has been pumped and treated in several loca-
tions, the contaminant plumes have been intercepted, and the impact on 
the lower area of the watershed has been limited. In the meantime, EPA has 
pursued the polluters through a series of investigations and trials, securing 
monetary judgments against some of the largest ones.
river restoration
During the first half of the twentieth century, the lower reach of the 
San Gabriel River was converted into a concrete channel for flood control 
purposes. The same was done with other Southern California streams, most 
famously the neighboring Los Angeles River. It was not inevitable: in the 
late 1920s, a committee from the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce hired 
the famed design firms of the Olmsted Brothers and Harland Bartholomew 
and Associates to plan regional recreation areas in the rapidly urbanizing 
Los Angeles Basin. The 1930 plan produced by the designers envisioned the 
San Gabriel River as a ribbon of parkland running through the metropolis, 
with construction kept back at least 1,000 feet from the water and natural 
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banks providing a buffer for flood flows. A variety of concerns—the expense 
of implementing the plan, the difficulties of establishing a governmental 
body with the territory and authority to do so, the foregone construction 
opportunities, and whether flood protection for communities along the 
lower reaches of the river would be adequate, to name a few—led to another 
choice, lining the channel and confining the river.
Since by mid-century most of the natural flows into the San Gabriel 
River were captured and impounded by dams in the upper area and at 
Whittier Narrows, with controlled releases diverted and spread for ground-
water replenishment, the concrete-lined portions of the channel conveyed 
little or no natural flow except during significant flood events. Municipalities 
throughout the upper and lower areas of the San Gabriel watershed dis-
charge treated wastewater into the river channel, and these discharges have 
made up most of the flow in the channel since the mid-twentieth century.
In the 1970s, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works 
paved a bicycle trail along the banks of the San Gabriel River from Azusa 
(at the base of the mountains) to Long Beach. The primary purpose of the 
37-mile bike trail was to facilitate alternative transportation, but over the 
ensuing two decades it became increasingly popular for recreational riders. 
Municipalities along the river constructed access points at numerous inter-
sections and increased patrols and lighting in higher-crime areas along the 
trail, and the county public works department made further improvements 
to the trail itself. As many as fifteen small parks and recreation areas were 
established or restored along the trail, and the California Department of 
Fish and Game stocks catfish and trout at the Santa Fe Dam Recreation Area, 
the Whittier Narrows Recreation Area, and other sites.
As the river course gained popularity as a recreation site, public atten-
tion to the condition of the river increased. Community organizations began 
weekend river cleanups, removing trash and other debris from the channel 
and banks and covering graffiti on the concrete surfaces. Birds flourished 
along the cleaned-up sections of the river, drawing more attention and visi-
tors. A network among members of community organizations located along 
the river developed into a group called Friends of the San Gabriel River. 
In the 1990s, the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers Watershed Council 
formed to advocate restoration efforts for both rivers. By the end of the 
decade, the San Gabriel River Master Plan Committee, composed of repre-
sentatives from thirty-five conservation groups, municipalities, and govern-
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ment agencies, was meeting monthly to compose a blueprint for restoration 
and protection of the river ecosystem.
In 1999, the California legislature approved the creation of the San 
Gabriel and Lower Los Angeles Rivers and Mountains Conservancy, with 
$15 million in capital to acquire land and continue restoration efforts along 
the rivers. A single conservancy was created for both rivers for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that they are connected via the Rio Hondo 
Channel, itself a target for restoration efforts. In a political concession to 
the state’s funding of the conservancy, Sacramento was given the power to 
appoint most of the board members. On the other hand, the conservancy 
lacks eminent domain powers, so it must work closely with municipali-
ties along the length of each river to ensure agreement on parcels of land 
to acquire. In 2000, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works 
established a watershed management division to work with the watershed 
council and the conservancy on projects to improve and restore the rivers.
The conservancy is an example of an additional governmental body 
established to overlap numerous other jurisdictions, but with a limited 
mission and authority. The conservancy cannot displace the functions of 
other local governments, but it can perform functions they cannot achieve 
together or independently. It adds to the number of governmental bodies at 
work on water resources in the San Gabriel River watershed, but it is not an 
addition that necessarily comes at the expense of the authority of other bod-
ies. It increases coordination costs, but if the same authority to acquire land 
for river restoration projects had been distributed among existing jurisdic-
tions, it is doubtful the coordination costs would have been smaller. What a 
body such as the conservancy can do is specialize and focus on watershed-
wide restoration activities that would have been difficult for other existing 
bodies to accomplish. Whether its accomplishments in this regard warrant 
the expense and effort of establishing another water resource organization 
in the watershed remains to be seen, of course, but its creation in 1999 was 
consistent with the logic presented in this chapter and book.
COnClusiOn: POlyCentriCity And the Pursuit Of MultiPle 
vAlues in the POlitiCAl WAtershed
The San Gabriel River watershed exists as a physical phenomenon, and it 
can certainly be said that all resources and problems within the watershed 
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are interrelated to some degree. On the other hand, different portions of 
the watershed confront different problems and are home to distinguishable 
communities. Furthermore, watershed management within the San Gabriel 
River case clearly exemplifies the presence of a multiplicity of goals, some 
of which have been present since the earliest organization of water manage-
ment activity within the watershed and others of which have emerged over 
time in connection with newly recognized problems or developing social 
values.
Under these circumstances, individuals and organizations within the 
watershed have established institutional arrangements and operated a num-
ber of resource management efforts at several scales. Groundwater supplies 
were allocated among pumpers within each of the watershed’s four major 
basins through largely (although not entirely) separate processes over four 
decades, rather than for the watershed as a whole through a single process. 
The flows of the San Gabriel River were divided between upper and lower 
watershed areas by another process. The representative body that moni-
tors the river agreement is not the same as the bodies that monitor the four 
groundwater basin judgments. More recently, new organizations (one a joint-
powers agency, the other a nonprofit conservancy) have been established to 
focus, respectively, on groundwater cleanup in the Main San Gabriel Basin 
and on river restoration throughout the watershed and beyond.
The resulting institutional array is complex but does not necessarily fit 
characterizations such as “fragmented,” “piecemeal,” or “myopic.” Although 
unquestionably imperfect (as any institutions created by human beings are), 
the institutions of the San Gabriel River watershed are comprehensible and 
do display a logic. The complexity of the institutional arrangements in the 
San Gabriel River watershed results from the combined effects of differences 
among the interests of individuals and organizations within the watershed, 
changes over time in the understanding of problems and in values for water, 
the need to pursue multiple resource management goals, distinctions in the 
efficient scale of operation of organizations performing diverse functions, 
and the importance of finding distributions of benefits and costs that are 
perceived as fair by those who bear them.
Taking the multiple problems and goals apart and pursuing them 
through diverse organizations therefore represents a plausible alternative, 
and one might even conclude represents a reasonable approach. Although 
control of groundwater pumping in each of the four major groundwater 
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basins mattered to some degree to everyone in the watershed, it plainly mat-
tered most to the collections of pumpers within each basin, and the adju-
dications of pumping rights in each basin took place through negotiations 
and litigation between and among those pumpers. With respect to the divi-
sion of San Gabriel River flows, the most relevant interests were the interests 
of lower area communities on the one hand and all upper area communities 
on the other. Groundwater contamination in the Main San Gabriel Basin 
certainly threatened Central Basin and even potentially West Basin, but its 
most direct and costly consequence was the shutdown of wells within the 
Main San Gabriel Basin. And its causes were traceable to polluters within 
the Main San Gabriel Basin, so it could be argued that establishing a water 
quality authority for that basin rather than the entire watershed exhibited 
some political and economic logic. The river restoration programs under-
taken more recently affect people not only within the physical watershed 
but in adjacent communities, and the conservancy is organized over that 
broader area.
Diverse management functions within the watershed also exhibit dif-
ferent efficiency scales, as the public economies literature would predict. 
The agency that imports water to the San Gabriel River watershed from 
the Colorado River and from Northern California is not the same as the 
entities managing local supplies or the various sub-watershed local govern-
ments that decide on behalf of their residents how much imported water to 
purchase each year. The importing organization, the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California, is enormous and encompasses several 
watersheds besides the San Gabriel, but the choices of what to purchase and 
what to supply are made at a much smaller scale through municipalities and 
municipal water districts.
In some ways, the San Gabriel River watershed is pretty typical. Previ-
ously existing jurisdictions—cities and the county, for example—did not 
match the contours of the watershed, and within that watershed, natural 
resources are interrelated. Merely observing that previously existing politi-
cal jurisdictions did not match watershed boundaries, however, fails to take 
into account the possibilities of institutional design. Individuals and orga-
nizations within the watershed created institutional arrangements over 
several decades to fit, if not the watershed’s topographic boundaries, then 
at least its principal problems and its principal communities of interest, 
and to provide means of pursuing multiple goals simultaneously. In those 
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processes of establishing institutions, individuals faced numerous institu-
tional design choices and debated at length (sometimes contentiously) over 
what to do—whether contamination remediation should be undertaken by 
an existing agency or a new one (in the end, they created a hybrid, a joint-
 powers authority of existing agencies), whether separate conservancies 
should be established for the San Gabriel and Los Angeles Rivers (and for 
the Rio Hondo that runs between them) or a combined one, and so forth. 
The choices they made reflected questions of hydrology but also of society, 
of scale efficiencies and transaction costs, of values, interests, power, and 
accountability—political questions.
As with the other case studies in this book, the San Gabriel River water-
shed does not represent an ideal. It represents a possibility. It is possible 
to manage a complex watershed facing significant problems, and to do so 
without a central watershed agency or authority. The patterns of organiza-
tion in the San Gabriel River watershed are non-centralized, or polycentric. 
As a political watershed, the San Gabriel case represents the possibilities that 
may be available through a sort of watershed federalism, an idea to which 
we now turn.
nOtes
1. One could argue there is only a semantic difference between these terms and 
the older terms “flood control” and “flood prevention.” It appears to us, though, that 
the shift of language is more than merely new labels on old bottles.
2. Los Angeles’s efforts to bring water from the Sierras are legendary (or infa-
mous) in this regard, but other municipalities such as Pasadena also explored water 
importation possibilities.
3. Water users in the smaller Raymond Basin did not form a water association, 
but there were far fewer major pumpers there and they embarked upon an adjudica-
tion and limitation of pumping more than a decade earlier than in any of the other 
basins.
As described in Chapter 1, many natural scientists and policy analysts accept 
that most natural systems, such as watersheds, are complex adaptive systems. 
These systems do not need to be simplified and managed for one or two val-
ues, their complexity is to be recognized, protected, and respected. The same 
thinking, however, has not pervaded the social sciences concerning water-
shed governance. Political complexity is viewed as a barrier to the sustain-
able use of natural systems and something to be corrected. As illustrated in 
Chapter 2, policy reforms are sought that simplify, integrate, and centralize 
so the externalities, spillover effects, commons dilemmas, and public goods 
Federalism and Watershed Governance
6
There also is the serious problem of “thinking federal,” that is, of 
approaching the problem of organizing political relationships from a 
federalist rather than a monist or centralist perspective.
Daniel elazar (1987, 12)
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that emerge from the human uses of a watershed may be traded off and bal-
anced against each other.
The previous chapters offered an alternative view, namely, that social 
complexity is neither a barrier to sustainability nor something that is read-
ily dispensed with. It arises from human decision-making capabilities, the 
many different conflicting values and goals people hold, the attempts to col-
lectively achieve those many values and goals by designing multiple institu-
tional arrangements in a world of transaction costs, and in so doing having 
to inevitably and unavoidably make difficult and challenging political deci-
sions. All of this social complexity cannot be quieted by relying on science 
or nature to define boundaries or by forcing diversity into the well-designed 
box of hierarchy.
Building on Chapter 5, this chapter focuses on an approach for struc-
turing complementary, cooperative, competitive, and conflicting relations 
among citizens, organizations, and governments at interstate watershed 
scales.1 Citizens, public officials, and elected representatives in the United 
States have considerable experience developing working relations among 
organizations and governments at different levels and scales, because that 
is the essence of federalism, a fundamental principle of American politics. 
Federal systems of government exhibit both diversity and unity: diversity 
through many governments organized at different scales and for differ-
ent purposes, and unity through coordination and cohesion among those 
governments. As such, federalism represents an important and powerful 
alternative to calls for more centralized governing forms. In this chapter, we 
explore federalism and how it structures watershed-level governance.
The chapter begins by distinguishing federalism from other forms of 
coordination and cooperation—federalism has particular defining features 
that differentiate it from other forms of governance. There follows a discus-
sion of coordination, cooperation, and conflict resolution among govern-
ments and organizations in a federal system: that is, how unity or integration 
is achieved in a federal system. From there we sketch out a form of policy 
analysis appropriate for identifying and diagnosing the weaknesses and 
shortcomings likely to appear in a federal form of governance. The chapter 
closes with a case study of the creation and operation of the Delaware River 
Basin Compact and Commission, the first federal-interstate compact in the 
United States. For forty-five years, the participating states and the federal 
government, through the compact commission and its advisory commit-
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tees, have addressed problems and provided benefits that the compact was 
intended for, failed to realize other benefits, created policy innovations 
to address unanticipated challenges, and resolved conflicts among them-
selves without recourse to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Delaware River 
Basin illustrates the strengths, challenges, and shortcomings of watershed 
federalism.
the Basics oF FeDeralism
The United States has a long and rich history of contesting over and experi-
menting with watershed-level governance. That experimentation occurs in 
the context of federalism. Federalism encourages innovation and experi-
mentation because of the dynamic tension between self-rule and shared 
rule. Federalism combines self-rule with shared rule. Federal systems are 
composed of equals, citizens and governments, who come together to form 
a common enterprise while maintaining their separate identities, rights, and 
authorities (Elazar 1987, 4). Achieving a workable combination of self-rule 
and shared rule depends on relationships among participants that protect 
the integrity of each while supporting and encouraging “the energetic pur-
suit” of common ends (Elazar 1987, 5).
In federal systems, citizens are constantly challenged to attend to issues 
of both political power (who gets what, when, and how) and justice (how 
power is to be exercised so good governance is realized) (Lasswell 1958; 
Elazar 1987).2 Watershed collaboratives, and the literature they have spawned, 
for instance, explicitly encompass this tension between power and justice 
(Weber 2003). Collaboratives are formed to address specific problems in 
watersheds by gaining the commitment of collaborative members to engage 
in specific projects and activities. The process that is used to gain that com-
mitment represents a particular form of justice—the deliberate coming 
together of equals whose free consent is required for the collaborative to 
act. The collaborative literature pays at least as much attention to the justice 
dimension (the relationships formed, the trust developed) as it does to the 
political dimension (the projects and plans adopted, the outcomes realized) 
(Sabatier et al. 2005).3
The focus on achieving self-rule and shared rule simultaneously is a 
critical feature that distinguishes federalism from other forms of gover-
nance. All forms of governance, no matter how centralized, are typically 
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divided into subunits that are based on function, territory, or both for the 
many reasons outlined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Consequently, all forms of 
governance are faced with challenges of achieving integration and cohesion. 
Hierarchical forms of governance depend on institutional mechanisms that 
tie the subunits more tightly to the central decision maker, giving the central 
decision maker greater control and direction over the subunits. The mecha-
nisms may be blatantly coercive, based on command and control, or they 
may be incentive based, appealing to the interest of the subunit. Either way, 
the integrity, independence, and discretion of the subunits are controlled by 
the center. Issues of power and justice are conflated within the central deci-
sion maker. The focus rests on how the central decision maker can best exer-
cise power in order to achieve desired ends. Justice becomes a consideration 
only to the extent that it helps the central decision maker more effectively 
exercise power.4
Relationships among governments in a federal system are qualitatively 
different. They are not hierarchical but polycentric (Ostrom 1973), or non-
centralized (Elazar 1987). Noncentralization refers to multiple centers of 
power, each with its own authorities and capabilities, and with no one center 
dominating or commanding the others.
Noncentralization, particularly in the U.S. federal system, is achieved and 
protected through constitutions. Constitutions define the capabilities and, 
just as importantly, limitations of governments (Lutz 1988). Governments’ 
capabilities, such as making and enforcing laws, are limited by circumscrib-
ing the substantive areas in which governments may act and/or by structur-
ally dividing authority through a separation of powers. Constitutions define 
relationships among governments, among branches within governments, 
and between citizens and governments.5
It would be a mistake, however, to consider the U.S. Constitution and the 
fifty state constitutions as the only constitutions that matter in the United 
States, particularly in relation to water. Hundreds of additional constitu-
tions have been devised and adopted that create “water governments.” For 
instance, interstate river compacts are constitutions devised and adopted 
by states that spell out the types of water and water-related issues the com-
pact will govern, a formula for allocating water, a governing body to oversee 
the operation of the compact and to establish policy, and perhaps a conflict 
resolution mechanism for settling differences among the states before, or 
instead of, calling upon the U.S. Supreme Court.
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For instance, Nebraska and Kansas entered into the Big Blue River 
Compact in 1971, which governs the Big Blue River and its major tributary, 
the Little Blue River, from its headwaters in Nebraska to its confluence with 
the Kansas River near Manhattan, Kansas (Kansas Revised Statutes, Chapter 
82a, Article 5). The compact governs water allocation and quality of sur-
face and groundwater. From May through September of each year, Nebraska 
must ensure agreed-upon minimum daily flows at the state line for both 
rivers. If minimum daily flows drop below compact-specified levels, Kansas 
may request that Nebraska shut down water diversions, both ground and 
surface, so as to restore the required minimum flows.6 The compact recog-
nizes water-quality issues, although it lacks regulatory authority. Nebraska 
and Kansas have developed a joint water-quality monitoring program and 
agricultural education and best practices programs (Big Blue Compact 
Administration, 29th annual report, 2002).
Interstate river compacts allow for a combination of self-rule and shared 
rule. States exercise their governing authority in ways and areas that they 
have historically used. Through compacts, however, they freely accede some 
of that control. Under the Big Blue Compact, for instance, Nebraska has 
had to regulate its citizens’ water diversions not to meet the requirements of 
Nebraska water laws but to meet the requirements of the compact.
Compacts allow states to cooperate and coordinate their resource use. 
Most states have also provided enabling legislation that allows local water 
users to devise constitutions creating water organizations to govern intra-
state water resources, as illustrated in the case studies in Chapters 1 and 5. 
For instance, most states allow for the creation of special districts that gov-
ern different aspects of water development and use. Among the most ubiq-
uitous, at least in the western United States, are irrigation districts. State-
enabling legislation typically spells out procedures for forming a district, 
such as who may participate in its creation and how, and once a district 
is created, its governing structure, powers (including taxing and spending 
authority), methods of reorganization and dissolution, and methods of 
electing and recalling board members.
Irrigation districts have allowed members to govern themselves, at least 
with respect to some aspects of resource use—arranging for water and its 
allocation, providing for system construction and maintenance, and allow-
ing members to decide how and to what extent they wish to tax themselves. 
This self-governance occurs within a system of shared governance. Districts 
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are governed by states’ water laws, conflicts are addressed through state 
courts, and so forth. Conversely, the integrity and autonomy of a district are 
protected by the district’s enabling legislation and constitution that spell out 
how the district may be reorganized or dissolved.
Given the centrality of constitutions in creating and sustaining noncen-
tralized systems, amendment procedures are critical. The amending process 
must allow participants to revise constitutions to address new and changing 
circumstances while still protecting the integrity of the governing system. 
One way this is accomplished is by strictly limiting governments’ ability to 
revise constitutions so one government does not become too powerful rela-
tive to the others and to its own citizens. A government cannot unilater-
ally change its own constitution, and member governments typically have 
greater powers to change the constitution of the general government than 
vice versa (Elazar 1987). For example, state governments have a constitu-
tionally defined role in amending the U.S. Constitution, but the U.S. gov-
ernment does not have a constitutionally defined role in amending state 
constitutions.7 Furthermore, the participation of elected officials in consti-
tution-amending processes is limited. For nearly all states, either legislatures 
or citizens may place constitutional measures on the state ballot, but citizens 
must approve them.
cooperation anD coorDination in a FeDeral system
Two important implications stem from a federal system of governance. First, 
in federal systems, joint action among members rests on mutual consent 
and building consensus rather than on threatening coercion or issuing com-
mands. Mutual consent permeates federal systems. The multiple veto points 
sprinkled throughout the structure of a federal system, combined with the 
constitutional protections afforded governments and citizens, require par-
ticipants to take one another into account in order to find mutual accom-
modation and agreement. Even if an actor has the authority to act unilater-
ally, often the initial tendency is to reach an understanding before acting. 
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused on a number of occasions 
to decree water allocations on an interstate river, although the court pos-
sesses the authority to do so at the request of one of the states. Instead, the 
court has urged the parties to devise their own water-allocation agreements 
through compacts. Elazar (1987, 67) refers to efforts to find mutual consent 
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as an element of the federal process. As he explains, “The elements of a fed-
eral process include a sense of partnership among the parties to the federal 
compact, manifested through negotiated cooperation on issues and pro-
grams and based on a commitment to open bargaining between all parties 
to an issue in such a way as to strive for consensus or, failing that, an accom-
modation that protects the fundamental integrity of all the partners.”
Second, strengthening and/or adapting a noncentralized, or polycentric, 
system is much different from doing so in a centralized system. Recall the 
earlier discussion in which centralized systems are strengthened by placing 
greater powers in the hands of the top-level decision maker. In contrast, a 
polycentric system becomes stronger by strengthening its constituent units, 
supporting their ability to communicate and coordinate, and providing 
means for resolving disputes among them.
Recently, several interstate river compacts have been before the Supreme 
Court to settle disputes and to revise operating rules and regulations to allow 
states to better coordinate their actions around shared rivers. The compacts 
include (1) the Arkansas River Compact between Colorado (upstream 
state) and Kansas (downstream state); (2) the Republican River Compact 
among Colorado (upstream state), Nebraska (downstream to Colorado but 
upstream to Kansas), and Kansas (downstream state); and (3) the North 
Platte Decree among Colorado (upstream state), Wyoming (downstream 
to Colorado but upstream to Nebraska), and Nebraska (downstream state). 
Conflicts centered initially on boundaries (what or who is covered by the 
agreement), as examined in Chapter 3. The downstream states claimed that 
the compacts governed groundwater, and consequently, groundwater use in 
the upstream states was to be counted against compact-defined water allot-
ments. In each case, the text of the compact did not mention groundwa-
ter explicitly, and conflict over its inclusion simmered for decades as states 
attempted to resolve the issue through the compact commissions. However, 
because the commissions used unanimity rules, upstream states typically 
managed to block attempts to incorporate groundwater use in compact 
water allotments. Finally, the downstream states in each case filed lawsuits in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and in each case, the court ruled that groundwater 
was within the bounds of the compacts.
With the boundary question resolved, the states, as part of the final 
settlements of each case, also adopted different institutional mechanisms to 
improve their ability to take joint action and to better realize their compact 
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commitments. Adoption of a unanimity rule for all decisions, no matter how 
great or small, limited the compact commissions’ competency to engage in 
governance. In each settlement, the states revised the commissions’ decision 
rules, allowing for a rule other than unanimity to be used in at least some 
situations.8 Also, in each of the settlements, the states devised a variety of 
conflict resolution mechanisms, providing the states with multiple oppor-
tunities to settle their differences before having to resort to the Supreme 
Court.9
In some of the cases, states better defined their own water rights laws 
and administrative practices so as to allow them to meet their compact 
commitments. For instance, the Supreme Court’s ruling that groundwater 
pumping in the Colorado portion of the Arkansas River Basin caused harm 
to Kansas water users in violation of the compact required Colorado to limit 
and regulate groundwater pumping in the basin (Kansas v. Colorado, 514 
U.S. 675 [1995]). Colorado water law recognizes the hydrologic connection 
between surface and groundwater and directs the state water engineer to 
incorporate wells into the prior appropriation system and to regulate them 
(Blomquist, Schlager, and Heikkila 2004). Although the state water engi-
neer successfully adopted a set of well regulations for the South Platte River 
Basin, he was unable to do so for the Arkansas River Basin for a variety of 
reasons. Faced with the possibility of paying Kansas millions of dollars in 
damages for allowing its water users to take more than they were entitled to 
under the compact, the Colorado legislature allocated additional resources 
to the state engineer to adopt well regulations. Working with the major well 
associations in the Arkansas River Basin, the state engineer adopted rules 
within a matter of months that withstood a court challenge brought by a 
handful of well owners who adamantly opposed regulation.
In the Republican River case, Nebraska faced more difficult issues with 
the Supreme Court decision finding that groundwater was covered by the 
compact. Pumping would have to be regulated to prevent Nebraskans from 
taking more water than was allocated to them under the compact; however, 
as noted in connection with the Platte River case in Chapter 3, Nebraska 
law did not authorize the state to regulate groundwater pumping. After 
more than a decade of conflict among groundwater pumpers, surface-water 
users, and local and state officials, the Nebraska legislature passed LB 962, 
which allowed the state department of natural resources to declare water-
sheds overallocated. Once a watershed is determined to be overallocated, 
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two things occur. A moratorium on new and replacement wells goes into 
effect and the natural resource districts overlying the watershed are required 
to engage in groundwater planning and adopt well regulations (LB 962, 98th 
Legis., 2nd sess., Nebraska Laws, 2004).
The strengthening of the three interstate river compacts most recently 
before the U.S. Supreme Court involved addressing relations among states 
and between states and citizens. It did not involve greater centralization. The 
rules governing the operation of the compacts were revised to allow states to 
better coordinate and cooperate with each other. Rather than being saddled 
with a unanimity rule for every decision, decision rules now vary depending 
on the issue, with the unanimity rule still in place for most major decisions. 
Furthermore, the compacts have conflict-resolution mechanisms that allow 
states to address disagreements without having to allow them to fester until 
they are severe enough for the U.S. Supreme Court to accept and resolve. 
Finally, states and citizens have wrestled with devising new laws and better 
implementing existing laws so that water providers and users abide by state 
laws and compact requirements.
Strengthening federal systems by tending to the ties among member 
governments, organizations, and citizens often involves the use of overlap-
ping organizations. Overlapping organizations may take a variety of forms, 
from purely voluntary organizations serving as forums for discussion and 
consultation to formal governments possessing powers of rule making, 
enforcement, and taxation. As observed in the San Gabriel River case in 
Chapter 5, overlapping organizations may be highly specialized, addressing 
a single issue, or general, addressing a variety of issues.
Watershed collaboratives are a form of overlapping organization at the 
voluntary end of the spectrum. They are widely heralded for encouraging 
their members to recognize and act on a more general, comprehensive view 
of a segment of a watershed.10 That is, in developing a watershed plan or 
designing a restoration project, multiple dimensions of the watershed are 
recognized and their interactions attended to, such as the interaction among 
land use, riparian areas, and the quality of water in the stream. As voluntary 
organizations, collaboratives rely heavily on persuasion and consensus to 
encourage members to exercise their discretionary authority in ways consis-
tent with the mission and goals of the collaborative.
At the risk of stating the obvious, more authoritative forms of overlap-
ping arrangements are qualitatively different from voluntary organizations. 
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These organizations are governments, either specialized (Type II, to use the 
language of Chapter 1) or general-purpose (Type I), with explicitly defined 
and delimited coercive powers. Interstate river compacts and commissions 
are examples of specialized (Type II) institutions grounded in enforceable 
laws. Compact commissions may adopt rules and regulations to carry out 
the purpose of the compact. They may monitor compliance with compact 
requirements, and member states may enforce compact commitments 
against one another and against their citizens. To be sure, persuasion, open 
bargaining, and accommodation among member states are vital if a com-
pact is to work well; however, in the end if all else fails, members can resort 
to enforcement mechanisms to ensure that rules are followed and commit-
ments carried out.11
Type II governments, because of their rule-making and enforcement 
authority and dedicated sources of funding, are often considered desirable 
mechanisms for accomplishing watershed management. Created through 
the design and adoption of a constitution, they are not easily dismantled or 
avoided. Rule-making and implementation powers allow them to request 
and command action. Dedicated sources of funding from taxes, fees, and 
bonds provide regular and dependable sources of capital. These authorities 
are significant when compared with voluntary organizations in which mem-
bers must spend considerable time, effort, and resources toward encourag-
ing and maintaining participation, gaining consensus, obtaining funding, 
and persuading members to follow through with their commitments of 
resources and action. Substantial energy is expended simply maintaining the 
existence of voluntary organization, energy that is not expended in main-
taining governments. Instead, that energy can be devoted to operations, 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.
Although attractive in that sense, more authoritative overlapping orga-
nizations are more difficult and costly to create than are voluntary organiza-
tions. Given their coercive authorities, multiple veto points characterize the 
processes used to create them. Veto points are the means by which consent 
is solicited and obtained from those who are to be subject to and governed 
by the new government. For instance, in devising an interstate compact, the 
designated representatives of each state must adopt the compact they have 
devised unanimously before it is brought before the legislatures of each of 
the states for ratification. If each state ratifies the compact, then it is brought 
before Congress and the president for approval. Given the extensive consul-
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tation and review process, most interstate river compacts take more than a 
decade to devise and adopt, if they are devised at all.
The benefits from creating a new government must be significant to jus-
tify the high creation costs. Not only must the benefits be significant, but the 
allocation of benefits and costs of its creation and operation must be equi-
table among its members if it is to be formed. For instance, the South Platte 
Cooperative Agreement discussed in Chapter 3 took more than a decade to 
complete, even though the states initially believed that they would be able 
to finalize an agreement within three years. The benefits for each state were 
clear: avoid extensive endangered species consultations with the federal gov-
ernment and protect existing water users and uses. Adequately protecting 
and recovering endangered species, fairly allocating the costs of doing so, 
and devising acceptable and workable decision-making and monitoring 
arrangements were more difficult issues on which to agree.
The more comprehensive the government to be formed, both in scale 
and in scope, the more costly it will be to create. Creating a government at 
the scale of a watershed means that many governments and citizens within 
that watershed will have direct and indirect opportunities to support or 
inhibit its creation. Creating a government at the scale of a watershed that 
has a scope of authority encompassing many dimensions of the watershed 
will directly implicate and involve even more governments and citizens in 
its creation. The larger in scale and scope of the government being devised, 
the more costly and difficult it will be to gain the necessary consensus for 
its creation. As discussed in Chapter 4, Derthick (1974) labels these lat-
ter forms of governments “political accidents.” Consequently, voluntary 
overlapping organizations will be easier to create than overlapping govern-
ments (Derthick 1974). And among governments, limited-purpose special 
districts will be easier to create than more encompassing and comprehen-
sive general-purpose governments. Given the high costs of creation and 
adoption and the challenges of ensuring an equitable distribution of ben-
efits and costs, in most watersheds, coercive forms of overlapping orga-
nizations are likely to emerge only after multiple attempts at creation. In 
many instances, voluntary forms of overlapping organizations will be all 
that participants are able to create; in other instances, voluntary forms will 
be created as stepping-stones to the creation of governments.
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a FeDeralism-BaseD policy analysis oF  
WatersheD Governance
Most policy analyses of the management and governance of watersheds are 
based on methods of analysis not well suited for polycentric systems. Such 
analyses assume that centralized, hierarchical forms of government are or 
should be the norm. Diagnoses proceeding from such an assumption tend to 
center on the diversity of organizations, agencies, and governments; that is, 
watershed governance is fragmented, disjointed, and disorganized because 
there is no single controlling center. Policy prescriptions of reducing diver-
sity, creating a centralized authority, and so forth readily follow.
A federal, or polycentric, policy analysis begins from a different starting 
point with a consideration of the major points of conflict within a water-
shed. Major points of conflict tend to encompass multiple actors and entail 
significant disagreement over the types and causes of problems or the fail-
ure, indifference, or inability of key actors to take steps to address the prob-
lems. From there, attention is paid to the types and qualities of the relations 
among the actors most directly involved in the conflicts. Policy solutions 
centering on creating, redefining, and restructuring relations among gov-
ernments and organizations may then be considered.
Of course, this is easier said than done because in crafting policy solu-
tions, the many political questions raised in previous chapters must be 
confronted. For instance, will a new government be created or will a new 
program and/or agency be incorporated within an existing government? 
Who will be included within the new program/agency/government? What 
will decision-making processes be like? To whom and how will the new 
program/agency/government be held accountable? Will the policy solu-
tions likely reduce the overall magnitude of transaction costs among the 
key actors? Have the trade-offs among transaction costs made by the policy 
solutions been carefully attended to, and have the obvious points of weak-
ness been identified?
Examples of policy makers, public managers, and citizens struggling to 
redefine relations in order to better address perceived watershed problems 
abound in the case studies included in previous chapters. One example from 
the Columbia Basin seems particularly apt. The incompatibility between the 
Northwest Power Planning Council’s fish recovery plan and the laws govern-
ing the federal water and power agencies allowed agency costs to blossom, 
FeDeralism anD WatersheD Governance    163
as the federal water and power agencies acted in ways that undermined the 
fishery plan. The council responded predictably. It increased its decision-
making costs by defining more precisely specific actions that the federal 
water and power agencies were to engage in, such as developing and adher-
ing to implementation plans and imposing timetables and deadlines on the 
completion of specific activities. In other words, the council attempted to 
limit the discretion of the agencies in order to reduce agency problems. The 
state and tribal fish and wildlife agencies that consulted and worked with the 
council on developing plans urged an additional approach. The state and 
tribal agencies understood that the federal water and power agencies would 
be reluctant partners. Consequently, the agencies requested that the council 
undertake a study on the federal water and power agencies’ decision-mak-
ing processes to identify appropriate points and procedures to directly insert 
consideration of the council’s fish and wildlife plan, with the expectation 
that such a study would provide the information needed to revise the laws 
governing the federal agencies (Blumm 1984). For tribal and state wildlife 
officials, gaining the support of federal agencies required orienting their 
decision-making processes to include conservation goals; simply limiting 
their discretion in carrying out conservation activities was insufficient. In 
the end, the council’s approach of limiting discretion met with only modest 
success, and it declined to engage in the study of federal agency decision-
making processes.
Gaining the cooperation and commitment of semi-autonomous gov-
ernments unfolds at different scales, as illustrated by the Platte River case 
study in Chapter 3. Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska together had to fol-
low through on their commitments to provide additional water and to care-
fully regulate new water demands. If even one state failed to realize its water 
and regulatory commitments, the entire agreement failed, regardless of the 
actions of the other two states. Both Colorado and Wyoming believed that 
the weakest commitment was from Nebraska. Their state laws required the 
careful regulation of all new uses of both ground- and surface water so as to 
protect existing water rights, but Nebraska had no such laws, particularly in 
relation to groundwater. Nebraska could not credibly commit itself to regu-
late pumping so that its citizens would not pump the additional water that 
the three states made available in the river, other than to promise to actively 
pursue such legislation. Ultimately, the state was successful in realizing such 
legislation but an agency problem blossomed, undercutting the credibility 
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of Nebraska’s commitment to regulating new uses. Farmers, anticipating 
the adoption of new legislation strictly limiting wells, applied for and were 
granted new well permits by the natural resource districts. Once the legislation 
passed, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources declared the Platte 
River Basin over-appropriated and a moratorium on new wells went into 
effect (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources 2004). Now the natural 
resource districts are required to develop groundwater management plans, 
but that task is more complicated because of the new well permits issued 
and new wells installed before the law took effect. Do the natural resource 
districts have sufficient expertise, resources, and social capital to develop 
groundwater management plans likely to realize the goal of protecting and 
enhancing river flows? The Nebraska Department of Natural Resources is 
likely to face challenging agency issues with the natural resource districts, 
issues that they will most likely attempt to address through increased deci-
sion-making costs for the department and for the districts.
One of the strengths of polycentricity is that the existence of indepen-
dent, autonomous governments organized at different scales allows first 
attempts to address problems and conflicts to occur at smaller scales, among 
the citizens, organizations, and governments most immediately involved and 
affected. These actors have access to a variety of institutional mechanisms 
that they may call upon to address shared problems, including mechanisms 
that do not require them to appeal to or depend upon governments orga-
nized at a larger scale. These mechanisms extend from creating voluntary 
organizations through which participants may cooperate and coordinate 
their actions to giving up some of their autonomy and authority by creat-
ing overlapping special-purpose or general-purpose governments. At each 
step, actors have choices about how political they want the issues to become: 
the more participants that are invited into the conflict, or the broader and 
more comprehensive the solutions, the more difficult the political questions 
become.
On the other hand, federalism also rests on consensus, although at an 
organizational rather than an individual level. Whether it is the passage 
of legislation, the revision of an existing constitution and government, or 
the creation of a new constitution and government, citizens, branches of 
government, and governments must be supportive. That is, they must not 
exercise their veto authority. A consensus orientation makes achieving coor-
dinated action challenging.
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the DelaWare river Basin compact: a FeDeral experiment
The Delaware River begins in the state of New York, just above the Catskill 
Mountains and zigzags, first to the southeast and then to the southwest, back 
and forth, creating the boundaries between New York and Pennsylvania, 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and New Jersey and Delaware, before finally 
flowing into the Atlantic Ocean through the Delaware Bay. It flows through 
and supports diverse habitats, from the wooded uplands of central New 
York and northwestern Pennsylvania, to the Philadelphia metropolitan area, 
to the tidal wetlands of Delaware.
In terms of the volume of water that passes through it, the Delaware 
is not a particularly notable river for the eastern United States. Its annual 
average discharge is less than 3 percent of that of the Mississippi, and just 
less than half of the Susquehanna, its neighbor to the west, yet it provides 
drinking water for almost 10 percent of the U.S. population (Albert 2005, 
1). It supplies water for major cities that reside within its boundaries, like 
Philadelphia and Trenton, but also for New York City, which is located in the 
Hudson River Basin.
The Delaware Basin’s physical complexity is readily matched by its insti-
tutional complexity. In 1783, Pennsylvania and New Jersey entered into a 
treaty to settle disputes over state ownership of islands in the Delaware River 
and to protect the river as a common highway by forbidding dams on the 
main stem (Albert 2005, 5). For the next 140 years the Delaware River was 
used largely for transportation purposes: its main stem was a major high-
way, and water from the main stem and tributaries fed transportation canals 
serving eastern cities.
Although the states bordering the Delaware River expressed interest 
in developing the river’s hydropower potential, the 1783 treaty foreclosed 
the building of main-stem dams. Not until the 1920s, with the populations 
of New York City, Philadelphia, and north New Jersey rapidly outstripping 
water supplies, was serious attention paid to the Delaware River as some-
thing other than a common highway. With Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey considering water-supply projects on the Delaware River, the 
states began to discuss an interstate river compact that would allow them to 
coordinate their water-supply activities.
Creating a new overlapping government in the form of an interstate river 
compact proved difficult. The states could not agree upon a fair allocation 
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of benefits. The initial compact negotiated by representatives of the three 
states established minimum flow requirements while allowing each state to 
develop three-fifths of its Delaware River drainage area (Albert 2005, 17). 
New York was the only state to ratify it. New York City intended to develop 
projects that would siphon off water from the Delaware and feed the water 
into its drinking water supply. Pennsylvania interests objected to New York 
City, located outside the watershed, taking water from the river and argued 
also that Pennsylvania deserved a larger portion of the river because the state 
contained the largest portion of the watershed (Albert 2005, 18). New Jersey 
suggested that the compact be revised and then submitted to the states as 
a second proposal for ratification. The revised compact allocated specific 
amounts of water to each state, with Pennsylvania receiving a third more 
water than New York and New Jersey. The minimum streamflow require-
ments were kept in place even though they were reduced. New York again 
ratified immediately, and New York City proceeded to work with the state to 
begin the development of reservoirs on the East and West Branches of the 
river. This time, however, New Jersey rejected the compact because its cities 
feared that the reduced minimum flow requirements would deprive them 
of drinking-water supplies during summers and drought years when river 
flows were already low.
The three states, representing the interests of their citizens, negotiated 
and renegotiated a compact to allocate the waters of the Delaware River. The 
states recognized that they needed to protect river flows while allowing for 
limited water diversions. The states also understood that they were more 
likely to gain federal assistance in the development of water projects if they 
were to first settle their differences over their uses of the river. New York rati-
fied both compacts but the other two states rejected them, largely for distri-
butional reasons. Lacking the required consensus to create an interstate river 
compact, New Jersey and Pennsylvania appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
to protect their interests in the river. New York City moved forward with its 
water development plans as if the compact had been adopted. New Jersey, 
joined later by Pennsylvania, filed suit before the U.S. Supreme Court against 
New York, seeking to prevent New York City from diverting water out of the 
watershed. The two states claimed that an out-of-basin diversion would vio-
late the riparian doctrine that all three states used to govern the river, and that 
a diversion as large as the one planned by New York would harm New Jersey’s 
waterpower potential, river recreation, potential water supply, and shad fish-
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The Delaware River Basin.
eries, among other things. They argued that New York City should develop 
water within its own watershed (Albert 2005, 21).12 Although joining New 
Jersey in the litigation, Pennsylvania sought only a decreed water allocation 
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and the establishment of a river master to monitor and enforce the Supreme 
Court water decree. The river master would be an independent monitor 
ensuring that New York City did not take more than what was allocated to it 
and that it properly released water from its reservoirs in a timely manner.
In 1931 the Supreme Court issued its decree, which demonstrated the 
risks states face in turning to another entity to resolve their conflicts. The 
decree was a series of rules imposed by the Supreme Court governing the 
states’ uses of the river. New York had the right to divert Delaware River 
water, and the Supreme Court allocated 440 million gallons of water per 
day to it. New York City was directed to release water from its planned res-
ervoirs in order to maintain minimum flows specified in the decree, and 
New York was required to address several water-quality problems. The other 
two states would not receive water allocations until they had developed spe-
cific water projects. The Supreme Court retained the authority to reappor-
tion the river, even to reduce New York City’s allocation if considerations of 
equity demanded such action; and the court retained jurisdiction over the 
decree rather than establishing a river master. Thus, it was up to the states to 
monitor the decree and if violations occurred, the states could petition the 
Supreme Court for enforcement (Albert 2005, 24).
The decree differed in significant ways from the two compacts the states 
had negotiated but failed to ratify. First, the benefits allocated to the states dif-
fered substantially. Under both compacts all three states would have received 
water allocations, but under the decree only New York received a specific allo-
cation. The decree also provided very little coordination among the states. 
Aside from establishing rules of use of the river that the states were to abide 
by, it did not create a mechanism that would allow states to share informa-
tion, discuss, or fight over the river. The compacts, by creating commissions, 
would have established forums for coordination and cooperation.
The decree did not spell the end of interstate cooperation, though. 
Within five years, the three states created the Interstate Commission on the 
Delaware River Basin, or INCODEL. Delaware joined later. INCODEL was 
a voluntary organization with no enforceable authority. Nevertheless, the 
states embraced it and used it to coordinate joint efforts at water-pollution 
control. The commission worked closely with the four states to adopt water-
pollution laws and construct wastewater treatment plants. By all accounts, 
these efforts were successful in improving the water quality of the river 
(Derthick 1974; Featherstone 1999; Albert 2005).
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INCODEL’s forays into water allocation and management, and proj-
ect development, proved rockier. These were the issues that prevented the 
states from adopting an interstate compact, and the differences remained, 
as INCODEL was soon to discover. INCODEL’s initial attempt to coordi-
nate water allocation and use involved the development of a formula for 
overall diversions and flow releases. The commission intended the for-
mula as a framework that would allow the states to coordinate their water-
 development activities while providing them with considerable flexibility in 
developing their own water-storage projects (Albert 2005, 33). The formula, 
however, was never adopted by the states.
INCODEL did not give up its efforts to coordinate the allocation and 
use of water. Rather, it switched approaches. Both Philadelphia and New 
York City were making preparations for water-supply projects, and New 
York was preparing to petition the Supreme Court to reopen the Delaware 
River decree and grant it a larger water allocation. Viewing the decree as an 
inadequate means of coordinating the states’ uses of the river, INCODEL 
returned to the compact. It developed a comprehensive basin-development 
program that consisted of a series of water-supply projects to be built in a 
specified order that would supply billions of gallons of drinking water to 
all of the major metropolitan areas. It also proposed an interstate compact 
that would create a water-resources construction agency to implement the 
comprehensive basin-development plan. The compact agency would have 
no planning or regulatory authority, and it would issue bonds to pay for the 
construction of the dams and reservoirs (Albert 2005, 39).
This third effort at creating an interstate river compact and compact 
commission also failed, for many of the same distributional reasons that 
the first two efforts failed. Pennsylvania interests argued that the first water 
projects scheduled to be built would benefit New York and New Jersey, but 
Pennsylvania would have to help finance them. Projects designed to pro-
vide drinking water to Philadelphia would be built later. Furthermore, 
Philadelphia interests were not united behind the water-supply projects ear-
marked for them (Albert 2005).
Once again, having failed to settle their differences, the states returned 
to the Supreme Court. New York and New York City petitioned the court to 
reopen the original decree and increase New York’s allocation to 800 million 
gallons of water per day, to recognize new water projects almost completed 
and another in the final planning stages. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
170    FeDeralism anD WatersheD Governance
eventually Delaware joined the lawsuit. The special master appointed by the 
Supreme Court worked with the parties to develop an acceptable settlement. 
In the final decree issued by the Supreme Court, which was the negotiated 
settlement devised by the states with the special master acting as facilitator, 
a number of changes were made to the original decree. First, New York’s 
allocation was increased to 800 million gallons per day. Second, New York 
agreed to water-release requirements governing its reservoirs that would 
ensure minimum flows and prevent the holding of water that the New 
York City water system did not need for its customers. Third, New Jersey 
was allocated 100 million gallons of water per day and agreed to cooperate 
with Pennsylvania if that state undertook efforts to build a main-stem dam. 
New Jersey agreed to repeal the 1783 treaty provision prohibiting dams and 
agreed to exercise its powers of eminent domain on property in New Jersey 
that Pennsylvania would have to purchase if it were to build a dam. Fourth, 
Pennsylvania’s request for a river master to administer and monitor flow 
releases was granted (Albert 2005, 47).
The second decree went well beyond simply allocating water; it laid 
the groundwork for the creation of an interstate river compact. It provided 
an independent river master and removed a number of obstacles that had 
prevented the building of a main-stem dam. Pennsylvania actively began 
planning such a dam, and to protect such an investment, it spearheaded 
efforts to revive interstate cooperation. Extensive flooding from two hur-
ricanes brought the Army Corps of Engineers into the basin, leading to a 
comprehensive study and recommendations for multiple dams for flood 
control, water supply, and recreation purposes. Eventually, the Army Corps 
of Engineers requested congressional authorization and funding for eight 
water projects, one on the main stem of the Delaware River at Tocks Island 
and seven on the river’s tributaries. In response, the states contracted with 
the Maxwell School at Syracuse University for an in-depth analysis of the 
economic, social, and political setting of the river basin and recommenda-
tions for interstate governance (Martin et al. 1960).
The Syracuse report cataloged the social, political, and economic diver-
sity of the river basin, which included vastly different conceptions of water 
problems, from New York City residents’ concerns over adequate supplies 
of drinking water to Catskills residents’ desire to maintain the integrity of 
their mountain streams and Easton residents’ apprehension about flooding. 
As the authors noted, “Water thus presents different faces to different places 
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and people, and moreover the face it presents varies over time—indeed it 
varies with the seasons” (Martin et al. 1960, 5). The complexity of the river 
extended also to citizens’ different uses and preferences for governments. 
After surveying dozens of organizations and associations actively involved 
in water issues, the authors concluded that what most people wanted were 
separate governmental agencies in charge of their issues and to whom they 
would have special access (Martin et al. 1960, 36). In response, the authors 
suggested that whatever type of government was created, it should be of 
general purpose in order to balance the many different particular demands 
and to accomplish some form of the public good (Martin et al. 1960, 55).
Creating the boundaries of a general-purpose water government, how-
ever, would not be straightforward. The activities of such a government 
would occur at different scales, some basin-wide and some not. Furthermore, 
the government would affect and be affected by forces beyond its boundar-
ies: transportation networks, inter-basin water transfers, and other govern-
ments (Martin et al. 1960, 104). The last would be particularly challenging:
[A]ny significant basin agency that may be devised at once becomes an 
orphan, with no strong parent government to look to for encouragement 
and support, no sister agencies with which to make common cause, no 
web of established procedure on which to lean, no body of precedent 
to serve as guide, and no articulate clientele to represent it in the public 
forum. . . . Few public bodies are likely to find much that is praiseworthy 
in a new regional program, and this is true especially of federal agencies 
in the field. (Martin et al. 1960, 104)
In the end, the authors proposed a two-phase approach to governance. 
They suggested the creation of a federal agency that would eventually be 
absorbed by a federal-state river compact. The agency would be vested with 
relatively broad water powers, including data collection and dissemination; 
comprehensive planning; building, owning, and operating all water-storage 
projects in the basin, including existing ones; governing all water allocations 
and diversions; and issuing standards and regulations for water-quality pur-
poses. Their reasons for creating a federal agency first and transforming it into 
a compact later were several. First, they believed that a federal agency could 
be created relatively quickly, whereas a compact may take years to negotiate. 
Second, the federal government would likely be more generous in funding 
water projects of a federal agency than of a state-created government. Third, 
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the initial activities of the agency would center on project construction, an 
activity at which the federal government is particularly adept; later activi-
ties such as water allocation and water-quality control are ones typically 
performed by states and could be done through the compact commission 
(Martin et al. 1960, 341–361). Such governing arrangements—transform-
ing a federal agency into a federal-state government and having the federal 
government as an equal member of a river compact and compact commis-
sion—had not been tried before.
The states accepted only the second phase of the study’s proposal. Within 
a year of the release of the Syracuse University study, the states had drafted a 
federal-state compact, and within another year, the four states and the federal 
government adopted it. The compact was unusual in two respects—its rela-
tively comprehensive scope compared to other interstate river compacts and 
its federal member. Most interstate river compacts govern rivers in the western 
United States, and they only address water-allocation issues. Only a handful 
extend beyond allocation to include water quality. The Delaware River Basin 
Compact gives the compact commission the authority to engage in compre-
hensive planning, data gathering, and monitoring; water-supply development 
by partnering with the Army Corp of Engineers, who would build the proj-
ects; water allocations and diversions; water-quality standard setting; drought 
planning; and flood-control and floodplain planning (Featherstone 1999).
What nearly brought a presidential veto of the compact, however, was 
the inclusion of the federal government as an equal partner. Members of the 
executive branch, such as Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, questioned the 
constitutionality of subjecting the federal government to the compact. It 
would be possible for the state representatives, who outnumber the federal 
representative, to adopt programs, projects, and regulations to which the 
federal government would be committed even if it objected to them.13 To 
allay such fears, two provisions were added to the compact. First, the federal 
government was committed only to those items that the federal represen-
tative voted to support. Second, the president was given the authority to 
suspend or delete any provision within the comprehensive plan out of con-
siderations of the national interest (Derthick 1974, 53).
For their part, the states wanted the federal government as a partner in 
the compact. Federal interests in the river basin would expand rapidly as 
dozens of federally built and funded water projects were brought on line; 
also, national parks were planned that would be associated with some of the 
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water projects; and, there was the continuing challenge of addressing water-
quality concerns. Rather than working with multiple federal partners, the 
states wished to deal with a single federal partner who would represent all 
federal interests. The states believed that the increasingly important role of 
the federal government merited a seat at the table.
The first challenge the commission faced turned out to be one for which 
it was particularly well suited. The compact gave full recognition to the 
Supreme Court decree, granting the commission the authority to adminis-
ter it but also the authority to override it by unanimous decision in cases of 
emergency, such as droughts or flooding. In 1961, just after the compact’s 
creation, drought emerged in the basin. By 1965, New York announced 
that because of the drought it would not release water from its reservoirs 
in accordance with the decree. The commission declared an emergency 
and the representatives worked out an alternative water-allocation agree-
ment acceptable to all. By 1967, the drought subsided, the emergency was 
rescinded, and the decree was once again followed (Derthick 1974, 54). The 
commission later developed a framework that established drought plans 
and operations, which the commission has called upon three times since 
the early 1980s, and each time the response has seen the states through the 
emergency (Featherstone 1999, 106–110; DRBC 2006a).
The commission has also experienced success around its water-quality 
activities, although not in the way it initially envisioned. Shortly after its 
creation, the commission sought to become the water-quality standard set-
ter for the basin, as opposed to the states or the federal government. The 
commission’s reasoning was that the states and the federal government are 
its members, thus standard setting should be centered in it. Neither the 
states nor the federal government were willing to concede direct regulatory 
authority to the commission, and it eventually changed its approach. Instead 
of seeking to become the standard setter for the basin, it worked with the 
states to develop water-quality standards and regulations that the states’ leg-
islatures or regulatory agencies could adopt as their own, and which they 
have largely done. Thus, there is considerable consistency in water-quality 
standards across the basin even though there is no single water-quality stan-
dard setter (Featherstone 1999, 137).
Many of the standards and regulations that the commission develops 
are adopted eventually by the states, or by municipalities, townships, and 
counties in the basin. For instance, the commission worked with each of 
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the states to review drought plans and suggested numerous revisions to 
the plans, both to strengthen the plans and to make them more nearly uni-
form across the basin. The commission wanted to avoid a drought scenario 
where one state’s water users were subject to strict conservation require-
ments while another state’s users enjoyed the additional supplies of water 
made available by the other state’s conservation efforts. All states revised 
their drought plans and regulations in accord with the commission’s recom-
mendations (Featherstone 1999, 111). The commission also adopted a set 
of conservation performance standards for fixtures such as toilets, faucets, 
and showerheads. All states except Pennsylvania adopted the standards, and 
most municipalities and water utilities within Pennsylvania adopted them 
independently (Featherstone 1999, 113).
In addition to working with the states to develop and adopt more uni-
form water rules and regulations, the commission coordinates the allocation 
and use of water across the basin through its licensing program.14 All sub-
stantial new diversions, wastewater releases, floodplain encroachments, and 
streambed modifications must first be approved by the commission. The 
commission has defined substantial diversions as those involving more than 
100,000 gallons per day for thirty days or longer (Featherstone 1999, 163). 
This allows all states and the federal representative to consider the impact 
of major projects on their interests and request modifications to projects 
even though they are located within a single basin state. Featherstone (1999) 
notes that before an organization or government formally requests a license, 
it works carefully with the staff of the commission. Considerable discus-
sion, negotiation, and modification of projects occur before the commis-
sion issues a license. The licensing powers also apply to federal projects, 
and states have used the process to obtain modifications in federal activi-
ties. For instance, Delaware realized water-quality protections in relation to 
an Army Corps of Engineers dredging project in the lower Delaware River 
(Featherstone 1999, 166–167).
The commission has used its licensing powers to gain compliance with 
its standards and regulations. It regularly requires utilities to adopt water 
conservation plans and to install water meters as a condition of receiving 
a license. In turn, states have also used the commission’s licensing powers 
to realize goals that they would not otherwise have been able to accom-
plish. By the 1970s, many municipalities in southeastern Pennsylvania relied 
almost exclusively on groundwater, and serious problems were emerg-
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ing—water tables declining, wells drying up, reduced flows in streams and 
rivers, and water-quality problems. Furthermore, groundwater pumping 
in Pennsylvania was affecting the flow of the Delaware River. Pennsylvania 
law does not allow for the regulation of groundwater. At the request of 
the Pennsylvania representative, the commission undertook a study of the 
groundwater problems and developed a set of groundwater regulations and 
standards based on the study. In 1980, the commission declared a ground-
water protected area in southeastern Pennsylvania and applied the ground-
water regulations and standards to all new or expanded water diversions 
of 10,000 gallons a day for at least thirty days (Featherstone 1999, 118). In 
order to obtain a license for a new groundwater withdrawal, the applicant 
must demonstrate that the withdrawal will not adversely impact the aquifer 
or existing users, must meter all service connections, must adopt water con-
servation rules, and must develop a drought contingency plan (Featherstone 
1999, 118). The commission has amended the reach of the protected area 
and the regulations several times. Most notably, the commission adopted 
numerical withdrawal limits in some reaches of the aquifer (Featherstone 
1999, 119). Pennsylvania relies on the commission to actively regulate 
groundwater in its portion of the Delaware River Basin, and, in turn, it pays 
the costs for the operation of the program (Featherstone 1999, 119).
Compared with these successes in increasing coordination among the 
states and the progress that has been made with respect to river flows and 
water quality, the commission’s efforts regarding water development and 
supply have not lived up to initial hopes and expectations for a variety of 
reasons, many outside the commission’s control. One of the commission’s 
first acts was to adopt a comprehensive plan. The initial plan largely con-
sisted of the eight water-storage projects for which the Army Corps of 
Engineers had received congressional authorization. Of those eight, only 
two smaller projects were built, both on tributaries of the Delaware River.15 
The major project, a main-stem dam and reservoir at Tocks Island, and five 
other smaller reservoirs were not built. In some ways, the Tocks Island dam 
was a centerpiece of the compact, one of the primary reasons that the states 
entered into it. In fact, Pennsylvania was pursuing a similar main-stem proj-
ect following the 1954 Supreme Court decree, which it put aside in favor of 
the compact and the Army Corps of Engineers constructing Tocks Island. 
Tocks Island was not built for a variety of reasons, mostly financial and envi-
ronmental. As the planning and design of the project proceeded, its costs 
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increased substantially. At the same time, the federal government began 
experiencing budget problems, and some members of Congress began to 
publicly question the value of the project. Financial problems delayed the 
project sufficiently that it was swept up in the environmental movement. 
Local and national environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club, raised a 
host of environmental issues, from eutrophication of the reservoir because 
of high phosphorus levels in the river, to the loss of fish and wildlife, to the 
loss of a free-flowing river (Albert 2005, 119). Eventually, opposition to the 
project among citizens of New York and New Jersey became so intense that 
by 1975, four years after the dam was originally scheduled for completion, 
the commission, over the strenuous protests of the Pennsylvania representa-
tive, voted against congressional appropriations for the project, effectively 
killing it (Featherstone 1999, 98).
The activities and performance of the federal representative also have not 
lived up to the hopes and intentions of the Delaware River Basin Compact. 
The expectation was that the federal representative would not only com-
mit the federal government to particular courses of action but be able to 
forge a single unifying federal position among the numerous federal agen-
cies active in the basin. Ideally, the representative would work with various 
agencies and develop a consensus position. Conflicts among federal agencies 
that the federal representative could not resolve would be turned over to the 
president (Featherstone 1999, 175). The federal representative, however, has 
no special power or authority in relation to federal agencies, no methods 
available to gain the cooperation and support of agency heads, and no more 
right to call upon the president than do cabinet secretaries. Consequently, 
the federal representative acts more as an ambassador than as a commis-
sioner (Derthick 1974, 71; Featherstone 1999, 176). He conveys the interests 
of the different federal agencies to the commission and in turn reports to 
the agencies on the interests and activities of the commission.16 Even that 
limited role has been threatened by actions of Congress. In 1995, Congress 
eliminated federal funding for the commission and replaced the federal rep-
resentative with a representative from the Army Corps of Engineers, with 
the expectation that the Army Corps of Engineers would provide federal 
funding. It has not done so and the commission has experienced budget 
problems ever since (DRBC 2006b).
The federal representative has turned out to be a partner with few ben-
efits but many costs. The primary benefit of having the federal government 
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as a partner in the compact is that all federal projects must receive a license 
from the compact commission before they may be built, thus giving the 
states a greater say in federal projects than they otherwise would have. On 
the other hand, the federal representative has been unable to deliver federal 
cooperation and support for the commission’s efforts, and the position has 
exposed the commission to national politics, both formally and informally. 
Formally, the commission is required to follow the federal Administrative 
Procedures Act and publish its rule makings and standard settings in the 
Federal Register (Albert 2005). Informally, powerful and well-organized 
interests have been able to derail commission activities by appealing to 
Congress or the president.17
Watershed-level governance in the Delaware River Basin is a federal 
form of governance, created and operated within a federal system. It con-
sists of a variety of special-purpose and general-purpose governments and 
voluntary organizations organized at different scales. Over the last forty-
five years, the basin states and the federal government have engaged in close 
cooperation and coordination of their uses of the basin by creating a special 
government of which they are members. They have used it to tightly coordi-
nate their most important uses and policies concerning the river. The com-
pact commission cannot impose water-quality standards on the states or the 
states’ citizens; however, the legislatures have agreed to adopt the commis-
sion’s standards. Also, the legislatures have agreed to adopt the commission’s 
drought plans. In other areas, states have ceded more direct authority to 
the commission. The commission, not the states, licenses all types of water 
projects. Furthermore, the states have agreed to allow the commission to 
regulate in areas where they have chosen not to. For instance, Pennsylvania 
has allowed the commission to develop and implement groundwater rules 
and regulations for the southeastern portion of the state. As Derthick (1974, 
72) notes, “A coordinating organization will work only to the extent that 
the participants share an interest in making it work.” That is the hallmark 
of a federal system, political action through negotiation and consensus 
building.
conclusion
In Chapter 1, we argued that complex adaptable systems of institutions are 
well suited for the management and protection of complex adaptive natural 
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resource systems. In this chapter, we laid out a theory of federalism (which 
is a complex adaptable system), used the theory to develop a form of policy 
analysis appropriate for a federal system, and pointed out how a complex 
adaptable system of governance makes some of the political choices identi-
fied and analyzed in the previous chapters more manageable. Before leaving 
this topic, however, we believe that there are important normative dimen-
sions to federal forms of watershed governance that should be pointed out.
In many watersheds, communities of interest have identified, defined, 
and organized themselves—albeit in a seemingly innumerable diversity 
of forms, from the most informal sorts of associations to the most formal 
incorporations of municipalities. As efforts to assemble sub-watershed or 
watershed-wide responses to problems get under way, these previously 
established communities of interest claim their place at the table. Having 
already organized, they are often in a position to either withhold their 
cooperation (the stick) or offer resources along with their cooperation (the 
carrot) in inter-organizational or intergovernmental water resources man-
agement arrangements. Their interests must be recognized and addressed. 
Communities of interest, communities that have invested in the watershed, 
are protected through federal arrangements.
Furthermore, Oakerson (1999, 5) argues that productive polycentric 
systems require committed and active citizens. The same theme is echoed in 
the ecosystem-management literature (Cortner and Moote 1999). However, 
supporters of ecosystem management and watershed-level management 
often fail to realize the connections between committed and active citizens 
and forms of governance. As de Tocqueville (1969) noted, American admin-
istrative decentralization (or as Elazar [1987] would say, noncentralization) 
has much to recommend it, even if it appears chaotic, and even if it moves 
forward in fits and starts. Noncentralization, which places problem-solving 
powers in the hands of citizens and communities, promotes liberty and 
freedom among citizens. Citizens view themselves as governors, capable of 
addressing shared problems and providing for shared benefits. Remove that 
problem-solving authority from citizens and place it in the hands of central 
administrators and, de Tocqueville (1969) argues, citizens become indiffer-
ent and passive, waiting for administrators to come to their aid. Thus, active 
citizens and communities, embedded in a federal system, engage in water-
shed management while at the same time preserving their liberty and their 
capacity for self-government.
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notes
1. Earlier case studies examined interstate watersheds but for different purposes. 
Chapter 3 used the Platte River to illustrate fundamental political decisions involv-
ing boundary drawing, decision rules, and accountability mechanisms. Chapter 4 
used the Columbia River to illustrate the unavoidable trade-offs among transaction 
costs. In this chapter, we explicitly focus on the ties and linkages among the many 
governments in a watershed through the lens of federalism.
2. As Elazar (1987, 84) explains, “One of the primary attributes of federalism 
is that it cannot, by its very nature, abandon the concern for either power or justice 
but must consider both in relationship to each other, thus forcing people to consider 
the hard realities of political life while at the same time maintaining their aspirations 
for the best polity.”
3. Concerns with power and justice repeatedly emerge in the watershed gover-
nance literature. In a study of intergovernmental arrangements for deciding upon 
and implementing alternatives for wastewater treatment, O’Toole (1993) observed 
that the governance issue of community autonomy (a justice issue) was itself one 
of the values with which participants were concerned, along with the management 
issues of efficiency and regulatory compliance (a power issue).
4. How the central decision maker can utilize justice to more effectively exercise 
power is a central theme in the organization theory and behavior literature (Barnard 
1938; Williamson 1985; Miller 1992).
5. For instance, the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution define relations 
between the federal government and citizens. Article I, Section 10, allows states to 
enter into compacts with one another, and Article IV governs relations among states 
through the full faith and credit clause and the privileges and immunities clause. 
Article VI establishes the supremacy of the national government and addresses the 
resolution of conflicts among the national and state governments. The designers of 
the U.S. Constitution anticipated the importance of coordination, cooperation, and 
conflict resolution among governments.
6. Over the history of the compact, Nebraska has met the minimum streamflow 
requirements except for brief periods during unusually dry years. In those periods, 
Kansas has requested that Nebraska actively regulate water diversions and Nebraska 
has done so, although on at least one occasion the minimum streamflow require-
ments were not met (Big Blue Compact Administration, 19th annual report, 1993).
7. The supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitution constrains and conditions 
state constitutions but does not give the U.S. government a role in amending them. 
The point at which the national government exercises the most immediate influence 
over state constitutions is in the adoption of enabling legislation that spells out the 
process and conditions for a territory to become a state. For instance, the enabling 
legislation for Arizona, the last of the lower forty-eight states to be admitted into 
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the Union, dictated specific items to be included in the state constitution. Congress 
imposed strict limits on the use and disposal of state trust land, the land the federal 
government granted to Arizona. In addition, the enabling legislation required the 
president to approve the constitution, a requirement not imposed on any previous 
state (McClory 2001, 22). Taft, the president at the time, vetoed the constitution 
because it allowed citizens to recall judges. Taft feared that the procedure would 
destroy the independence of the judiciary. The citizens of Arizona amended the con-
stitution to remove recall of judges, and the constitution was passed by Congress 
and the president (McClory 2001, 31). Upon admission of Arizona to the Union as a 
state, the citizens of Arizona promptly amended the state’s constitution to allow for 
the recall of judges (McClory 2001, 32).
8. For instance, the Republican River Compact settlement allowed a state to call 
a special meeting of the compact commission to address substantive concerns over 
the operation of the compact. All three states did not have to first agree to a special 
meeting (Final Settlement Stipulation 2002, 36).
9. Returning to the Republican River Compact settlement, the states devised 
several different conflict-resolution mechanisms. If the compact administration 
cannot settle a dispute, a single state may request non-binding arbitration. If non-
binding arbitration fails to settle the issue, the states, by unanimous consent, may 
use binding arbitration. If unanimous consent for binding arbitration is not forth-
coming, a state may still resort to the U.S. Supreme Court, but only after it has used 
the multiple conflict-resolution mechanisms afforded it under the compact (Final 
Settlement Stipulation 2002, 36–37).
10. Scholars and practitioners of watershed collaboratives often confuse or con-
flate scale and centralization, however. One of the oft-claimed benefits of watershed 
collaboratives is that they encompass watersheds. In practice, many do not; rather, 
they match segments of watersheds, such as the upper portion of a stream or creek, 
or the middle portion of a river.
11. Governments can, of course, be general-purpose—municipalities, counties, 
states, and the national government. As discussed in Chapter 5, they tend to have 
more extensive powers and more diverse sources of funding than do special govern-
ments. As general-purpose governments, they address, act on, balance, compromise, 
and make trade-offs among a whole host of issues. A general-purpose government 
may consider and attempt to balance a variety of water problems, and in turn, water 
problems are considered and balanced against transportation needs, economic 
development, and so forth. As general-purpose governments, and as foundational 
governments in the U.S. federal system, they provide the institutional structure 
around which governance is created. They provide the means by which governments 
and citizens within their jurisdictions create and follow common sets of laws and 
settle disputes.
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12. New York City turned to the Delaware River Basin for water after towns, 
farmers, and other water users in the Hudson River Basin strenuously opposed fur-
ther water supply projects (Albert 2005).
13. As Derthick (1974, 51) explained, “The executive branch maintained that 
the proposal would require the federal government to yield certain of its consti-
tutional powers to ‘a third form of government’ responsible to neither the federal 
government nor the states.”
14. The commission is guided in its licensing program by its comprehensive 
plan. The commission is required to approve licenses that do not conflict with the 
plan. The term “comprehensive plan” is somewhat of a misnomer since the plan does 
not consider the many dimensions of the watershed and human impacts on those 
dimensions. Also, it is not integrated—it does not attempt to balance and make 
trade-offs among the many different aspects of the watershed that it governs—and 
it is not prospective. Rather, the comprehensive plan is a loose compilation of the 
commission’s standards, regulations, policy statements, operating rules for water 
projects, and licenses issued. The commission does engage in more prospective and 
integrated planning through what is called the Water Resources Plan. The Water 
Resources Plan, which was just completed in 2004 after an extensive public par-
ticipation process, establishes a framework to guide the actions of the commission 
and the states for the next thirty years. The plan consists of five key results areas, 
with goals and objectives identified for each of the areas. The areas are sustainable 
water use and water supply, waterway corridor management, linking land and water 
resource management, institutional coordination and cooperation, and education 
and involvement for stewardship (DRBC 2004).
15. The Beltzville Reservoir, located on a tributary of the Lehigh River, holds up 
to 39,830 acre-feet of water. The Blue Marsh Reservoir on the Schuylkill River holds 
14,600 acre-feet of water (Featherstone 1999, 67).
16. As Derthick (1974, 71) explains, “Unable to deliver commitments from the 
federal government or to state a unified position, the federal commissioner . . . typi-
cally reports the positions of federal agencies. He is an ‘ambassador’ rather than a 
‘commissioner.’ ”
17. For instance, once it became apparent that the federal government would 
not be building large water projects in the basin, the commission turned to other 
alternatives to expand water storage (Featherstone 1999). The commission decided 
to pursue the expansion of a reservoir by raising the dam. In order to pay for the 
expansion, the commission wanted to impose a tax on all basin water users, which 
required an amendment to the compact. The compact forbids imposing taxes on 
pre-compact water users. Although the commission and the states were prepared 
to support such a compact amendment, petroleum refineries and steel companies, 
who were major water users, managed to gain sufficient support in the U.S. Senate 
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to prevent congressional approval of the compact amendment. The companies 
believed that they would gain little from the reservoir expansion but pay the bulk 
of the expense (Featherstone 1999, 98).
In the preceding chapters, we have paired analytical discussions of political 
topics in watershed management with case studies of the institutions that 
currently exist in certain locations in the United States. We begin this closing 
chapter with a consideration of those case studies as a group—what their 
similarities and differences reveal and how those lessons relate to the broader 
themes of the overall book, beyond the connections that were drawn in the 
particular chapters in which the cases appeared.
The cases do not represent “successes” and “failures” nor were they 
chosen for that purpose. It is not our intention to show that the institu-
A Rational Embrace?
7
An institutional structure that realigns but does not supersede existing 
authorities is emerging, together with a shared perception of the possi-
bilities and conflicts implicit in managing resources whose requirements 
are partly incompatible. The goal is an ecologically sustainable salmon 
population coexisting with an economically sustainable hydropower sys-
tem. An optimist sees in the still incomplete story of the Columbia basin 
a social system searching for a path to that goal of dual sustainability; a 
pessimist sees resistance to the changes needed before sustainability can 
be realized.
KAi N. LEE (1995, 214)
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tions in some cases have worked well and those in other cases have worked 
poorly. All of the cases—the Santa Ana River watershed in Chapter 1, the 
Platte River Basin in Chapter 3, the Columbia River Basin in Chapter 4, the 
San Gabriel River watershed in Chapter 5, and the Delaware River Basin in 
Chapter 6—exhibit a mix of successes and shortcomings.
To say that is to invite questions of what we mean by successes and 
shortcomings and what criteria we are using for evaluation. As one might 
expect given the nature of resource management in a watershed or any other 
social and ecological system, a mix of criteria is involved. Some criteria for 
assessing success have to do with the conditions of the water resource per 
se—whether declining streamflows or groundwater levels have been stabi-
lized or reversed, whether contamination incidents have been remediated 
and water quality protected or improved. Some have to do with the other 
natural resources associated with the water resource—the protection or res-
toration of fish populations or migratory bird habitat. Some have to do with 
the human communities associated with the water resource—whether con-
flicts over allocation of supplies are addressed and resolved, whether eco-
nomic uses have been sustained, whether the watershed continues to sup-
port local communities. Some have to do with the political character of the 
watershed governance and management institutions themselves—whether 
they provide meaningful opportunities for addressing concerns, expressing 
values, participating in decisions, and holding decision makers accountable. 
Last and definitely not least, some criteria have to do with adaptability—
whether people can modify the institutional arrangements as changes occur 
to resource conditions, the demographic and/or economic composition, or 
the political and cultural values within the watershed.
Such a multifaceted composite does not lend itself to a scale along 
which one could arrange the five cases from “best performing” to “worst 
performing.” This type of assessment presumes a single evaluation criterion, 
which we do not have. Neither do watersheds, at least in the real world. Our 
conclusion that each case exhibits a mix of successes and shortcomings fol-
lows from our multiple evaluation criteria and from the particular selection 
of cases.
Why include multiple cases, if we cannot rate or rank them, and if each 
ends up as an amalgam of accomplishment and disappointment? Any reader 
might pose such a sensible question, and we offer two answers. First, each 
case has connected with points being made in the respective chapters—
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Box 7.1 Case Studies Used in the Previous Chapters 
	 Principal	issue	highlighted	 Distinct
Case	 in	the	case	study	 organizational	feature
Santa Ana River Watershed complexity and A joint-powers agency at
   watershed (Chapter 1)    dynamics    the watershed scale
Platte River Basin Politics of boundary definition, An administrative agree-
   (Chapter 3)    decision making, and     ment among states and
    accountability    the federal government
Columbia River Basin Limits on human decision A congressionally created
   (Chapter 4)    capabilities: bounded     river basin council
    rationality and transaction 
    costs
San Gabriel River Specialization and coordination Absence of any watershed-
   watershed (Chapter 5)    in a multi-organizational    scale organization or 
    setting    agency
Delaware River Basin Federalism and the challenges A federal-interstate
   (Chapter 6)    and possibilities of coordination     commission
    among governments
about complexity and uncertainty (the Santa Ana River case in Chapter 1), 
about the politics of decision-making structures (the Platte River case in 
Chapter 3), about the challenges posed by bounded rationality and trans-
action costs (the Columbia River case in Chapter 4), about the prospects 
for differentiation by function and scale as an alternative to organizational 
integration (the San Gabriel River case in Chapter 5), and about the politi-
cal capabilities and complications of federalism (the Delaware River case in 
Chapter 6). Second, each case presents both common and distinct lessons 
compared with the others.
LEssoNs fRom thE cAsEs
No two cases among our five have the same organizational structures and 
institutional rules. Each therefore represents a distinct possibility for govern-
ing and managing a complex resource system. Thus, together they reinforce 
our overall position that the search for a best way of organizing watershed 
management is a misplaced undertaking.
Instead, common to all of the cases is a polycentric, indeed federal, style 
of governance. This polycentric, federal style features
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	 nested and overlapping jurisdictions (i.e., a mix of Type I and Type II 
governance structures);
	 differentiation among organizations by function and by scale (i.e., 
multiple organizations participating in watershed governance and 
management that are not mere duplicates of one another);
	 representation of diverse communities of interest through various 
public jurisdictions and private associations (sometimes implicitly 
but usually explicitly recognizing the politics of position and identity 
that are present within a watershed); and
	 multiple nodes and pathways for data gathering, communica-
tion, deliberation, and participation in decision making (provid-
ing some redundancy as well as some coordination and means of 
accountability).
The fact that we can identify these common features of the polycentric, fed-
eral style of watershed governance is not at odds with our statement above 
that no two cases have the same organizational structures and institutional 
rules. Polycentric and federal systems can take a variety of forms in water-
sheds as in other political settings.
Another commonality among the cases is the dynamism of governing 
and managing complex adaptive systems. All of the cases are ongoing stories 
of the relationships between complex social and ecological systems, which 
have changed and are changing over time. In each case, human beings have 
managed to make some progress toward the “dual sustainability” Lee men-
tions in the quote at the beginning of the chapter, even though in each case, 
plenty of problems remain unsolved and challenges lie ahead. This point is 
worth some further discussion, with specific illustrations.
In each watershed, the natural resource management agenda has 
changed significantly over time, usually for a combination of reasons that 
include emerging problems, improved information, changed social values, 
and new opportunities. The loss of fish populations in the Santa Ana and 
Columbia Rivers, for example, and the threat to several species in the Big 
Bend region of the Platte River occurred during the twentieth century (and 
persist in the twenty-first), but the attention paid to those losses rose because 
of better information, increased public concerns, and legislative mandates. 
Groundwater contamination in the San Gabriel Valley, which had been 
developing for decades, came to the attention of the public and policy mak-
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ers through improved information, and the efforts to remediate it (rather 
than simply abandon the groundwater basin as a source of supply) benefited 
from economic growth and technological advance. Plans for construction 
of flood control, water supply, and hydropower facilities on the Delaware 
and Platte Rivers were scaled back or canceled because of changing public 
attitudes, economic realities, and new opportunities to meet water demands 
through increased efficiency and conservation. River restoration efforts just 
getting under way in the San Gabriel River watershed reflect changes in 
public values for water resources, as a postindustrial population appreciates 
the recreational and aesthetic dimensions of river channels as much as their 
utility for disposing of municipal and industrial wastes.
None of this is meant to dismiss or minimize the ecological damage that 
has been done and continues in these watersheds; rather, the point is that in 
each watershed, both the ecological systems and the social systems changed, 
and the current state of affairs in each place emerges from the interactions of 
those social and ecological systems. In each case, institutional arrangements 
have been created and modified by people over time in response to changed 
awareness and understanding of problems, changes in the set of tools avail-
able for addressing them, and changing public attitudes and preferences. 
Some older institutions have been left in place, others modified, and others 
replaced. In each case, people have faced choices about whether to add new 
tasks to existing organizations or add new organizations; sometimes they 
have chosen the former and other times the latter. And in each case, the 
set of institutional arrangements in place at this moment is complex, with 
multiple public and private organizations working on different dimensions 
of watershed problems at different scales, with varying degrees of specializa-
tion, coordination, integration, success, and failure.
compLEx systEms, DEcompositioN, AND NoNcENtRALizAtioN
These observations relate to one of our broader themes. Although resources 
in a watershed are interrelated, watersheds are complex systems with some-
what decomposable features and problems, and people have often con-
structed institutional systems in ways that address or take into account that 
near-decomposability.1 More precisely, people have used institutions to 
bound problems and recognize communities of interest within the water-
shed—establishing one set of rules for allocating flows on the main stem of 
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a river, for instance, and other sets of rules for allocating extractions from 
one or more groundwater resources in the same watershed, or creating sepa-
rate jurisdictions for the upper and lower areas of a watershed and then 
tying those jurisdictions together through a compact, court decree, or other 
institutional mechanism. These are political choices, but that does not mean 
they should be lamented or overturned. Using the San Gabriel River case as 
an example, it is just as reasonable to argue that (1) the pumpers from each 
of the four major groundwater basins in the San Gabriel River watershed, 
for instance, really are relevant communities of interest with respect to the 
allocation of pumping rights; while (2) the lower watershed area as a whole 
and the upper watershed area as a whole are the relevant communities of 
interest with respect to dividing the flows and monitoring the water quality 
of the river main stem; and (3) the municipalities and private water suppli-
ers overlying the contamination plumes in the Main San Gabriel Basin really 
are differently positioned with respect to the costs and benefits of contami-
nation remediation than others located elsewhere in the watershed. That 
different organizational structures have been devised for addressing these 
different problems and communities of interest within the San Gabriel River 
watershed is not necessarily fragmentation, or even mere political expedi-
ency; it can be seen instead as a combination of rational problem-solving 
strategy (decomposing a system into components that can be addressed 
more manageably by boundedly rational people) with political realism (to 
paraphrase the observation by Lebel et al. [2005] concerning the politics of 
scale, position, and place within a river basin: although everyone is in the 
same watershed, everyone is not in the same boat).
Each of the river basins and watersheds covered in the case studies is 
organized in ways that recognize and demonstrate the significance of com-
munities of interest and identity, including ones that do not conform to 
the watershed’s physical boundaries. In the basins where some form of 
basin-wide governance system was adopted—the Platte, the Columbia, the 
Delaware—already organized communities of interest have played signif-
icant roles, both in working with basin-wide efforts and in undermining 
basin-wide efforts. Furthermore, in each of those basins, the initial effort 
(or at least desire) to manage resources on a basin-wide scale has gradually 
given way to recognition of the necessity or preferability of organizing at 
least some efforts on a smaller scale. In the Columbia River Basin, fish and 
wildlife recovery programs are being decomposed to the sub-basin scale; in 
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the Delaware River Basin, states eventually agreed to an institutional divi-
sion of various reaches of the river so they could do their own planning for 
water-supply distribution; and in the Platte River Basin, each state took on 
the task of regulating the water-use behavior of its own residents in order to 
meet the states’ obligations to one another and the objectives in the coop-
erative agreement. Thus, in all of the case studies, the tendency has been to 
create organizations at a variety of scales, sometimes moving toward and at 
other times moving away from a watershed-wide focus.
The principle of decomposition has been applied in these watersheds 
not only spatially but topically. Although fish and wildlife recovery is clearly 
linked to the operation of hydropower and flood-control facilities, or the 
control of groundwater withdrawals is linked to the flows of hydrologically 
connected rivers, or the remediation of contamination is linked to the avail-
ability of water supplies for municipal and industrial uses or for irrigation, 
and so on, people in the watersheds we included in this book have often 
chosen to create separate organizations and employ separate staff to focus 
on facility operation, groundwater use, fish and wildlife recovery, or the 
cleanup of underground pollution plumes. These choices have been affected 
to some degree by historical developments and/or jurisdictional jealousies 
(i.e., they are “path dependent”), but they also reflect a recognition of the 
limitations of human beings as information processors. As Chapters 1 and 4 
particularly emphasized, the information requirements implicit in compre-
hensive integrated management of water or any other natural resources are 
enormous, and the information and decision-making capabilities of people 
are, well, not.
People are capable of a great deal of knowledge and creativity, but it 
is also well within the sensible judgment of boundedly rational people to 
decompose interrelated problems in a complex system and have different 
individuals or groups focus on them. Of course, when this option is cho-
sen, mechanisms for communication, information sharing, and coordina-
tion must be devised, established, and maintained. There are risks of error 
proneness with either choice. When boundedly rational people attempt 
comprehensiveness and integration, they face risks of imperfectly under-
standing micro-level and subsystem patterns, selecting and paying attention 
to the wrong indicators of resource conditions, persisting in policies while 
system-scale indicators remain acceptable even though smaller-scale condi-
tions are going awry, and so on. When boundedly rational people choose to 
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institutionally subdivide a complex system and address its decomposable 
units separately, they face risks such as overlooking externalities and, among 
individuals in separate organizations, failing to communicate effectively 
with one another and coordinate actions.
There are substantial challenges of coordination in multi-organizational 
structure, but this needs to be viewed realistically in terms of trade-offs. It 
is simply not possible to trade in all the coordination problems of a multi-
 organizational system for a better-functioning single organization. Integrated 
organizations have coordination problems of their own (see Department 
of Homeland Security) and lack some of the advantages of polycentric 
structures. In a world where information, communication, coordination, 
and decision making are all costly and imperfect, there are always trade-
offs between the costs and benefits of organizational integration on the one 
hand and organizational differentiation on the other. It is therefore to be 
expected that the balance struck between them will differ from one water-
shed to another, as it has in the cases in this book.
obsERvAtioNs oN fRAgmENtAtioN
We mentioned above that polycentric systems need not be dismissed merely 
as fragmentation. The relationship between fragmentation on the one hand 
and noncentralized, polycentric, or federal systems on the other bears some 
further discussion. There are four important considerations as we reflect 
upon the concern with fragmentation.
First, fragmentation is clearly a real problem in institutional design. 
For instance, the fragmentation of water resource responsibilities across so 
many federal agencies (such as the Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation, Fish 
and Wildlife, National Marine Fisheries Service, EPA) has presented real 
obstacles to progress in some of the cases we have described. Organizations 
in a watershed can indeed work at cross-purposes, failing to coordinate their 
actions and putting “turf” interests ahead of other concerns. As we have 
noted, the proliferation of agencies and organizations within a watershed is 
not an intrinsically good thing.
The second consideration concerns whether the presence of multiple 
organizations working on various dimensions of natural resource issues 
within a watershed constitutes undesirable fragmentation or sensible dif-
ferentiation. This is an empirical question, not one with an a priori answer. 
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In examining the institutional landscape of a watershed, observers should 
not merely take a census of public and private entities but look at what 
they do and how they relate to one another. Looking at what they do, it is 
worthwhile to consider whether institutions and organizations have been 
created to address different geographic scales, distinct problems, or issues; 
to finance and operate specific projects; or to try to assess whether and to 
what degree multiple organizations merely duplicate one another or have 
been established to take advantages of specialization or scale. Looking at 
how they relate to one another, it is important to search for the connections 
as well as the distinctions between organizations. A simple census of public 
and private organizations in a watershed will not reveal whether there are 
also coordinating institutional mechanisms such as contracts, compacts, 
memoranda of understanding, stipulated judgments, court decrees, joint-
powers agreements, and the like. Any conclusion about whether a particular 
watershed enjoys the benefits of an “institutionally rich environment” or is 
beset by “fragmentation and duplication”—or more realistically, where it is 
situated on a spectrum between those poles—depends on a closer exami-
nation. The case studies in this book illustrate some of the institutional 
arrangements that can connect organizations and coordinate activities in a 
watershed even in the absence of a comprehensive watershed management 
authority.
Third, some manner of fragmentation will be present no matter how 
natural resource management and protection is organized. In large part this 
is an unavoidable consequence of the presence of multiple communities of 
interest and identity in a complex social system. In Chapter 4, for example, 
we noted that each state in the Columbia River Basin has its own laws and 
regulations governing water use, logging, and fishing. Suppose as an alter-
native (another thought experiment, if you will) that rules for water use, 
logging, and fishing were set on a watershed-by-watershed basis rather than 
state-by-state. Now shift your focus to a state in the Columbia Basin, say, 
Oregon. Some of Oregon is in the Columbia Basin and some is not. If rules 
for water use, logging, and fishing were established on a watershed basis, 
Oregonians owning property, doing business, or pursuing recreation in dif-
ferent parts of the state would be subject to differing rules. Real communi-
ties of interest and identity, including states, tribes, cities, and counties as 
well as interest groups, exist in every watershed and need to be taken into 
account. Identified as “Columbia Basin dwellers,” the community is subject 
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to fragmented rules owing to the differences among states; identified as 
“Oregonians,” the community would be subject to fragmented rules owing 
to the differences among watersheds. One can make a reasoned or even an 
impassioned argument that the latter type of fragmentation is preferable to 
the former, but one cannot argue effectively that one arrangement repre-
sents “fragmentation” and the other does not.2
Fourth and finally, in addition to the thought that watershed-by-water-
shed rule making would substitute one kind of fragmentation for another, 
there is the question of which watersheds “count.” Staying with Oregon and 
the Columbia Basin, consider the watershed of the Willamette River. The 
Willamette flows into the Columbia—should the rules governing water 
use, logging, fishing, and so forth in the Willamette watershed be subsumed 
within the Columbia Basin, or is the Willamette “big” enough, “important” 
enough, “distinctive” enough to have its own governing body making rules 
for natural resource use and protection? Similar questions could be asked 
for tributaries of the Willamette, or for any other watershed nested within 
the Columbia, or for any other watershed within any other watershed any-
where in the United States. The answers to these questions are judgment 
calls. Neither science nor nature can answer them. As we noted in Chapter 1, 
we cannot just let nature do the choosing for us. The choice of boundaries 
for governing bodies for the management and protection of water, or any 
other natural resources, and the choice of organizational structures, deci-
sion rules, and so forth are political choices—unavoidably, inescapably, and 
essentially political choices.
The case studies in this book illustrate to a small extent the variety of 
political choices that are available in managing watersheds. As we have seen, 
even decision rules can vary, not only from place to place but from time to 
time and from one kind of decision to another. In some of the organizations 
in the Delaware and Columbia Basins, unanimity rules (consensus require-
ments) were modified over time to super-majority rules. In the Columbia, 
Platte, and Delaware Basins, the degree of agreement needed for major 
modifications to basin plans or cooperative agreements is different from the 
degree of agreement needed for day-to-day administrative decisions. In the 
San Gabriel River watershed, modifying the apportionment of river flows 
between the upper and lower areas is subject to a different decision rule 
than modifying the apportionment of pumping rights within any of the 
major groundwater basins, or modifying the funding and implementing of 
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groundwater cleanup projects in the Main San Gabriel Basin, or approving 
river restoration projects through the Lower Los Angeles and San Gabriel 
Rivers and Mountains Conservancy.
A (soRt of) bottom LiNE
From the theoretical arguments we have presented in the preceding chap-
ters and from the case studies, it appears to us that effective management of 
watersheds cannot be comprehensive and integrated into a single jurisdic-
tion, but neither can it be the job of nongovernmental collaborative part-
nerships alone. The former option is foreclosed by the limits on human 
capabilities and the complexity of natural resource systems and social sys-
tems and fails to take advantage of some of the benefits that can be gained 
through organizational diversity (i.e., advantages of functional specializa-
tion and scale differentiation). The latter option confronts problems of col-
lective action that are familiar in political economy. Governmental power is 
often needed to overcome free-rider tendencies, to raise funds, and to make 
and enforce authoritative policies. Consensus-based collaborative processes 
can also lead to gridlock, as we noted in Chapter 3, when interests benefited 
by the status quo use their implicit “veto” by withholding their agreement 
and blocking consensus.
Collaborative partnerships are pretty heavily dependent on who chooses 
to be involved, and involvement is a challenge to sustain over time. And even 
with respect to initial involvement, there are a number of potentially vex-
ing questions. Can someone (an individual, an interest group, a business, 
a municipality, etc.) opt in voluntarily and make their values and interests 
count in watershed decision making whether or not others think they should 
be involved? Can someone opt out voluntarily, escaping costs or other bur-
dens borne by those who remain? Can a collaborative, perhaps even non-
governmental, watershed council or partnership make someone participate? 
How are voluntary partners/collaborators held to commitments?
Between the ideal of the integrated authority and the ideal of the collab-
orative partnership, what remains? The polycentric structures of federal sys-
tems and politics. In the “federal watershed,” a mix of Type I jurisdictions and 
nongovernmental organizations may represent communities of identity and 
interest, and a number of Type II jurisdictions may be created and employed 
to pursue specialization and scale advantages. A combination of smaller 
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(and more directly participatory) local arrangements with overlapping (and 
more likely representative rather than directly participatory) organizations 
at larger scales strives to balance the autonomy of local arrangements to do 
their own thing with the need to have some way of ensuring that actions 
by one local arrangement in one subsystem do not impose harm on other 
subsystems.
There is no single organizational model for this kind of combina-
tion. We are left instead with adding to, modifying, and subtracting from 
the organizational array in place at a given time as conditions (social and 
ecological) change, or as our understanding of them changes. But that is 
not a bad thing. Indeed, it makes sense that one must monitor complex 
adaptable institutional systems, just as one would closely monitor com-
plex adaptive ecological systems, with an eye toward learning and an open-
ness to changing course. As we observed in Chapter 6, federal systems 
depend heavily upon the presence of individuals who know what they are 
doing—not only with respect to the ecological sciences but the social sci-
ences too. Fortunately, operating within a culture of federalism can also 
help cultivate those skills. People are capable of operating at multiple lev-
els of action, playing different roles in diverse arenas, and coordinating 
their behavior with one another. In the federal watershed more specifi-
cally, this means finding and skillfully employing the kinds of mechanisms 
of inter-organizational coordination we have pointed to—memoranda of 
understanding; inter-organizational agreements, contracts, and compacts; 
stipulated judgments and court decrees; joint-powers agencies; decision 
rules that encourage consensus but allow matters to come to a vote if con-
sensus is not reached.
two chEERs foR poLitics
The preceding discussion is not intended to be a defense of the status quo 
in water resources management in the United States (or elsewhere). A great 
deal of both the past and the status quo is pretty indefensible. Important 
interests, values, and communities have been left out for too long, and some 
rules that made sense 150 years ago do not necessarily make sense today or 
looking toward the future (e.g., the first come, first served rigidity of the 
prior appropriation doctrine). The attraction of ideas such as grassroots 
environmental management and collaborative environmental management 
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has a lot to do with overcoming past exclusion and bringing new interests 
and values into policy making on a more nearly equal footing with estab-
lished ones.
One way to think about the governance of watersheds is in terms of 
constitutions. Earlier we referred to institutional arrangements as consti-
tutions establishing numerous “water governments” in the United States. 
Constitutions, understood in this broader sense, establish and contain 
rules concerning who participates in decision making and how, how com-
munities of identity and interest will be represented, how authority over 
various decisions is allocated among a number of different entities—in 
short, who can do what, under which conditions, and with what limita-
tions. Constitutions embody commitments that allow individuals and 
communities to make decisions and allocate resources with some assurance 
about “the rules of the game.” But any constitution worth having will also 
be adaptable, accommodating the establishment of new rules and entities 
when they are really needed. Constitutions can freeze in place rules that 
once made sense but no longer do. Our repeated references in this book to 
complex, adaptable systems of institutions were intended to convey pre-
cisely this point.
Constitutional questions and decisions are not merely political, or sort 
of political. They are essentially political. The politics of watershed manage-
ment—the politics of creating new organizations alongside old ones and 
figuring out their boundaries and interrelationships, the politics of estab-
lishing and modifying representation and decision rules (one person–one 
vote, one community–one vote, hierarchy–consensus/unanimity, super-
majority–majority, veto points–deference to experts, etc.), the politics of 
distributing benefits and costs, and, above all, the politics of establishing 
policy directions in an unavoidably multi-organizational setting—is frus-
trating, time-consuming, costly, and unavoidable.
Politics in the watershed, then, is not just some residue of the past to 
be overcome. It is also how we change the present and anticipate the future. 
Politics and institutions are not just how individuals and communities pro-
tect their interests. Politics and institutions are also how we accomplish 
change. The politics of watersheds is to be embraced, if not with joy, then 
with a reflective understanding that this is how imperfect people living in a 
complex social and natural environment have to deal with one another and 
their world. It is how we get things done.
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NotEs
1. We mean near-decomposability in the same sense as Herbert Simon (1996); 
namely, that complex systems are composed of parts that themselves can be consid-
ered distinctly even while recognizing that they are connected to the other system 
components. Decomposability should not be confused with decentralization.
2. The only way to eliminate this kind of “fragmentation” (i.e., different sets 
of governing rules confronting people who can be identified as within the same 
community of interest or identity) is to replace both jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
and watershed-by-watershed governance with a single set of federal rules governing 
water use, logging, fishing, and so forth, an option that strikes us as neither likely 
nor desirable.
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